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Abstract 
I 
Abstract 
The IPO underpricing phenomenon has existed for a long time in stock markets around 
the world, although its magnitude varies from country to country. However, the evidence 
regarding IPO over-performance or underperformance in the long-run is mixed. The 
purpose of this thesis is to examine the long-run performance of IPOs in Thailand using 
various methods to ascertain the significance of the over- or under-performance of IPOs. 
The Thai stock market is a relatively new stock exchange compared to established stock 
markets. Therefore, there are not yet many public companies listed on the Thai market. 
Consequently, one of the ambitions of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) is to 
stimulate market activity and increase the number of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in 
Thailand. This may mean that a close study of a number of important issues related to the 
Thai IPO stock market is particularly interesting. The thesis, therefore, investigates three 
inter-related empirical issues concerning the Thai IPOs listed on the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) and the Market for Alternative Investment (MAI) during the period 2001 
to 2012.  
The first empirical study re-examined the evidence from the long-run returns. The three-
year stock returns of the IPOs were investigated using Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR), Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR), and Wealth Relatives (WR). This 
study further compared abnormal returns with various alternative benchmarks, such as the 
CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) Three-Factor (FF) models, the Size Control Portfolio 
(SD) model, the eight industry benchmarks, and also more robust statistical tests. The 
calendar-time approach based on the market model with an additional liquidity factor as 
well as Fama-French and Carhart models were applied for verifying long-run abnormal 
returns. This study provided robust evidence that Thai IPOs underperform in the long-run, 
irrespective of alternative benchmarks and methods. However, the results are sensitive 
not only to the methodology used, but also to the exact-time-period chosen and the size 
effect from big-sized companies going public in the sample period. If they omitted the 
two big firms from the IPO sample and considered the equally-weighted CAR and 
BHAR, the event-time returns related to CAPM, FF and SD models and the calendar-time 
approach, they would conclude that they cannot earn any abnormal returns irrespective of 
the alternative benchmarks and weighting methods used. In the same vein, after 
controlling for firm size, the long-term over-performance will disappear for Thai IPOs. 
Abstract 
II 
The second empirical study examines the relationship between the intended uses of IPO 
proceeds disclosure and the under-pricing and long-run performance of IPOs. The results 
reveal that the levels of use-of-proceeds disclosures reduce firms’ cost of capital. This 
study also suggests that firms disclosed use-of-proceeds for investment has negative 
effects on IPO underpricing. The findings also indicate that the proportion of common 
shares owned by the Thai government provides a positive signal for IPO over-
performance in the long-run. For the effect of the use-of-proceeds purposes, this study 
suggests that ‘Investment’ IPOs perform better in the long-run than ‘Debt Repayment’ 
IPOs. The final empirical study investigated the relationship between IPOs’ pricing 
effects and their subsequent classification as speculative investments. The findings 
showed a significant positive relationship between the magnitude of the IPO underpricing 
and the probability of an IPO firm being officially classified as speculative on the 
Turnover List (TOL). The results also revealed that a six-month abnormal return after 
going public increases the probability of speculative dealing in the IPOs.  
There are several implications for this study. The findings may therefore be useful for 
investors, security analysts, and companies and regulators in many other emerging 
markets beyond Thailand. Given the conflicting results of poor post-IPO stock market 
performance, investors may do better holding Thai IPOs for a short period with the 
likelihood of gaining a higher return. In addition, the results help investors to identify 
which characteristics are associated with more over-performance or underperformance, 
which will be informative to them when formulating their investment strategies. For the 
IPO firms, endogenous information disclosure of intended use-of-proceeds could be used 
as another signaling factor, but it creates a trade-off between the benefit of reducing 
information asymmetry and the costs associated with revealing information and possible 
litigation. Additionally, the findings from the third empirical work in this thesis are 
particularly useful for SET and SEC, enabling the Thai authorities to monitor IPOs that 
have a high probability of becoming speculative stocks in the future and so be able to 
warn investors about the risks associated with trading in them. Regulators may also use 
the probability of Turnover List risk as one of the benchmarks to measure the success of 
the rules they impose on companies planning to go public. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Background to the Research Area 
The ultimate goal for any firms is ‘Going Public’ via an initial public offering of shares to 
investors. Going public marks an important watershed in the life of a young company 
(Ljungqvist, 2007). An Initial Public Offering (IPO) is defined as the first offer of stock 
by a private company to the public. IPOs are generally issued by firms seeking or raising 
capital in order to create a public market in which founders and other shareholders can 
convert some of their wealth into cash at a future date and the IPO issuers will obtain the 
assistance of underwriters or investment banks (Ritter and Welch, 2002). Further, an IPO 
provides access to public fund and so may lower the cost of capital and reflects on the 
firm’s investments and operations. Importantly, IPO companies are expected to contribute 
to economic development through innovation and job creation (Giudici and Roosenboom, 
2004; Takahashi and Yamada, 2015).  
Indeed, there are several anomalies of IPOs, the most common one being the ‘IPO 
Underpricing’ phenomenon, which refers to the statistically and economically significant 
positive initial returns on the first-trading day after going public. Early studies such as 
Ibbotson (1975) claimed that when firms go public their shares tend to be underpriced, in 
that the share price jumps substantially on the first trading day. However, the magnitude 
of underpricing varies substantially from one market to another with IPOs in developed 
markets being more fully priced than those traded in emerging markets. Therefore, most 
investors believe that if they subscribe for IPOs, they can make profits and gain high 
initial returns. Figure 1.1 shows evidence of IPO underpricing across countries. The 
second anomaly of IPOs is the ‘Hot-Issue’ phenomenon, whereby observed IPO activity 
exhibits significant, and to some extent predictable variations over time. Ritter (1984), 
Ibbotson et al. (1994) and Lowry and Schwert (2002) found that there is a positive 
association between IPO underpricing and future IPO activity. This indicated that periods 
of high IPO volume tend to follow periods of high initial returns.  
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Another important phenomenon is that IPOs tend to underperform company benchmarks 
in the long-run
1
.  Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) found evidence of substantial negative 
abnormal returns of IPOs in the long horizon period. They suggested that a reason for 
long-term underperformance of IPOs is a possible overvaluation in the early aftermarket 
trading.   Ritter (1991) argued that IPO companies intend to go public when investors are 
over-optimistic about the company’s future growth potential. However, while the 
majority of studies find that IPO firms in general are found to underprice their IPOs (see 
Figure 1.1), the empirical evidence on the long-run performance of IPOs and the hot-issue 
phenomenon in each stock exchange is still controversial. Especially for the long-run IPO 
stock performance, different findings are observed when various methods are used to 
measure stock market performance in the long-run. There is a debate in the IPO literature 
(e.g. Loughran and Ritter; Barber and Lyon, 1997; Fama, 1998; Lyon et al., 1999; 
Gompers and Lerner, 2003) on the measurement problem involved in estimating long-run 
stock market performance, such as which benchmark to use to estimate abnormal returns 
and how to construct test statistics.       
Consequently, IPO activity has attracted the attention of researchers and policy-makers, 
leading to a substantial amount of empirical studies in the financial literature. To this end, 
one can conclude that several important issues have been covered in the previous studies, 
such as IPO pricing, the operating performance of IPOs, the initial underpricing, 
performance of IPOs in the long-run, the relation between the economy and the IPOs, and 
the characteristics of the IPOs (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Carter et al., 1998; Jelic et al., 
2001; Kirkulak and Davis, 2005; Kenourgios et al., 2007; Kirkulak and Davis, 2005; 
Dimovski, et al., 2011; Su and Bangassa, 2011; Chen et al, 2004; Su, 2004; Ahmad et al., 
2011; Costa et al., 2013 among others). In particular the empirical IPO literature has 
become increasingly sophisticated econometrically, focusing on testing variety 
hypotheses such as asymmetric information, principal-agent, a signal of firm quality, 
institutional explanations and ownership and control. 
 
                                                        
1 See Ritter, 1991; Kooli and Suret, 2004; Álvarez and González, 2005; Akhigbe et al., 2006; Mazouz et al., 2008; Su 
and Bangassa, 2011; Thomadakis et al., 2012; Wen and Cao, 2013; Agathee et al., 2014 and among others. The author 
intensively details and discusses evidence of long-term performance of IPOs in Chapter 2 Section 2.2.   
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Figure 1.1 Selected empirical evidence on the ‘IPO Underpricing’ phenomenon across countries 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Bayley et al. (2006) 1995-2000 419 26.7% 
Dimovski et al. (2011) 1994-2000 380 29.6% 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Chen et al. (2004) 1992-1997 818 298% 
Chi and Padgett (2005) 1996-2000 668 129.2% 
Yu and Tse (2006) 1995-1998 343a 123.6% 
Gannon and Zhou (2008) 2003 293a 76.6% 
Guo and Brooks (2008) 2001-2005 286a 93.5% 
Gao (2010) 2006-2008 217 157% 
a A-share in shanghai, reserved for domestic Chinese 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Minardi et al. (2015) 2004-2012 138 4.5% 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Hahl et al. (2014) 1994-2006 67 15.6% 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Ljungqvist (1997) 1970-1993 180 9.2% 
Note: Year: Period of study; N: Sample size; and IR: Average Initial Return (IPO Underpricing), which is average (usually equally-weighted mean) returns calculated from offering price to the closed price of the first trading day. 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Darmadi and Gunawan 
(2013) 
2003-2011 101 22% 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Beckman et al. (2001) 1980-1998 216 31.5% 
Kirkulak and Davis (2005) 1998-2002 687 42.6% 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Paudyal et al. (1998) 1984-1995 95 61.8% 
Jelic et al. (2001) 1980-1995 182 99% Malaysia 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Chi et al. (2010) 1991-2005 114 5.9% 
New Zealand 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Allen et al. (1999) 1985-1992 151 63.5% 
Chorruk and 
Worthington (2010) 
1997-2007 136 17.6% 
Boonchuaymetta and 
Chuanrommanee (2013) 
2001-2011 153 18% 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Espenlaub and Tonks (2000) 1986-1991 428 12.2% 
Burrowers and Jones (2004) 1995-1997 125b 15.7% 
Goergen et al. (2007) 1991-1995 228 9.7% 
b Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the UK, reserved for 
small- and medium size companies.  
Author (s) Year N IR  
Ritter (1991) 1975-1984 1,526 14.3% 
Ritter and Welch (2002) 1980-2001 6,249 18.8% 
Bradley et al. (2009) 1993-2003 2,531 30.8% 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Heerden and 
Alagidede (2012) 
2006-2010 138 108.3% 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Durakan (2002) 1990-1997 173 14.6% 
Mauritius Author (s) Year N IR  
Agathee et al. (2012) 1989-2010 44 13.1% 
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 Korea 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Cho and Lee (2013) 2001-2008 591 71.6% 
Thailand 
Hong Kong 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Mazouz et al. (2009) 1994-2007 558 15.9% 
Nigeria 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Adjasi et al. (2011) 1990-2006 125 43.1% 
 
 
Canada 
 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Algebaly et al. (2013) 1992-2009 163 24% 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Handa and Singh 
(2015) 
2001-2012 127 19.9% 
Author (s) Year N IR  
Kooli and Suret (2004) 1991-1998 445 20.6% 
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With regard to IPOs in Thailand, there are a few empirical studies investigating IPO 
performance in the long-run (e.g. Allen et al., 1999; Chorruk and Worthington, 2010), but 
they have only used the SET index as a benchmark, with more emphasis on the event-
time approach. Their findings indicating that Thai IPOs either over-perform or 
underperform in the long-run are still mixed. This is due to the fact and problem that the 
benchmark used may not adequately adjust for risk and the methods used are subject to 
various statistical biases. In addition, prior studies on the Thai market employ the event-
time approach and have not fully addressed the measurement problems which have been 
subject to intense debate in studies involving long-horizon returns. The author therefore 
takes steps to address the measurement problems and re-appraises the robustness of 
existing Thai evidence.  
Moreover, there are other studies related to IPO event in the Thai context. For instance, 
Lonkani and Firth (2005) demonstrated the accuracy of earnings forecasts and its 
relationship with the information reported in the Thai prospectuses such as the size and 
age of firms and the leverage ratios and the IPO performance. In the same vein, 
Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012) examined the governance reform following the 1997 
East Asian financial crisis and its effect on Thai IPO underpricing. Recently, 
Boonchuaymetta and Chuanrommanee (2013) investigated the relationships between the 
following six major factors, namely underwriter reputation, ownership concentration, 
book-building, IPO allocation, the length of the silent (lock-up) period, and investor 
interest and IPO underpricing. However, they never considered how the narrative 
information reported on the IPO prospectus
2
, which plays an important role for IPO 
investment analysis due to it being the first source of information for the listed company, 
especially the ‘Intended Use-of-Proceeds Disclosure,’ affects IPO pricing and the long-
term performance of Thai IPOs. Interestingly, there is only a local language version for 
the Thai IPO prospectuses and the uses of IPO proceeds information is also reported in 
the small part of the ‘Executive Summary’ section. Thus, the uniqueness of Thai IPO 
prospectuses has been closely and carefully studied in the present research.           
                                                        
2 Firms typically include information such as company background, management structure, financial statements, 
intended use of proceeds and major shareholders in the prospectus, to assist potential investor for making an informed 
evaluation about the risk associated with the investment. The IPO prospectus provides insight into which types of 
information are selected by a listed firm and its underwriter for presenting the firm in relation to investors and analysts 
(Bukh et al., 2005). 
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Another strand of research pays considerable attention to IPO underpricing and how it 
allows “good” firms to distinguish themselves from “bad” ones and to improve their 
external financing in the future (Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 
1989). Here a good company will find it advantageous to signal its IPO through 
underpricing, while a weak and poor company will not find such underpricing 
worthwhile. Indeed, there are several studies claiming that IPO underpricing is a signal of 
the differenting quality of firms ( Jegadeesh et al., 1993; Su and Fleisher, 1999; Kennedy 
et al., 2006; Kooli and Meknassi, 2007; Espenlaub et al., 2012; Pour and Lasfer, 2013  
among others). Interestingly, during the IPO process, IPO stocks have some features that 
are more likely to be speculated rather than others due to large information asymmetry. 
Here a few studies (See for example Malkiel, 2003 and Hong et al., 2006) show that most 
of the earlier speculative manias were most prominent for IPOs.  Therefore, IPOs should 
transmit some signals identifying speculative stocks in the secondary market. These 
issues, such as reexamining the long-term performance of Thai IPOs, any unique 
information disclosure on the IPO prospectus, and IPOs’ signaling for speculative stock 
detection, are important and have been investigated in this thesis in an attempt to fill 
research gaps in the IPO field.     
For the Thai IPO stock market, the above-mentioned issues are especially interesting to 
analyze for a number of reasons. First, compared to other countries that have established 
markets, such as the USA, the UK, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and others, the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET) is a relatively new stock exchange and many public 
companies have not yet been listed on the Thai market. As can be seen in Figure 1.2, 
since the establishment of SET in 1975 the total number of listed companies has increased 
on average by 19 companies per year. On the other hand, there are just about 700 
common stocks that are being traded on the Thai stock market. One of the ambitions of 
SET, therefore, is to stimulate market activity and increase the number of IPOs. Second, 
the size of IPOs in Thailand is moderately small
3
 and the SET requirements to list IPOs 
differ from those in other countries. This may cause different patterns in Thai IPOs’ 
pricing and thus lead to different price dynamics over time. Third, Thailand has recently 
joined the ASEAN exchange
4
. The ASEAN trading link system was established in 2012 
                                                        
3 The SET is the fourteen-largest market in Asia-Pacific by capitalization, thirteen-largest in terms of the number of 
listed companies (Chorruk and Worthington, 2010). 
4 The ASEAN Exchange is a collaboration of seven exchanges from six South East Asian countries: Indonesia, 
Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. This alliance aims to promote the growth of the ASEAN 
capital markets by streamlining access to ASEAN stocks, introducing cross-border harmonization, and also creating 
ASEAN-centred products.  
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and is designed to enable investors to trade stocks from exchange to exchange more 
easily. There are now three exchanges that are connected to the ASEAN link system: the 
Bursa Malaysia, the Singapore Exchange and the Stock Exchange of Thailand. As a 
result, through their local brokers, investors in Malaysia and Singapore can, for instance, 
conveniently trade in SET and MAI stocks including Thai IPOs. In the future, Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Vietnam will also gain access to the ASEAN link system. Finally, 
Thailand is relatively  small and sparsely traded market, but is nevertheless quite well 
integrated into the global market. The above argument justifies the rational reasons 
supporting  why this thesis focuses on the IPO market in an emerging country, 
particularly Thailand.    
 
Figure 1.2 Number of IPOs and existing companies on the SET, 1975-2014 (Adapted from Chorruk 
and Worthington, 2010) 
1.2 The Thai Stock Market and the IPO Market Background 
This section provides information about the Thai stock market characteristics including 
the Thai capital market, the IPO activities and process, and also the legal, regulatory and 
reporting framework for Thai companies.  
1.2.1 The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET)       
In 1972, the Thai government published the document “Announcement of the Executive 
Council No.58 on the Control of Commercial Undertakings Affecting Public Safety and 
Chapter1: Introduction 
7 
 
Welfare”. This allowed the government to control the operations of finance and securities 
companies which until then had operated freely. These amendments preceded long-
awaited legislation establishing “The Securities Exchange of Thailand” that was finally 
enacted in May 1974. This was followed by revisions to the Revenue Code at the end of 
the year, allowing the investment of savings in the capital market. By 1975 the basic 
legislative framework was in place and then “The Securities Exchange of Thailand” 
officially started trading on April 30, 1975. On January 1, 1991 its name was formally 
changed to “The Stock Exchange of Thailand” or SET5.  
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1992 (SEA) stipulates that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), a single unified supervisory agency, be the regulator of the 
Thai Capital Market. Thus, the SEC oversees the development of the capital market but 
the Bank of Thailand (BoT) takes responsibility for the money market. The SEA also 
provides a clear separation between the primary and the secondary markets to facilitate 
their successful development. However, both primary and secondary markets are 
regulated by the SEC.  A company that wishes to issue new securities must first apply for 
SEC approval and comply with its filing requirements. Then, the SEC needs to ascertain 
the financial status of the company before allowing the firm to issue securities to the 
public. Following the IPO, securities will subsequently be traded in the secondary market 
once the issuer has applied for and been granted approval by the SET. The roles of the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand are defined in the SEA (1992) as follows: i) To serve as a 
centre for the trading of listed securities and to provide the essential systems needed to 
facilitate securities trading; ii) To undertake any business relating to the Securities 
Exchange, such as a clearing house, a securities depository centre, a securities registrar; 
iii.) To undertake any other business approved by the SEC. The regulatory frame work of 
the Thai capital market is shown in Figure 1.3. 
                                                        
5 The beginning of the modern Thai capital market came about as a result of the National Economic and Social 
Development Plan No.1 (1961-1966), which aimed to support economic growth and stability and to develop the quality 
of life of the Thai people. In July 1962, a private group established an organized stock exchange as a limited 
partnership. Its name changed to the “Bangkok Stock Exchange Co., Ltd.” in 1963. However, it was unsuccessful due to 
not having any government support and having a lack of investment knowledge and understanding. As a result, trading 
volume decreased sharply from 114 million Baht in 1968 to 28 million Baht in 1972, by which time the National 
Economic and Social Development Plan No.2 (1967-1971) had been launched to support the establishment of a formal 
stock exchange for the first time in Thailand focusing on the significant role of additional capital to enhance the 
economy and industry.  
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Figure 1.3 Regulatory Framework of the Thai Capital Market (Source: The SET’s website, 2015) 
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1.2.2 Market for Alternative Investments (MAI) 
The Market for Alternative Investments (MAI), or the sub-market, was established in 
1999. It is a source of funding for small or medium-sized enterprises, having over 20 
million Baht (or £4 million, 1 GBP: 50 Baht) in paid-up capital after IPO. However, as far 
as firms applying to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), Thailand for an IPO are 
concerned, there are slight regulatory differences (see Appendix 1B, Pages 17-21). 
The MAI’s purpose is to create new fund-raising opportunities for innovative business 
with high potential growth as well as to provide a greater range of investment 
alternatives. Its vision and mission are to provide new opportunities for long-term quality 
growth and to enable entrepreneurs and small and medium-sized firms to access funds, to 
achieve sustainable growth through transparency and good governance and to strengthen 
their competitiveness through powerful networking.  
1.2.3 Differences between SET and MAI Markets 
The main differences between SET and MAI are as follows. The SET is a market for 
large companies with a requirement of more than 300 million Baht in paid-up capital after 
IPO to raise long-term funds. Paid-up capital is defined as a company’s capital that has 
been funded by shareholders. Paid-up capital represents money that is not borrowed. It is 
usually less than a company’s total capital because a company may not issue all of the 
shares that it has been authorized to sell. A company that is fully paid-up has sold all 
available shares and then cannot raise its capital, except by borrowing money through 
debt, or being authorized to sell more shares. In contrast, the MAI market is a source of 
funding for small or medium-sized enterprises with a requirement of over 20 million Baht 
in paid-up capital after IPO. The MAI market’s listing criteria and regulations are more 
flexible than those in the case of SET in terms of the lower paid-up capital required, the 
fewer consecutive years prior to the qualifying period required for listing, the requirement 
of fewer minority shareholders after public offering (≥300 shareholders for MAI and 
≥1,000 shareholders for SET) and the lower application fees than those for the SET 
market companies. The MAI’s purpose is to create new fundraising opportunities for 
innovative business with high growth potential as well as to provide a greater range of 
investment alternatives. Its mission is to provide new opportunities for long-term quality 
growth and to enable entrepreneurs and small-size or medium-size firms to access funds, 
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to achieve sustainable growth through transparency and good governance, and to 
strengthen competitiveness through networking. 
In addition to this information service, the SET plays an important role for listed 
companies by issuing their securities to the public. They rigorously verify the company 
before issuing the securities to the public and they also cooperate with the SEC in order to 
protect the interests of investors.   The following section briefs about listing regulations 
for new equities. 
1.2.4 Listing Regulations for Common Stocks 
To expand business for a company, the public offering of securities is an alternative 
financing option that has a lower cost than borrowing from financial institutions. Before 
actually offering securities in the primary market, it must be approved by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC). After that, the securities can be traded in the 
secondary market or on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), which is a channel to 
increase liquidity for public companies. The exchange also places importance on the 
overall quality of listed companies by improving the standard of the listing rules and 
regulations. All listed companies must follow all the SET’s listing requirements and only 
then can they obtain listing status.     
For listed companies, SET assists them to gain sources of long-term capital. They can 
also use funds for expanding their businesses, setting up an appropriate structure and 
enhancing their competitiveness. In addition to issuing common stocks, a listed firm can 
raise further capital by issuing preferred stocks, warrants, bonds and convertible bonds. 
As a result, a listed company receives a positive image and gains in reputation and public 
acceptance due to its transparent information disclosure. These advantages perhaps aid 
listed firms to enhance their creditability and bargaining power. Moreover, listed 
company status can influence foreign investors, increasing the participation of such 
investors. Listed company status gives more confidence to public investors. In public 
firms, the management must be accountable to shareholders. An additional benefit of 
being a listed company is human resource development for when a company has a good 
image, a well-respected reputation and public acceptance, it will attract many applicants 
who would like to be employees of such a company. The company can thus employ high-
quality and particularly skilled workers.  More interestingly, a listed firm obtains tax 
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privileges from holding shares in other companies incorporated under Thai law, laws 
governing mutual funds, or the Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand Act. Any 
dividend received from such firms will be tax exempt. However, such dividends must be 
received from stocks or investment units that have been invested in by the listed firms for 
at least three months both before and after the date of the dividend payment.  
For shareholders, listed company stocks must be traded in the secondary market. 
Therefore, investors can buy or sell their stocks frequently due to high liquidity in the 
exchange market. In addition, they can use shares as collateral for loans because the 
market value of the company can be more easily estimated. The benefits of investors are 
also protected by SET rules and regulations due to securities trading and the disclosure of 
listed company information. Individual shareholders of listed companies will receive tax 
privileges. For instance, the proceeds from the sale of listed securities will be exempt 
from personal income tax.    
The listing criteria depend on the SET’s policy of improving the quality of listed 
companies. The SET focuses on financial information disclosure, management and good 
corporate governance practices, in particular, the sufficiency of and timeliness of access 
to information. Thus, all investors should receive significant information relevant to 
investment decisions at the same time. To have a complete listing status on SET, the 
company is required to have all of these qualifications (See more details in Figure 1A and 
Tables 1B-1F, Appendix 1B, Pages 17-21). Once the companies go public, they are 
categorized into 8 major-sectors (Agro & Food, Consumer Product, Financial, Industrial, 
Resources, Services, Property & Construction and Technology), depending on the listed 
companies they come from and in which particular industry they are in (see Table 1A in 
Appendix 1A, Pages 16).  
1.3Aims, Motivations and Contributions 
This thesis is composed of three IPO empirical studies focusing on Thai-listed companies. 
This chapter is followed by the three empirical works on the Thai IPO performance, IPO 
information disclosures and IPOs’ signalling, which comprise Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Each 
chapter has its own literature review, description of the research method and empirical 
findings.  
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Statistical inference is problematic when the abnormal returns on individual IPOs overlap, 
as they do when multi-year buy-and-hold returns are applied. Indeed, this is a problem for 
Thai long-term performance studies (e.g. Allen et al., 1999; Chorruk and Worthington, 
2010), not just those examining IPO performance. These measurement issues have been 
addressed in this study. An alternative statistical approach that avoids the overlap 
problem with buy-and-hold returns is to measure abnormal returns in calendar time rather 
than event time. To the best of my knowledge, the author has applied the Fama-French 
(1993) 3 factors and the Carhart (1997) 4 factors to unique Thai data for the first time. 
The use of this approach, which has not been adopted in prior Thai studies, may serve as 
a control for the cross-sectional dependence of observations that is inherent in the event-
time approach used in previous Thai studies. Therefore, chapter 2 reviews prior empirical 
studies relating to IPO performance in the long-run and re-examines aftermarket 
abnormal returns for Thai IPOs. Two broad research questions are addressed: ‘How do 
Thai IPO companies perform relative to several benchmarks in the long-run?’ and ‘Do 
both event-time and calendar-time approaches produce the same results’. The first 
empirical study in this thesis aims to investigate the long-term performance of IPOs for 
companies listed on the Thai stock market, to re-examine the robustness of existing 
empirical evidence using a variety of different methods to calculate abnormal returns by 
applying different market benchmarks and by using more robust statistical tests and to 
compare results of the performance of Thai IPOs between using the event-time approach 
and the calendar-time approach. The first study, on the other hand, provides a more 
extensive contribution to the literature by not only using a more up-to-date dataset than 
the data samples used in previous studies on the IPO market in Thailand, but also by 
analyzing the IPO performance in two stock market segments, namely, SET and MAI. In 
addition, there is the problem resulting from the existence of evidence that benchmark 
selection can have an important impact on the magnitude of abnormal returns in such 
event studies (Espenlaub et al., 2000). In order to mitigate this problem, this study 
compares abnormal returns in relation to a number of alternative benchmarks. The 
analysis of long-term IPO performance in Thailand is therefore more extensive than in 
previous studies and the author provides a number of robustness checks of our findings by 
employing the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Fama-French (FF) three-factor 
model and the Size-Decile portfolio (SD) model in the event-study analysis. Furthermore, 
the cross-sectional pattern of IPO performance in the long-run was further analysed in 
relation to industry classifications. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time that 
such an investigation for the Thai stock market has been conducted, and it is also the first 
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time this has been done when eight industry indices have been employed as benchmarks. 
This study further presents more results for robustness purposes using a calendar-time 
approach.  
Chapter 3 deals with endogenous disclosure of the intended use-of-proceeds and the 
short- and long-run performance of IPOs. The second empirical study, which is also 
described in this Chapter, relates to the disclosure of the intended use of IPO proceeds 
and addresses the following research questions: ‘Do the levels of information disclosures 
affect IPO underpricing and long-run performance?’, Do the types of use-of-proceeds 
impact on the performance of IPOs, and if so, in what way?and ‘Which important factors 
can determine the performance of IPOs?’  Chapter 3 aims to investigate the 
characteristics of the IPO market and of IPO underpricing,  to discover the market 
structure and performance of IPOs in relation to the level of the use-of-proceeds 
disclosures that are generally reported in Thai IPO prospectus files and to study the effect 
of types of use-of-proceeds on IPO underpricing and IPO aftermarket returns. The second 
empirical work in this thesis contributes to the IPO literature in several ways. The author 
made use of the intended use-of-proceeds disclosure index for measuring the level of the 
disclosure and also hand-collected unique data on IPO subscription rates by foreigners 
and institutional investors as our additional proxies using electronic documents from the 
SEC library. These represent a shift compared to past empirical literature that focused on 
the presence or absence of forecast disclosure. The second empirical chapter will 
contribute to the knowledge of the usefulness of the prospectus information, especially 
narrative information such as the use-of-proceeds, to price the IPOs. Later in the research 
design, it is argued that the determining factors affecting both levels of IPO prices may 
explain the underpricing as well as the long-run performance facts. To the author’s 
knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the relationship between the intended use-
of-proceeds and IPO underpricing and the long-run performance of IPOs simultaneously. 
Leone et al. (2007) and Singh and Van der Zahn (2007) examined relationships between 
the use-of-proceeds and intellectual capital disclosure and IPO’s cost of capital. Chahine 
and Filatotchev (2008) studied the effects of information disclosure and board 
independence on IPO underpricing and long-term underpricing. Apart from the IPO 
discount issue, Wyatt (2014) recently also investigated useful information in use-of-
proceeds disclosures in the IPO prospectus associated with the survival of a firm. 
Additionally, there are a number of studiess examining the use-of-proceeds and long-term 
performance of either IPOs or SEOs (Jeanneret, 2005; Autore et al., 2009; Suzuki and 
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Yamada, 2012; Nielsen et al., 2015). Apart from the conventional t-test, the author 
employs a wider range of statistical tests including the bootstrapping simulation and non-
parametric tests in order to verify the validity of the results.  
Chapter 4 explores the linkage between IPO underpricing and the aftermarket abnormal 
return and the likelihood of being speculative stocks (so-called Turnover List stocks). The 
details of this empirical study are given in Chapter 4. This study addresses the research 
question: ‘Do the nature and extent of the initial returns of IPOs and after-market returns 
explain the probability of stocks appearing on the Turnover List, and if so, in what way?’ 
and   ‘Are IPOs stocks more speculated than non-IPO stocks?’  In the third empirical 
study of this thesis, the author aims to examine the nature and extent of the initial returns 
of IPOs and after-market returns to explain the probability of stocks appearing on the 
Turnover List applying IPO signaling, market-feedback and price manipulation models 
and to study the relationship between nature of IPOs and non-IPOs and the risk of being 
speculative stocks. In the last section of Chapter 4, the author extends the sample to a 
panel dataset, consisting of Thai IPO and non-IPO companies, excluding financial 
companies, real estate investment trusts and closed-end investment funds, for the same 
period. For the last empirical study, to best of the author’s knowledge, Turnover List 
stock has not been drawn on the previous literature.  
This thesis represents the first comprehensive study of equity IPOs in Thailand, 
investigating both short- and long-run performance, the use-of-proceeds disclosure, and 
IPOs’ signalling for speculative stock detection. The research undertaken is important 
because it investigates an issue that has not sufficiently addressed in Thailand. Although 
there has been tremendous growth in the Thai IPO market, shown by the increasing 
numbers of listed companies on the Stock Exchange of Thailand, from just 229 firms at 
the beginning of 1990 to 756 firms at the end of 2014 (see Figure 1.2), research on ‘going 
public’ in Thailand is relatively limited as mentioned in section 1.1. 
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1.4 Outline of the Thesis   
This thesis is organized into 5 Chapters, including this Chapter 1, which contains an 
introduction to the thesis. Chapter 2 re-appraises the long-run performance of Thai IPOs. 
Chapter 3 details the endogenous disclosure of use-of-proceeds affecting IPO 
underpricing and IPO performance in the long-run. The evidence of IPOs’ signaling for 
the detection of speculative stocks is reported in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 is the conclusion of 
this thesis.    
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Appendix 1A 
Table 1A SET Industry Groups and Sector Classifications 
Industry Sector 
1. Agro & Food Industry  
(AGRO) 
AGRI Agribusiness 
FOOD Food & Beverage 
 
2. Consumer Products 
(CONSUMP) 
FASHION Fashion 
HOME Home & Office Products 
PERSON Personal Products & Pharmaceuticals 
 
3. Financial (FINCIAL) BANK Banking 
FIN Finance & Securities 
INSUR Insurance 
 
4. Industrial (INDUS) AUTO Automotive 
IMM Industrial Materials & Machinery 
PAPER Paper & Printing Materials  
PETRO Petrochemicals & Chemicals 
PKG Packaging 
STEEL Steel 
 
5. Property & Construction 
(PROPCON) 
CONMAT   Construction Materials 
CONS Construction Services 
PF & REIT Property Fund & REITs 
PROP Property Development 
 
6. Resource (RESOURC) ENERG Energy & Utilities 
MINE Mining 
   
7. Services (SERVICE) COMM Commerce 
HELTH Health Care Services 
MEDIA Media and Publishing 
PROF Professional Services 
TOURISM Tourism &Leisure 
TRANS Transportation & Logistics 
   
8. Technology (TECH) ETRON Electronic Components 
ICT Information & Communication Technology 
Note: 
The Thai stock exchange categorizes equities into 8 sectors, depending on the listed companies they come from and in 
which particular industry they are in (Source: the SET’s website, 2015). 
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Table 1B Qualifications of the applicant 
 Qualifications 
Applicant status Public limited company or corporation established under a 
special law 
Paid-up capital for common stocks ≥ THB 300 million (after public offering) 
Distribution of minor shareholding  
 
Number of minor shareholders (non-strategic 
shareholders) 
 
 ‘Strategic shareholders’ refer to directors and 
managers, including related persons and associated 
persons and shareholders  who have a holding of above 
5%  
≥ 1,000 shareholders 
 
Hold ≥ 25% paid-up capital for companies with THB 300 
million ≤ paid-up capital < THB 3,000 million. 
 
Hold ≥ 20% of paid-up capital for companies with paid-up ≥ 
THB 3,000 million. 
Public offering 
Approval 
 
Number of shares cumulatively offered for sale  
      -  Paid-up capital < THB 500 million 
      -  Paid-up capital ≥ THB 500 million 
 
Method of public offering 
 
Has been granted approval by the SEC 
 
≥ 15% of paid-up capital 
≥ 10% of paid-up capital or THB 75 million, whichever is 
higher 
 
Offering via an underwriter 
Track record -  Must have been in operation for at least  3 years 
-  Must have had the same company management for at  
   least one year prior to the application date 
-  Must have had a net profit as follows:  
   Achieved a minimum net profit of THB 50 million over  
   the past 2 or 3 years, a net profit from operations of THB  
   30 million for the previous full-year and a net profit in  
   the year of filing the listing application as reported by  
   combining all quarterly results for that year.  
-  For a privatized state enterprise, operations prior to  
   privatization will be considered as a continuation of  
   operations. 
(Source: the SET’s website, 2015) 
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Table 1B Qualifications of the Applicant (Continued) 
 
 Qualifications 
Financial Condition and Liquidity -  Be in a stable and healthy financial  
   condition and have sufficient working  
   capital. 
-  Have a minimum total shareholders’  
   equity of THB 300 million. 
Management 
    -  Management and control persons 
 
 
 
 
 
    -  Scope of duties and responsibilities 
 
Qualifications for management and control persons should be 
in line with SEC regulations and they should not possess any 
characteristics prohibited by SEC rules and regulations. 
  
Duties and responsibilities must be clearly defined as 
specified by SEC rules and regulations. 
Corporate governance and internal control -  Have good corporate governance in practice   
   Have an audit committee qualified by SET. 
-  Have effective auditing and internal control  
   systems as specified by the SEC. 
Conflict of interest Must have no conflict of interests as specified by the SEC. 
Articles of Association of the applicant Must ensure that the articles of association of the applicant 
and its subsidiaries are in line with the SEC rules and 
regulations. 
Financial statements and auditors Must ensure that financial statements have been prepared in 
accordance with the SEC rules and regulations. The 
applicant’s auditor must also be approved by the SEC, 
Thailand. 
Provident fund The provident fund of the applicant must already be 
established on the date on which the listing document is filed. 
Note: 
If it is deemed that the admission of the issuer is beneficial to the Thai stock market, the Board of Governors of the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) accepts the listing of the issuer by relaxing the quantitative listing criteria as deemed 
appropriate (Source: the SET’s website, 2015).  
Table 1C Additional Requirements for Companies Engaged in Infrastructure Projects 
 Additional requirements 
Nature of Business Have a concession period of ≥ 20 years with ≥ 15 years 
remaining as of the application date, or obtain specific 
permission from a government agency/state enterprise, or 
possess a contract to sell products/services which can 
generate stable revenues. 
Source of Finance Possess confirmed and sufficient sources of finance 
(Source: the SET’s website, 2015) 
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Figure 1A Listing Procedures (Adapted from the SET’s website, 2015) 
In general, the applicant spends a total of 6 months in the preparation stage (the period 
before submitting a listing application to the exchange) of listing common shares. Table 
1F summarizes the information on the preparation for the listing of common shares and 
the listing fees. The preparation period is an estimate based on the assumption that the 
overall qualifications of the applicant primarily comply with the SET listing requirements 
with only a few adjustments, should the applicant require any. More importantly, strategic 
shareholders who hold at least 55% of the total shares of the firm’s paid-up capital after 
the IPOs are prohibited from selling their shares during the first 6 months after going 
public. This is known as ‘the silent (quiet) or lock-up period’. In general, such a silent 
period in the Thai stock market is required for 1 year after listing. Strategic shareholders 
such as directors, managers and executive management, including related and associated 
persons will be permitted to sell a maximum of 25% of the locked-up shares every six 
months afterwards. Such firms that have secondary listing are exempted from the silent 
period rule. This also precludes stock analysts affiliated with an underwriter from 
covering the stock of an IPO for the same period. Before issuing new securities to the 
public, an issuer must produce ‘A Prospectus’ which is a document describing the 
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security offering and its financial conditions with the help of its underwriter. The due 
diligence investigation helps assemble the information needed to meet the SEC filing 
requirements. 
Table 1D Preparation for Listing of Common Shares 
Duration Descriptions 
Between 3 and 6 months before 
listing application filing  
-  Find out relevant rules and regulations such as the Public Company Act, SEC  
   rules and regulations governing the issue and the public offering of securities,  
   and SET listing rules and regulations 
-  Appoint a financial advisor approved by the SEC and discuss with a financial  
   advisor how to ensure the applicant’s qualifications     
-  Restructure shareholding, establish a good corporate governance and get rid of  
   any conflict of interest 
-  Prepare financial statements and reports in accordance with accounting  
   standards 
-  Establish an audit committee and appoint independent directors     
Between 2 and 5 months before 
listing application filing 
-  Transform into a public limited company 
-  Prepare an Initial Public Offering (IPO) application and relevant documents 
-  Make a plan for pricing and allocating IPOs   
Between 1 and 2 months before 
listing application filing 
-  Establish provident fund 
-  Appoint share registrar and submit IPO documents to the SEC 
-  Submit IPO application to the SEC 
-  Prepare for company visit and interviewing by the SEC officers 
Within 7 days of consideration of 
a listing application by the SET 
after all required and relevant 
documents have been submitted 
-  Submit a listing application to the exchange 
-  Prepare for company visit and interviewing by the SET officers (The SET and  
   SEC visit the applicant together in the case of a parallel application filing) 
-  Distribute shares to the public and report the share distribution documents to  
   the SET 
-  First trading begins within 3 days after the share distribution and other required  
   documents have been submitted to the exchange  
(Source: the SET’s website, 2015) 
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Table 1E Listing fees 
Application fee Initial fee Annual fee 
THB 50,000 0.05% of paid-up capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Minimum THB 100,000 
Maximum THB 3,000,000  
Regressive rate varies by the level of paid-up capital as 
follows:  
(capital: million baht)                   rate 
< 200                                           0.035% 
200 < capital ≤ 1,000                  0.030% 
1,000 < capital ≤ 5,000               0.025% 
5,000 < capital ≤ 10,000             0.020% 
> 10,000                                      0.010% 
Minimum THB 50,000 
Maximum THB 3,000,000 
(Source: the SET’s website, 2015) 
Table 1F Descriptive Disclosure of Material Information 
Disclosure of material 
information 
Description 
Information reported on a 
regular basis 
-  Quarterly review of financial statement (within 45 days from the end of the  
   accounting period) 
-  Audited financial statements (within 3 months from the end of the accounting  
   period)  
-  Annual report and an AGM notice (within 110 days from the end of the fiscal  
   year accounting period) 
-  Disclosure report for additional information (Form 56-1) (within 3 months from  
   the end of the accounting period) 
Additional information reported  
(may be required) 
-  Immediate public disclosure of information is likely to have an effect on the price  
   of the company’s securities, the interests of shareholders, or investment decisions  
   such as a capital increase or decrease, a dividend payment or a non-dividend  
   payment, and a merger or an acquisition of assets. 
-  Information to be reported to the SET within 3 working days from the date on  
   which such incidents occur such as a change of a board member on the company’s  
   board of directors, and change in the company’s memorandum of association. 
-  Information to be reported to the exchange within 14 days such as a copy of the  
   shareholder name list as of the closing date of the share transfer, and a report of  
   the ordinary or extraordinary general meeting of shareholders. 
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Chapter 2 
Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
2.1 Introduction 
The IPO underpricing phenomenon has existed for a long time in world stock markets, 
although its magnitude varies from country to country. However, the evidence regarding 
IPO over-performance or underperformance in the long-run is mixed. Some studies have 
found that IPOs show underperformance in the long-run or have negative abnormal 
returns over different holding periods after the IPO issue date (Ritter, 1991; Lee et al., 
1996; Kooli and Suret, 2004; Álvarez and González, 2005; Akhigbe et al., 2006; Mazouz 
et al., 2008; Su and Bangassa, 2011; Thomadakis et al., 2012; Wen and Cao, 2013; 
Agathee et al., 2014). This finding implies that in the initial period after the IPO flotation, 
IPO investors earn positive returns, but that the returns from their investments are 
subsequently reduced in the long-run. In contrast, however, the findings of Jelic et al. 
(2001), Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007), and Moshirian et al. (2010) have all demonstrated 
IPOs’ long-run over-performance using market index benchmarks in certain countries, 
such as Malaysia, China and Korea. This mixed picture regarding IPOs’ long-term 
performance may be related to the application of different methods and approaches used 
to measure the abnormal returns. 
Chapter 2 aims to study the long-term performance of IPOs for companies listed on the 
Thai stock market and to re-examine the robustness of existing empirical evidence using a 
variety of different methods to calculate abnormal returns by applying different market 
benchmarks and by using more robust statistical tests. The data sample in this study is 
comprised of a total of 227 IPOs listed on the Thai stock market in the period between 
2001 and 2012.  
The remainder of this chapter consists of five sections. Section 2.2 gives an overview of 
the existing literature on the long-run IPO performance relevant to this study. Section 2.3 
presents the methodology and alternative techniques to evaluate the abnormal 
performance of IPOs. Data and samples are explained in Section 2.4, while the empirical 
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results and a discussion of the findings are provided in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 then 
concludes Chapter 2. 
2.2 Related Literature  
2.2.1 Prior studies on the long-run performance of IPOs  
Most of the existing studies from various stock markets around the world provide 
evidence showing IPO underpricing or revealing their outperformance in the short-run. In 
contrast, the results of IPO over-pricing or underperformance in the long-run are 
puzzling. The behaviour of IPO returns in the long-run has attracted much attention in the 
literature in recent years. The empirical evidence tends to support the view that IPOs 
underperform. For instance, a study by Ritter (1991), using US market data, investigated 
IPO underperformance in the long-run and found that three-year market-adjusted buy-
and-hold returns were -23.4% and also that they were negative in every sub-period. In his 
study, Ritter applied alternative benchmark portfolios to find out whether measurement 
problems could account for the underperformance of IPOs in the long-run. Additionally, 
he investigated possible explanations for IPO performance by categorising his sample by 
gross proceeds, initial returns, industry, issuing year, and age of firms. Ritter (1998) 
attributed such long-term underperformance to the fact that IPO investors are over-
optimistic about IPO valuations whereas there is much uncertainty concerning the value 
and growth of the IPO companies. In consequence, investors overpay for IPOs in the 
initial period of listing.
6
 However, when more information becomes available in the 
subsequent period, the differences in opinions between optimistic and pessimistic 
investors are reduced. As a result, the IPO price declines after going public, or when the 
investors receive more information about the company. In a more resent study on the US 
market, Akhigbe et al. (2006) studied the long-term performance of 2,483 IPOs by using 
industrial sector classifications. They reported that the mean one-, two- and three-year 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the IPO firms were -27.07%, -19.05% and -10.16%, 
respectively. In addition, Wu and Kwok (2007) investigated the long-run performance of 
global and domestic IPOs of a number of US companies from 1986 to 1997, and found 
that both global and domestic IPOs underperformed the market index up to three years 
                                                        
6 Lonkani and Firth (2005) argue that buying stocks in an initial public offering is more risker than investing in already 
listed companies due to the lack of information. Information asymmetries between management and potential investors 
are uncertainties investors face when deciding whether or not to subscribe to new issues. 
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after going public. They indicated that if investors bought the IPO stocks at the end of the 
offer month and held them for one-, two- and three- years, they would suffer a negative 
abnormal return of -1.58%%, -7.81% and -10.63%, respectively, for global IPOs; and -
3.94%, -10.78% and -11.48%, respectively, for domestic IPOs. 
In the UK, Goergen et al. (2007) studied 252 IPOs listed on the London Stock Exchange 
between 1991 and 1995. They found poor long-run performance of UK IPOs, in 
particular in cases of those of the smaller firms while those of the large firms performed 
better in their cross-sectional study. This finding is consistent with the results of 
Burrowes and Jones (2004), who found long-run underperformance or negative returns 
from Alternative Investment Market (AIM
7
) IPOs during the initial two years. In 
addition, Lee et al. (1996) investigated the short- and long-run returns of 266 Australian 
IPOs during the period 1976-1989. They also showed that the equally-weighted 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) at month 36 was -51.26%. Further, Lee et al. (1996) 
suggested that the performance of Australian IPOs was considerably poorer than that of 
the US IPOs reported in Ritter’s (1991) study. In another study, Kooli and Suret (2004) 
examined the aftermarket performance of 445 Canadian IPOs in the period up to 5 years 
after their listing.
8
 Kooli and Suret’s (2004) results indicate that IPOs’ underperformance 
in the long-run is not always statistically significant, depending on the methodology used. 
Similarly, Jakobsen and Sørensen (2001) investigated 76 Danish non-financial firms 
listed between 1984 and 1992. They also found, after considering buy-and-hold returns 
and cumulative abnormal returns, that the performance of the stock market was better 
than that of the IPOs. The volatility adjusted underperformance of five-year post-issue 
IPOs, relative to the market, was 30.4%. The resultsof Jakobsen and Sørensen (2001) also 
show the underperformance of Danish IPOs compared to the stocks of matching firms
9
. 
Furthermore, the findings of Brounen and Eichholtz (2002) document the poor 
performance of property IPOs in the UK (-4.53%) and in France (-12.62%) but the over-
performance of IPOs in Sweden (18.89%). Kirkulak (2008) reported the 
                                                        
7 The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) was established on 19 June 1995by the London Stock Exchange (LSE) for 
the flotation of shares of small, young,or growing firms. AIM was created with the primary objective of providing such 
companies with the opportunity to list their stocks on a regulated exchange, allow them to gain access to the public 
equity market, and improve their visibility. 
8 Kooli and Suret (2004) studied 445 Canadian IPOs listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE), Montreal Stock 
Exchange, Vancouver Stock Exchange, Alberta Stock Exchange (ASE) and over-the-counter (CDN) between 1991 and 
1998. 
9 For each IPO stock, Jakobsen and Sørensen (2001) selected a stock of a matching (similar) firm of approximately the 
same size according to the market value quoted on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange.  
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underperformance of Japanese IPOs and documented average three-year equally-
weighted BHARs of -34.5% and CARs of -18.3% for 433 IPOs between 1998 and 2001.  
In an Asian context, Mazouz et al. (2008) investigated the long-term performance of 537 
IPOs in Hong Kong from 1990 to 2002 and reported that three-year average CARs (using 
an equally-weighted portfolio) were -74.83%, when the market index was considered as a 
benchmark, and -17.78% (using both the value and the size index). Moreover, also in an 
Asian context, Su and Bangassa (2011) demonstrated a potential loss for investors who 
buy-and-hold Chinese IPOs in the long run.
10
 This result supports the findings of Chen et 
al. (2000) concerning poor post-issue performance after listing. It contrasts, however, 
with the results from the study of Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) which showed that 
investors buying IPOs in Malaysia on the first day of trading and holding them for a 
three-year period could gain significant abnormal returns for equally-weighted event time 
CARs and BHARs using two market benchmarks
11
. Moreover, these findings support the 
results of Jelic et al. (2001), who reported positive and statistically significant long-term 
returns up to 3 years after listing for Malaysian IPOs during the period from 1980 to 
1995. More interestingly, Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) also found that the long-run 
performance of large firms is inferior to that of small IPO firms. There exists further 
international empirical evidence showing poor IPO performance in the long-run (Álvarez 
and González, 2005; Thomadakis et al., 2012, Wen and Cao, 2013; Agathee et al. 2014, 
among others)
12
.  
2.2.2 Thai long-run IPO performance studies  
Specifically in the Thai context, Allen et al. (1999) pioneered investigations into the long-
run performance of IPOs in Thailand. They studied 151 IPOs listed on the main board of 
the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) from 1985 to 1992. Allen et al. (1999) reported 
that the long-run abnormal returns of Thai IPOs, based on the equally-weighted 
cumulative market-adjusted return (CAR) in month 36 after listing, was 10.02% and that 
                                                        
10 Su and Bangassa (2011) found that the mean market-adjusted one-, two-, and three-year BHARs were -16.24% (t-stat 
= -6.57), -12.65% (t-stat = -4.44)and -21.74% (t-stat = -2.89), respectively. 
11 Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) used a benchmark which partially takes into account the different sizes of Malaysian IPOs 
by adopting the more representative Exchange Main Board All Share (EMAS) Index for Main board IPOs together with 
the Second Board Index for companies listed on this board in a reference portfolio. 
12 For example, the findings of Thomadakis et al. (2012) show a long-term adjusted outperformance of first (40.82%) 
and second holding year periods (13.49%) and adjusted underperformance at the end of the third year of issue holding 
(-15.35%). Álvarez and González (2005) revealed the existence of negative abnormal returns for the Spanish stock 
market. The recent studies of Wen and Cao (2013) and Agathee et al. (2014) document IPOs’ poor performance in the 
long-run in Taiwan and in Mauritius. 
 
Chapter 2: Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)  
 
27 
it was not statistically significant. They also showed that the long-term return was higher 
when a value-weighted portfolio of IPOs was used. These findings contrast with the 
empirical results of Chorruk and Worthington (2010), who investigated the performance 
of IPOs on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) during the more recent period of 1997-
2008 and found that Thai IPOs underperformed relative to the market at the end of a 3-
year post-listing period when they were measured by the equally-weighted cumulative 
and buy-and-hold abnormal returns. In the context of this type of event studies, Fama 
(1998) introduced the concept of the so-called “bad model problem” and argued that 
although it is less serious in the case of the short-run returns, it becomes more severe 
when longer return horizons are analysed, which may then lead to counterfeit abnormal 
average return results. In consequence, the findings of the previous studies for the Thai 
IPO stock market may not be sufficiently reliable and, hence, it is worthwhile re-
examining them.  
There are a few major differences between the previous event studies of the long-run 
performance of Thai IPOs (Allen et al., 1999; Chorruk and Worthington, 2010) and the 
analysis conducted in this current study. Firstly, Allen et al. (1999) used only cumulative 
market-adjusted return (CAR) to measure abnormal returns in the long-run, and Chorruk 
and Worthington (2010) added buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) and wealth 
relative (WR) when measuring the long-run IPO performance. Fama (1998) and Mitchell 
and Stafford (2000) also suggest that BHAR has more statistical problems than CAR due 
to a positive skewness bias
13
. This leads to the negative bias of the standard t-statistics. In 
order to address the inference problems of BHAR as a performance measure, Lyon et al. 
(1999) developed new techniques, such as a skewness-adjusted t-test. Unfortunately, the 
previous studies of the long-term performance of the IPOs in Thailand were unaware of 
the skewness bias issue. Furthermore, Chorruk and Worthington (2010) studied the 
performance of Thai IPOs listed during the Asian financial crisis period, also known as 
                                                        
13 Fama (1998) argues that if the mean of CAR increases as N, i.e. the number of months summed, the standard error of 
the CAR increases in proportion much more slowly, i.e. as N1/2. In an average of monthly abnormal returns (ARRs), the 
pricing error is constant, but the standard error of the CAR increases similarly to N-1/2. Fama (1998) calls this a “bad 
model problem” and argues that although it is less serious in event studies that focus on short return windows (e.g. a 
few days), since the daily expected returns are close to zero and hence have little effect on the estimates of unexpected 
(abnormal) returns, it is more severe in longer return horizons. Bad model problems are most acute with long term buy-
and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs), which compound (multiply) the problems of an expected-return model in 
explaining short term returns. This is the reason that a bad model problem that produces a spurious abnormal return of 
X% per month becomes more reliable in the case of CAR. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) pointed out that even if there is 
no abnormal return after the first period, the BHAR measure can grow with the return horizon. For instance, if I 
suppose that returns for the first year after going public are 10% for IPO firms and zero for the benchmarks, the 1-year 
abnormal return for IPOs is thus 10%. If the event and benchmark firms both have a 100% buy-and-hold return over the 
next 4 years, the BHAR after 1 year increases to 20% (i.e. (1.1 x 2.0) – (1.0 x 2.0)). 
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the ‘Tom Yum Kung Crisis’. The period between 1997 and 1999 was characterized by 
low trading volume and there were no IPOs issued in the Thai stock market during that 
time. In addition, their studies omitted some important risk factors, such as liquidity and 
momentum, and this omission may have affected their results about the Thai IPOs 
performance. Previous researcherss investigating Thai IPOs made no adjustment for size 
effects either and also applied only the main stock market (SET) index as a benchmark. 
Moreover, the studies which used only the SET market index may not have captured well 
the expected returns on small-size and medium-size stocks.  
This study addressed all these issues in the research analysis and, in contrast to the 
existing previous studies, the IPOs performance in Thailand in the long-run were 
investigated using a wide range of alternative benchmarks (CAPM, FF and SD models) 
and models which had been designed to adjust for size effects. Moreover, this study 
examined the cross-sectional average of the calendar
14
 regression results of the long-run 
returns as a further robustness check. In addition, this IPO study provided qualitative 
analysis by investigating the cases of individual IPO companies which, for example, were 
characterized by unusually high returns, through explaining the circumstances related to 
their business activity etc. (very little research in this area has even attempted to do that 
and to engage in detailed analysis of this kind), or by investigating the behaviour of IPOs 
during the key political events throughout the sample period in this study (the military 
coup in 2006 in Thailand), in order to provide a better explanation and understanding of 
the results. Table 2.1 summarises the recent empirical studies of long-run IPO 
performance in different countries, including Thailand, since 1996. The general weight of 
evidence shows negative long-run performance across several markets internationally. 
However, there are also some instances of long-run over-performance, notably in 
Germany, Malaysia and Thailand. It can be seen that the empirical results appear to be 
sensitive to the methods used to measure long-run stock price performance. In particular, 
the approach and weighted return used for the evaluation of abnormal returns in the long 
horizon period. 
                                                        
14 Generally, long-term IPO performance analysis in the existing literature relies on the use of either event-time or 
calendar-time approaches. An event-time approach is applied when performance is measured relative to the date of the 
IPO, whereas a calendar-time approach is used when the returns are obtained for each calendar month and for each 
sample company that had an IPO event in the post-event period of interest. The portfolios of the IPOs are re-formed 
every month and then the portfolio returns are evaluated. The calendar-time approach is applied  in this study in order 
to address contemporaneous cross-correlation, which may be a concern given some political and global macro shocks in 
Thailand (e.g. the coup in 2006 and also the Global Financial Crisis in 2007) affecting all IPO stocks in the market at 
certain points in time during the sample period. 
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Table 2.1 A summary of recent published empirical works on the long-run of IPO performance using event-time and calendar-time approaches 
Author Sample size Country Sample 
period 
Approach Portfolio
a of 
IPOs 
Benchmark Long-run IPO 
performance measure
b 
Sign
c 
(+/-) 
Ritter (1991) 1,526 IPOs 
 
United States 1975-1984 Event-time EW 
VW 
Market-index, 
Industry and size-matched 
company 
CAR 
BHAR 
WR 
(-)
* 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) 
 
4,753 IPOs 
 
United States 1970-1990 Event-time 
Calendar-time 
EW 
VW 
Market-index 
Sized-match company 
Size and book-to-market 
portfolio 
BHAR 
WR 
FF model 
(-)
* 
Lee et al. (1996) 266 IPOs Australia 1976-1989 Event-time EW Market index BHAR (-)
* 
Ljungqvist (1997) 145 IPOs Germany 1970-1990 Event-time EW Market index BHAR (-)
* 
Allen et al. (1999) 
 
151 IPOs 
 
Thailand 1985-1992 Event-time EW 
VW 
Market index CAR (+) 
Chen et al. (2000) 
 
342 IPOs 
 
China 1992-1995 Event-time EW Market index BHAR 
WR 
(-)
*
 
Espenlaub et al.(2000) 588 IPOs United 
Kingdom 
1985-1992 Event-time 
Calendar-time 
EW 
VW 
Market-index 
Sized-match company 
Size, Size and book-to-
market portfolio 
CAR 
CAPM, FF, SD, and 
RAT models 
(-) and (-)
*
 
Jakobsen and Sørensen (2001) 76 IPOs 
 
Denmark 1984-1992 Event-time EW Market index, 
Size-matched company 
CAR 
BHAR 
(-)
*
 
Jelic et. al. (2001) 182 IPOs Malaysia 1980-1995 Event-time EW Market index CAR 
BHAR 
WR 
(+)
*
 
Durukan (2002) 
 
173 IPOs 
 
Turkey 1990-1997 Event-time EW Market-index BHAR (+) 
Kooli and Suret (2004) 445 IPOs 
 
Canada 1991-1999 Event-time EW Size-matched company CAR 
BHAR 
(-) 
Alvarez and Gonzalez (2005) 34 IPOs 
 
Spain 1987-1997 Event-time EW Market-index, 
Size portfolio, 
Book-to-market ratio, 
Size and book-to-market 
ratio 
BHAR (-) 
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Table 2.1 (continued) A summary of recent published empirical works on the long-run of IPO performance using event-time and calendar-time approaches 
Author Sample size Country Sample 
period 
Approach Portfolio
a of 
IPOs 
Benchmark Long-run IPO 
performance measure
b 
Sign
c 
(+/-) 
Akhigbe et al. (2006) 
 
2,483 IPOs 
 
United States 1990-2000 Event-time EW Market-index, 
Industry indices 
BHAR (-)
* 
Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) 
 
454 IPOs 
 
Malaysia 1990-2000 Event-time 
Calendar-time 
EW 
VW 
Market-index,  
Size-matched company 
 
CAR 
BHAR 
WR and FF models 
(-)
*
 and (+)
* 
Bessler and Thies (2007) 
 
218 IPOs 
 
Germany 1977-1995 Event-time EW Market-index, 
Size-matched company 
BHAR (-)
*
 and (+)
* 
Burrowes and Jones (2007) 271 IPOs  
 
United 
Kingdom 
1995-1997 Event-time EW Market-index CAR (-)
* 
Goergen et. al. (2007) 
 
252 IPOs 
 
United 
Kingdom 
1991-1995 Event-time 
Calendar-time 
EW Market-index,  
Size-matched company 
CAR 
BHAR and FF model 
(-)
*
 
Kirkulak (2008) 
 
433 IPOs Japan 1998-2001 Event-time EW Market index CAR 
BHAR 
(-)
*
 
Chorruk and Worthington 
(2010) 
 
136 IPOs 
 
Thailand 1997-2008 Event-time EW Market index CAR 
BHAR 
WR 
(-)
*
 
Su and Bangassa (2011) 
 
590 IPOs 
 
China 2001-2008 Event-time 
Calendar-time 
EW Market-index,  
Size-matched company 
CAR 
BHAR, FF and CARH 
models 
(-)
*
  
Thomadakis et al.(2012) 
 
254 IPOs 
 
Greece 1994-2002 Event-time 
 
EW Market-index CAR 
BHAR 
(-)
*
 
Wen and Cao (2013) 121 IPOs Taiwan 2005-2007 Event-time EW Market-Index BHAR (-)
* 
Agathee et al. (2014) 44 IPOs Mauritius 1989-2010 Event-time 
Calendar-time 
EW 
VW 
Market-Index 
Size-matched company 
CAR 
BHAR 
WR and FF model 
(-)
* 
Note: 
a There are 2 types of portfolio constructions, namely, an Equally-Weighted portfolio of IPOs (EW) and a Value-Weighted portfolio of IPOs (VW). 
b The main stock market performance measures include CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return), BHAR (Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return), WR (Wealth Relative), CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model), 
FF (Fama-French (1993)Three Factor Model), CARH (Carhart (1997) Four Factor Model). 
c (+) indicates a positive abnormal return of IPOs in the long-run (over-performance) and (-) indicates a negative return of IPOs in the long-run (underperformance). * defines a statistical significance. 
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2.3 Data sources and sample selection 
The sample adopted in this study includes all 227 IPO stocks on the Thai stock market 
during the period from January 1, 2001 to April 4, 2012. This period was selected because 
January 2001, seemed to be a start-up period after the financial crisis of 1997 and was 
also when the annual volume of IPO issues began to increase. In the years before the 
study period, from 1997 to 1999, there were no IPOs issued at all. In order to avoid a 
sample selection bias, the sample also includes IPOs that were delisted before their three-
year anniversary. Information and the number of the IPOs issued is from the official 
prospectus filing form (Form 69-1), available on the IPO filing database provided by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Thailand. The information concerning IPO 
companies listed on the SET and MAI during the period 2001 to 2012 was obtained from 
several sources. In general, the listed companies are obliged to publish a prospectus 
detailing to all investors their company profiles including the history of the company, the 
organization’s structure, the offer size, the proportion of shareholders, 5-year financial 
statements, the risks involved with their operations and so on. I also have prospectuses for 
all sample IPOs, which are available on the SEC, the Thai electronic database. The data 
are available on the SEC website at http://sec.or.th. Additional information on IPOs was 
obtained from the SET website located at http://set.or.th. Further data were obtained from 
another secondary source, the SET SMART located at http://www.setsmart.com.  
2.3.1 Sample selection   
This section discusses the data collection by describing the criteria used to select the IPO 
companies and their benchmarks. In the initial step, lists of companies were collected, 
companies that had issued an IPO and had been listed on the SET and MAI during the 
period 2001 to 2012.  The lists of IPO companies were obtained from the prospectus files 
on the SEC (Thailand) database. These were then verified with the SET database in the 
‘New Listed Company Information’ section in order to confirm that the IPOs had 
subsequently been trading on the exchange.     
The author collected all IPOs that had gone public since 2001 in Thailand. However, IPO 
companies had to satisfy the following criteria in order to be included in the final sample: 
(i) an offer price of Baht 1.00 per share or more; (ii) an offering involving equity only; 
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(iii) the company had to be listed on the SET (the main market) or MAI (small- and 
medium-sized market); (iv) the availability of price data on the Datastream database; and 
finally (v) the exclusion of companies classified as companies from Trust, Closed-End 
Fund or Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) sectors. The companies that are listed under the 
Trust, Closed-End Fund or Exchange Traded Funds sectors are excluded in this study 
because the data were not comparable with those of public listed companies. They also 
have different statutory requirements for preparing annual company reports.   
The lists of companies are then cross-checked with the listing statistics available at 
http://www.set.or.th/en/company/ipo/upcoming_ipo_set.html on 14 May, 2014. When 
collecting the data for individual companies, the possibility of a change in a company’s 
name is first checked. This is necessary as several companies had changed their name a 
number of times and the previous names did not appear on the Datastream database. In 
addition to this, the company classification according to eight sectors
15
 occurs on the SET 
website so that IPOs can be matched with their industry benchmarks to show IPO 
performance.  
2.3.2 Individual IPO company stock returns 
The stock price data for individual IPO companies are collected from the Datastream 
database. In particular, the data comprised each IPO’s closing price on the first day of 
trading and the 36 monthly stock returns following going public
16
. The monthly stock 
returns for each IPO were compared with monthly returns of stock market indices such as 
the SET and MAI indices and also additional alternative benchmarks, namely, CAPM, 
Fama and French’s Three Factors Model and Size-Decile Model on a rolling basis for 
each of the 36 months after the initial listing.  
 
                                                        
15 To examine industry differences, the sample was categorised into eight sectors, based on the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) sector classification. I also employed these 8 industry indices as an alternative benchmark. However, 
these indices had been calculated by the SET since 2004. Therefore, the data for analysing the performance of IPOs 
according to the industry benchmark comprised 133 IPOs going public from January 2004. 
16 It ‘shows a theoretical growth in value of a shareholding over a specified period, assuming that dividends are re-
invested to purchase additional units of an equity at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date. Gross 
dividends are used where available and the calculation ignores tax and re-investment charges. Adjusted closing prices 
are used throughout to determine price index and hence return index’ (Datastream database definition). 
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2.3.3 Market returns    
The closing day stock market (SET and MAI) indices
17
 were also collected from the 
Datastream database in order to calculate the monthly market returns as market 
benchmarks
18
.  To analyze IPO performance after listing on the Thai stock market, the 
SET index
19
 (the main stock market index in Thailand) and the MAI index (small- and 
medium-sized markets) were incorporated into the event-study methodology. The IPO 
samples in this study were listed on two boards, with a benchmark appropriate to each 
board being used. The SET index was applied to provide a benchmark for IPO companies 
listed on the Main Board of the Stock Exchange of Thailand. Meanwhile, the Second 
Board Index was adopted for companies listed on the Market for Alternative Investment 
(the sub-market). The MAI index comprises all stocks quoted on the small- and medium-
sized market. Both the SET and MAI indices are weighted by market capitalisation. As of 
12 May 2014, there were 495 and 97 companies listed on the SET and MAI, respectively. 
The returns of IPOs forming the Main (Sub) Board are adjusted to the SET (MAI) index 
returns.  
2.4 Methods 
Existing empirical studies employ several different methods to investigate the long-run 
behaviour of IPOs. Generally, either raw returns or abnormal returns (measuring price 
dynamics relative to some benchmark) are used to assess the long-run performance. The 
studies of Ritter (1991), Carter et al. (1998), Jelic et al. (2001), Durukan (2002), Ritter 
and Welch (2002), Burrowes (2004), Álvarez and González (2005), Su and Bangassa 
(2011) employed cumulative average returns (CAR), buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) and 
wealth relatives (WR). In this study the author follows this event-time approach by 
exploiting all three abnormal return measures: CAR, BHAR and WR in order to 
investigate the performance of Thai IPO in the long run.  
                                                        
17 The SET index is a market capitalization-weight price index, calculated from the prices of all common stocks 
including unit trust and property funds on the main board. Excluded are stocks that have been suspended from trade for 
more than one year. The MAI index is a market capitalization-weighted index, relying on the same calculation 
methodology as that of the SET Index. It is calculated from the prices of all common stocks listed on the MAI. 
18 “Benchmark selection can have an important impact on the magnitude of abnormal returns for event studies” 
(Espenlaub et al., 2000).  It is therefore difficult for event-study research to choose an appropriate benchmark. In order 
to alleviate this problem, I compare abnormal returns in relation to a number of alternative benchmarks. 
19 For the SET index, it was calculated from the 100 largest stocks, weighted by market capitalization.  
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This study also selected the appropriate market indices as benchmarks for each IPO firm 
depending on their stock exchange listing and the size of the IPO firms. The returns of the 
IPOs were analysed in horizons up to 36 months after the first day of trading. This was 
done in order to be able to make comparisons with findings presented in previous studies, 
which typically followed Ritter(1991) and other studiess which adopted similar 
methodology. 
2.4.1 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
The market-adjusted abnormal returns of company i in event month t (ARi,t) are calculated 
for each event month t as follows: 
ARi,t  = Ri,t – Rm,t               (2.1) 
where Ri,t is the monthly raw return of the company i in event month t, excluding the 
initial return.  
Thus, Ri,t = (Pi,t-Pi,t-1)/Pi,t-1 where Pi,t is the last traded price of the company in event 
month t and Pi,t-1 is the last traded price of the company in event month t-1. Rm,t is the 
return on the market index (SET or MAI indices) in event month t and is calculated as Rm,t 
= (Pm,t-Pm,t-1)/ Pm,t-1 where Pm,t is the last closed stock market index in event month t and 
Pm,t-1 is the last closed market index in event month t-1. 
The average market-adjusted return for a sample of n companies in event month t is 
defined as follows: 
                               (2.2) 
In the case of the value-weighted arithmetic mean of the market-adjusted return, the 
formula is computed as: 

AR i,t 
1
n
ARi,t
i1
n

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
AR i,t   iARi,t
i1
n

                (2.3) 
where i is the weight of market value and is also calculated by MVi/iMVi , where MVi 
is the market value of IPO firms on the first day of trading and ARi,t is the market-adjusted 
return. The cumulative average abnormal return of company i from event month 1 to 
event month T is defined as follows: 
               (2.4) 
In (2.1), (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) this study uses the assumption that the event windows of the 
N securities do not overlap to set the covariance terms to zero. Inferences about the 
cumulative abnormal returns can be drawn using  
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (1, 𝑇)~𝑁(0, 𝜎2(1, 𝑇))                                  (2.5) 
To estimate whether the cumulative market-adjusted returns are significantly different 
from 0, a conventional t-statistic is considered and calculated as follows: 
                                                                                             (2.6) 
where  is the standard deviation of the abnormal return in the sample and n is the 
number of IPOs. 
Previous studies have reported that abnormal return distributions show fat tails and are 
right skewed. Parametric tests such as the student t-test and the conventional t-test are not 
well specified. Non-parametric tests have proven to be useful in testing for event effects 
due to well-documented (theoretical) robustness results in the statistical literature (e.g., 
see Álvarez and González, 2005; Akhigbe et al., 2006) and to be more powerful at 

CARi,t  AR i,t
i1
T


CARt ,month 
CAR i,t
(CARi,t ) / n
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detecting a false null hypothesis of no abnormal returns. Then, this study employs the 
non-parametic Wilcoxon signed-ranks test to test the null hypothesis that the median 
abnormal return is zero. This test considers that both the sign and the magnitude of 
abnormal returns are important. The statistic is given by: SN = ∑ri
+
, where ri
+
 is the 
positive rank of the absolute value of abnormal returns. It is assumed that none of the 
absolute values are equal, and that each is different from zero. The sum is over the values 
of abnormal returns greater than zero. When N is large, the distribution of SN, under the 
null hypothesis of equally likely positive or negative abnormal returns, will be 
approximately a normal distribution with: E(SN) = N(N + 1)/4 and then σ
2
(SN) = N(N + 
1)(2N +1)/24. 
2.4.2 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) 
The abnormal return of company i in event month t are BHARi,t. 
                     (2.7) 
where Ri,t  and Rm,t are the monthly return on the stock i and  the market index in event 
month t respectively. The mean buy-and-hold returns are calculated as: 

BHARi,t   iBHARi,t
i1
n

                    (2.8)
 
When equally-weighted (EW) is considered, ωi = 1/n, and when value-weighted (VW) is 
employed, ωi = MVi/∑iMVi, where MVi is the IPO firm’s stock market value on the first 
trading day. Therefore, the identification of IPO outperformance (underperformance) is a 
positive (negative) value of BHARi,t . In order to test whether the average buy-and-hold 
return is significantly different from 0 or not, a conventional t-statistic is calculated as: 
      
                  (2.9)
 

BHARi,t  (1 Ri,t ) 1
t1
T






 (1 Rm,t
t1
T
 ) 1







BHARt,month 
BHARi,t
(BHARi,t ) / n
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Many researchers document that long buy-and-hold abnormal returns are positively 
skewed or have a positive skewness bias (Lyon et al., 1999; Ahmad-Zaluki et al., 2007; 
Goergen et al., 2007; Su and Bangassa, 2011; and also others). As a result, this leads to 
the standard t-statistics being negatively biased.
 
Beginning with Fama et al. (1969), CARs provide a common approach to investigate 
long-run returns. Fama (1998) additionally proposed a bad-model problem using long-
term buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs), which compound an expected-return 
model’s problems in explaining returns in the short-run. He also suggested that CARs 
should be used rather than BHARs.
 
In order to eliminate the skewness bias and to test that 
the cumulative abnormal return and buy-and-hold abnormal returns are significantly 
different from 0, a bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics, as developed by Johnson 
(1978), were also applied as follows:  
 
              (2.10) 
where    
             
                               (5 
2.4.3 Wealth Relatives (WR) 
The relative long-run performance of IPOs is measured by the Wealth Relative ratio 
(WR) as calculated by Ritter (1991). Thus, 
                             (2.11) 

tsa  n S 
1
3
ˆ S2 
1
6n
ˆ 







S 
BHAR
(BHARt )
and ˆ 
(BHARi,t  BHARt )
3
i1
n

n(BHARt )
3

WRt 
1
n
1 Ri,t 
t1
T







i1
n

1
n
1 Rm,t 
t1
T







i1
n

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where WRt is the wealth relative ratio for the period between t = 1 and t = T. Ri,t is the 
market return of firm i in month t, Rm,t is the return on the stock index and n is the number 
of IPOs. 
In the case of Wealth Relatives being larger (smaller) than 1, it indicates that the IPO 
firm’s performance is superior (inferior) to the performance of the benchmark. This study 
used two benchmarks in this study: the SET and MAI Indices.  
In general, either raw (absolute) performance or performance relative to a benchmark 
(abnormal returns) is employed to measure long-run performance (Ritter and Welch, 
2002). However, raw returns are usually not the best measure to determine whether the 
performance of an IPO was appropriate in respect to risk and return (Bessler and Thies, 
2007). To analyze the performance of IPOs in the long-run after listing the raw returns 
with various benchmarks were adjusted and event-study methodology was also employed. 
Monthly abnormal returns are calculated for up to 36 months after going public. This 
study followed Espenlaub, Gregory and Tonks (2000) who re-examined the long-term 
underperformance of UK IPOs. To calculate the abnormal return, this study applied three 
alternative benchmarks as follows: 
2.4.4 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
CAPM was developed by Shaper (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966). In general, 
the CAPM shows how there can be a relationship between the average return of stock and 
market risk factors. However, it makes many assumptions. To calculate the abnormal 
return with respect to CAPM benchmark or CAAR, the formula is computed as:  
                    (2.12) 
where Rit is the return on the IPO company i in event month t, Rmt is the return on the 
market in event month t as measured by the return on the SET index, Rft is the one-month 
treasury bill rate in event month t, and βi is the CAPM beta of company i, estimated by 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression up to 36 months after the IPO.  

CAARit  Rit  R ft 
ˆ i Rmt  R ft  
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2.4.5 Fama and French Three-Factor Model (FF) 
The Fama and French (1993) three-factor model is used to control for event clustering 
and cross-correlation in IPO returns. Fama and French (1993) suggested using this model 
to describe the cross-section of expected returns rather than using Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM). Banz (1981) also implies that the CAPM does not describe expected 
returns on small stocks. Therefore, the three Fama-French factors are employed in this 
event study and are regressed on excess returns of IPO portfolios. The abnormal return 
with respect to the Fama and French three-factor model benchmark or FAAR, the formula 
is computed as:  
                        (2.13) 
where Rit is the monthly return on the IPO firm in event month t, Rft is the one-month 
Treasury bill rate in event month t, Rmt is the monthly return on a value-weight market 
portfolio of SET in event month t, SMBt is the difference between the returns on 
portfolios of small and big stocks or the value-weighted return on small companies minus 
the value-weighted return on big companies in event month t, and HMLt is the difference 
between the returns on portfolios of high- and low book-to market-value or the value-
weighted return on high book-to-market value companies minus the value-weighted 
return on low book-to-market value companies in event month t.  
Following Fama and French (1993) portfolios were constructed that mimic the size and 
value factors in the Thai stock market. Thai IPO firms in this study were categorised into 
6 groups: BH, BM, BL, SH, SM, and SL. This study omitted common stocks, which are 
in financial sector from the FF three-factor and Carhart four-factor construction
20
. Firstly, 
the median size value or market capitalisation was then used to divide the stocks into two 
groups; small (S) and big (B). Secondly, the stocks were also divided into three book-to-
                                                        
20 The finance literature in general excludes financial and insurance companies and banks from cross-sectional asset 
pricing tests (e.g., Brennan et al., 1998; Fama and French, 2008). The reason for excluding financial firms is their high 
leverage and their accounting treatment of revenues and profits which is significantly different than that in other sectors 
(Opler and Titman, 1994). In addition, Fama and French (2000) emphasise the regulated nature of financial firms.  The 
main prediction of an asset pricing model, though, is that the expected return on any risky asset is linear in beta. Thus, 
the cross-sectional difference between the mean return of assets is entirely predicted by their beta exposure. Since asset 
pricing models ought to capture cross-sectional discrepancies across all assets, it is an economically relevant question 
whether these models are able to price also financial stocks. 

FAARit
ff  Rit  R ft 
ˆ i
ff (Rmt R ft ) ˆ i
ff (SMBt )
ˆ i
ff (HMLt ) 
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market equity groups, based on the bottom 30% (low, L), middle 40% (medium, M), and 
top 30% (high, H) of the ranked values of the book-to-market ratio. Finally, the stocks 
were organised into six groups with regard to cross of securities group is BH, BM, BL, 
SH, SM, and SL.  
According to Fama and French (1996), the SMB and HML portfolios are organised by 
considering each event month t and sorting all IPO firms by market capitalisation and 
book-to-market value. Thus, 
 
SMBt (Small minus Big) is calculated as follows:  
SMBt  =   Average Returns of Small Size minus Big Size 
          =  (SL + SM +SH) /3 – (BL + BM + BH) /3 
and HMLt (High minus Low) is calculated as follows: 
HMLt  =  Average Returns of High BE/ME ratio minus Low BE/ME ratio 
           =  (SH + BH) /2 – (SL + BL) /2 
2.4.6 Size Control Portfolio (SD) 
Size effects have been applied to studies of IPO performances in different ways. For 
example, Espenlaub et al. (2000) used market capitalization to categorise 10 size control 
portfolios. Therefore, to calculate the abnormal return, the third model is a simple size 
adjustment where the benchmark is the average return on the relevant size-decile 
portfolio, as in the following: 
                                        (2.14) 
where SDARit is the abnormal return by using SD, and Rst is the return on the size control 
portfolio in event month t. In this model, the control portfolio returns are equally-
weighted average returns on six portfolios: BH, BM, BL, SH, SM, and SL derived from 
the Fama and French three-factor model.  

SDARit
ss  Rit Rst
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The abnormal returns which are relative to each of the three benchmarks, are cumulated 
over time up to period T after listing. The author calls this the Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (CAR). Therefore,  
                             (2.15) 
where ARit is the abnormal return form firm i in month t. When an equally-weighted 
portfolio of IPOs (EW) is considered, ωi = 1/n, and when value-weighted returns (VW) 
are employed, ωi = MVi/∑iMVi, where MVi is the IPO firm’s stock market value on the 
first trading day. 
To assess the statistical significance of CAPM, Fama and French  and  SD abnormal 
return, the author applies t-statistics based on Brown and Warner’s (1980) Crude 
Dependence Adjustment Test in order to correct for cross-sectional dependence: 
 
             (2.16) 
 
where 
 
 
 
CARt is the cumulative average abnormal return till month t, and CAR36 is the cumulative 
average abnormal return for the 36 months after going public.  
2.4.7 Calendar-time Approach 
Fama (1998) suggested that the event-time approach overstates the statistical inferences 
once it no longer controls for correlation among individual firms. Therefore, as a 

CART   i
t1
T
 ARit
t


t  stat 
CARt
t * (AR pt  (CAR36 /36))
2
t1
T



/ (35)

AR pt 
1
n
ARit
i

Chapter 2: Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
 
42 
robustness check of the results, the calendar-time portfolio approach using Fama and 
French’s (1993) three-factors was used to eliminate the potential problems of cross-
sectional correlations among Thai stocks in the event-time approach and also to obtain 
more robust t-statistics. First, the average monthly abnormal returns on a diversified 
portfolio composed of firms going public within the last 36 months in each calendar 
month between January 2003 and May 2012 were calculated. Second, Fama and French’s 
(1993) three factors were estimated to test the significance in the pattern of long-term 
returns. If IPOs overperform on a risk-adjusted basis, a portfolio of IPOs should 
consistently overperform relative to the FF model. 
The monthly excess returns on equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios of IPOs 
were regressed on the market premium, the size premium, and the value premium using 
the following model: 
Rpt– Rft= β0 + β1(Rmt- Rft) + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + Ɛt                        (2.17) 
where Rpt is the return of the IPO portfolio in month t, Rft is the one-month Thai T-Bill 
rate, observed at the beginning of month t, Rmt is the value-weighted return on the market 
index in month t, SMBt (small minus big) is the monthly return on the zero investment 
portfolio for the size factor in the stock returns or the difference between the equally-
weighted average of the returns on a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of big 
stocks, and HMLt (high minus low) is the monthly return on the zero investment portfolio 
for the book-to-market equity factor in stock returns, or the difference between the return 
on a portfolio of high book-to-market ratio stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market 
ratio stocks, constructed independently from the size portfolio.  
Furthermore, in this study an additional variant of the market model was applied with the 
inclusion of the liquidity factor. The definition of the liquidity factor (LIQt) follows 
Amihud (2002) and the author calculated it as: 
1
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∑
|𝑅𝑖,𝑡|
𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑑=1  where Ri,t is the return on 
day d in month t, Vi,t is the Baht volume of trade (in thousands) on day d in month t and 
Daysi,t is the number of trading days in month t for stock i. 
 
Chapter 2: Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
 
43 
In addition, a momentum factor was added to the Fama-French model. This study 
constructed the momentum factor (MOMt) following Carhart (1997), where MOMt is the 
average return on the two high prior return portfolios (past winner stocks) minus the 
average return on the two low prior return portfolios (past loser stocks). This study used 
value-weighted portfolios formed on size and one year-lag returns to construct the MOMt 
variable. The portfolios, which were constructed monthly, were formed on size (small and 
big) and sorted by one year-lag CAR returns (from low to high). The monthly size 
breakpoint was the median market value. The return breakpoints were the 30th and 70th 
percentiles.  
The MOMt variable was therefore defined as: MOM = ½ (Small High + Big High) – ½ 
(Small Low + Big Low). The portfolios including all Thai stocks (but excluding financial 
stocks) were reformed monthly. Finally, I estimated the LCAPM model with the liquidity 
factor: 
Rpt– Rft= β0 + β1(Rmt- Rft) + β2LIQt + Ɛt                (2.18) 
and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model:        
Rpt– Rft= β0 + β1(Rmt- Rft) + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4MOMt  + Ɛt           (2.19) 
where MOMt is the monthly return on a zero-investment portfolio for the momentum 
factor constructed as the difference in returns between a portfolio of past winner stocks 
and a portfolio of past loser stocks defined as described above. Other variables were 
defined in the same way as in the model in equation (2.17).  
The calendar-time approach method weights each month equally. This leads to the 
reduction of any underperformance when it is correlated with the number of IPOs in the 
portfolios (Gompers and Lerner, 2003). As a result, the intercepts, the estimates of which 
are based on the Weighted Least Squares (WLS) method, weighted by the square root of 
the number of IPOs in the IPO portfolios in each calendar month provide a test of the null 
hypothesis that the mean monthly abnormal return on the calendar-time portfolio is zero.  
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2.5 Empirical findings 
The previous section defined the appropriate research methodology and method, 
including the sample collection and the index creation for the study. In this section the 
data results and statistics analysis will be presented. 
The Thai IPO sample in this empirical chapter consists of 227 common stocks issued 
between 2001 and 2012 in Thailand’s stock markets. Table 2.2 shows the main 
characteristics of the data divided according to the IPO year across the whole sample and 
split into the SET and MAI subsamples. Approximately 65% of the IPO listings were 
made on the SET market and 35% on the MAI market. Although the sample size in this 
study is larger and more up-to-date than in the previous Thai IPO studies,such as 150 
IPOs for Allen et al. (1999) and 136 IPOs for Chorruk and Worthington (2010), the 
number of new issues in Thailand is still less when compared to IPO activities in Asian 
countries such as China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore (see 
Moshirian and Wu, 2010
21
).    
As in Chorruk and Worthington (2010) and Boonchuaymetta and Chuanrommanee 
(2013), nearly all of the firms in the sample issued their IPOs in 2004 and 2005. 
Interestingly, after 2006 there was a lower number of Thai IPO issues than in the previous 
period. A probable reason for this lower IPO activity is that there was a military coup and 
various political conflicts in Thailand at that time. However, the proportion of the IPOs 
issued in the MAI increased markedly compared to those in the SET market. This seems 
to be consistent with the flexibility of the MAI market’s listing regulations as mentioned 
in Chapter 1. Most of the IPO firms in Thailand belong to the Property & Construction 
industry (22.47%). The majority of IPOs in the MAI sample are from the Services 
industry (28.75%). Further analysis of industries reveals that in the SET market, 16.33% 
of the sample comes from the Services sector, 14.29% from the Financial sector, 13.60% 
from the Technology sector, and 12.93% from the Industrial sector and the remaining 
industries have less than a 10% representation. In the MAI market, 25% of the sample 
belongs to the Industrial sector, 13.75% to the Property & Construction industry, 12.50% 
                                                        
21 Moshirian and Wu (2010) reported the number of 982 IPOs (China), 563 IPOs (Hong Kong), 1,392 IPOs (Japan), 410 
IPOs (Korea), 708 IPOs (Malaysia), and 384 IPOs (Singapore) going public between 1991and 2004.    
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to the Consumer Products industry, and 10% to the Technology industry and the 
remaining industries have equal or less than a 5% representation.  
Table 2.2 Sample size of Thai IPOs 
 
Panel A: sample size disaggregated by exchange and by IPO offering year 
Year Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET) 
Market for Alternative 
Investment (MAI)  
Total 
Number % Number % Number % 
2001 6 4.08 3 3.75 9 3.96 
2002 19 12.93 2 2.50 21 9.25 
2003 21 14.29 6 7.50 27 11.89 
2004 36 24.49 13 16.25 49 21.59 
2005 31 21.09 14 17.50 45 19.82 
2006 9 6.12 6 7.50 15 6.61 
2007 5 3.40 7 8.75 12 5.29 
2008 8 5.44 3 3.75 11 4.85 
2009 5 3.40 11 13.75 16 7.05 
2010 4 2.72 7 8.75 11 4.85 
2011 3 2.04 7 8.75 10 4.40 
2012 0 0 1 1.25 1 0.44 
Total 147 100.00 80 100.00 227 100.00 
Panel B: sample size disaggregated by exchange and by industry group 
Industry Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET) 
Market for Alternative 
Investment (MAI)  
Total 
Number % Number % Number % 
Agro & Food  6 4.08 2 2.50 8 3.52 
Consumer Products 3 2.04 10 12.50 13 5.73 
Financial 21 14.29 2 2.50 23 10.13 
Industrial 19 12.93 20 25.00 39 17.18 
Resources 14 9.52 4 5.00 18 7.94 
Service 24 16.33 23 28.75 47 20.70 
Technology 20 13.60 8 10.00 28 12.33 
Property & Construction 40 27.21 11 13.75 51 22.47 
Total 147 100.00 80 100.00 227 100.00 
 
2.5.1 Long-run Performance Results in Equally-weighted and in Value-weighted 
Portfolios of IPOs 
 
In this section the empirical results, including a robustness analysis, are presented and an 
extensive discussion of the findings is provided. Table 2.3 shows descriptive statistics for 
the excess returns of the Thai IPOs over the 36 month period after going public (See more 
Table 2A, Appendix 2A, Page 64). In relatively small samples, the abnormal return 
analysis may suffer from the problem that the excess returns are not normally distributed. 
Therefore, the Jarque-Bera test was employed to verify the null hypothesis about the 
normality of the distribution. The results show that the null hypothesis cannot be 
accepted. This means that the average market-adjusted returns (ARs) between months 1 
and 36 are not normally distributed, which may cause statistical inference problems 
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(Brown and Warner, 1980). In order to control for a possible bias in the calculation of 
long-run abnormal returns using the CAR and BHAR measures, the author applied a 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic and a crude dependence adjustment test.  
Table 2.3 Average market-adjusted returns for Thai IPOs listed from 2001 to 2012, relative to two 
market benchmarks: SET and MAI and normality test 
 
Montht Nt Average market-adjusted returns (ARt) (%) 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum SD Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
1 227 -5.39 -8.57 106.59 -41.80 21.26 1.67 7.96 338.56*** 
2 227 0.33 -2.72 86.50 -28.00 15.56 0.22 10.73 746.92*** 
3 227 0.01 -1.23 64.34 -58.30 12.86 0.30 7.33 190.59*** 
4 225 2.78 -0.95 140.33 -24.68 18.21 3.81 24.52 4,888.70*** 
5 225 1.28 -0.30 49.31 -43.03 11.91 0.78 5.65 88.55*** 
6 224 0.58 -1.01 97.85 -67.89 14.73 1.50 13.96 1,204.00*** 
12 218 0.20 -0.51 49.91 -30.96 11.46 1.02 6.51 149.81*** 
24 209 -1.08 -2.69 79.20 -60.99 13.13 1.60 13.42 1,035.29*** 
36 197 0.08 -0.47 127.78 -30.15 13.33 4.71 45.48 15,538.43*** 
Note: 
This table shows descriptive statistics of market-adjusted returns up to a 36-month period after listing or going public, 
excluding the initial return (IPO underpricing). The Jarque-Bera test results of null hypothesis show distributions that 
are normal.  
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present equally-weighted and value-weighted abnormal returns of the 
227 IPO firms for up to 36 months after listing (See more in Tables 2B-2M, Appendix 
2A, Pages 65-76). These were calculated using CAR, BHAR and WR measures. The 
average market-adjusted return at the end of the first month is -5.39% and it is statistically 
significant at 0.01 level. The statistical significance of the buy-and-hold market 
benchmark abnormal returns was tested by using conventional, bootstrapped skewness 
adjusted t-statistics and sign-rank tests. This test indicates that the equally-weighted buy-
and hold abnormal returns (EWBHARs) of -5.39% (t-stat = -3.82), -4.62% (t-stat = -2.39) 
and -4.88% (t-stat = -2.43) are statistically significant in the entire sample in one-, two- 
and three-month periods, respectively. This means that the IPO underpricing or the high 
initial return of IPOs is adjusted instantaneously in the early aftermarket trading.
22
 This 
finding is similar to the results of Lee et al. (1996) and Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) which 
showed that there were negative returns in the first-month period after listing for the IPOs 
on the Australian and Malaysian stock markets, respectively. Yet they are in contrast to 
the findings of Chorruk and Worthington (2010), which show positive CARs for the Thai 
                                                        
22 Consistent with the results of Allen et al. (1999), the equally-weighted market-adjusted return at the end of the listing 
month for 151 IPOs, launched on the SET market during the 1985-1992 period, was -2.9%. 
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IPOs (15.42%) in the first month after entering the secondary market. The reason why a 
one-month CAR was still positive could perhaps be that Chorruk and Worthington (2010) 
included the initial return (the underpricing effect) when they calculated the abnormal 
return. The WRs, which are reported in Table 2.5, conform to the values of equally-
weighted BHARs in this study. As can be seen in Table 2E (Appendix 2A, Page 67), all 
wealth relatives have a value of less than 1.00 between months 1 and 36, apart from 
months 12-14 (WR = 1.00). For the main Thai stock market, the results indicate that SET 
IPOs are underperforming between -5.29% (t-stat = -3.62) at month 1 and -19.63 (t-stat = 
2.92) for the EWCARs and -16.58% (t-stat = -2.01) for the EWBHARs at month 36.  
Negative abnormal returns at the end of year 3 were also obtained using the non-
parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test and the bootstrapped adjusted t-test. This finding of  
underperformance is consistent with the results of Ritter (1991), Jakobsen and Sørensen 
(2001), Kooli and Suret (2004), Álvarez and González (2005), Almad-Zaluki et al. 
(2007), Goergen et al. (2007),  Kirkulak (2008), Mazouz et al. (2008), Wen and Cao 
(2013) and Agathee et al. (2014) showing that the IPOs underperform relative to the 
benchmarks in the long-term. However, the underperformance using EWCAR and 
EWBHAR in this study is smaller than that reported by Chorruk and Worthington (2010), 
who found a three-year BHAR of -25.39% for the Thai IPOs. In addition, these findings 
demonstrate that for the small- and medium-size IPOs from the MAI market, the three-
year EWCAR is 13.91% (t-stat = 1.20) and EWBHAR is 4.51% (t-stat = 0.33). The 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-stats and the sign-rank stats show no statistical 
significance. The EWCAR figures for the entire SET and MAI samples from Panel A in 
Table 2.4 are plotted in Figure 2A (see Appendix 2B, Page 83). The CAR, as an equally-
weighted measure, shows a poor abnormal performance throughout the whole long 
horizon period. It is also noticeable that the CAR for SET declines in performance over 
the three years after listing, whereas the CAR for MAI increases or outperforms above its 
benchmark after month 24. It can be seen from Figure 2A that both the market-adjusted 
CARs display similar patterns between the event months 1 and 13, after which period the 
CAR for SET drops instantaneously. However, the CAR pattern for the MAI sample 
moves just under the zero-return line (exhibiting underperformance) until the end of year 
2, after which it rebounds from -4.12% in month 24 to 4.05% in month 25.  
Figure 2B shows the long-run performance of the Thai IPOs by using equally-weighted 
BHAR over a 36-month horizon after going public (see Appendix 2B, Page 83). The 
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mean BHARs for both sub-samples are also negative until month 9, after which they 
become positive. Interestingly, at month 16 the mean BHAR for SET changes to a 
negative return; it is -16.58% and statistically significant at the end of year 3, while the 
IPO returns in MAI are still outperforming the benchmark during months 11 to 36 and the 
mean BHAR for the MAI sample is at 4.51% (t-stat = 0.33) in year 3 but is not 
significant. The BHAR of the SET market IPOs shows a similar pattern of increasing and 
decreasing values over the whole 36-month period following the IPO. In contrast to the 
BHAR for MAI, the abnormal return is negative during months 1 to 10, after which 
period it slightly fluctuates above the zero line until month 24. The small 
underperformance for MAI in year 2 does not continue in year 3.  
In attempts to measure long-term performance, one can apply either an equally-weighted 
portfolio of IPOs or a value-weighted market portfolio to calculate cumulative and buy-
and-hold abnormal returns. Fama (1998) argues that equally-weighted returns may produce 
different inferences from those derived from value-weighted returns. Therefore, in this 
study the author considers both equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios, which 
provide an important robustness check for the findings. 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 in Panel B illustrate the investment results in a value-weighted portfolio 
of the Thai IPOs over a 36-month horizon. The results indicate that the three-year VWCAR 
and VWBHAR are 5.51% (t-stat = 1.18) and 26.34% (t-stat = 3.75), respectively, for the 
whole sample. This finding implies that if investors buy IPOs at the closing price on the 
first trading day and hold them for a three-year period, they can generate long-term 
abnormal returns if their investment result is measured by VWBHAR. Separation of the 
Thai IPOs into SET and MAI samples further reveals more detailed patterns. IPOs for the 
SET market comprise 147 companies while the MAI market sample contains only 80 IPO 
companies.  
Again, Tables 2.4 and 2.5 document the market value-weighted cumulative and buy-and-
hold abnormal returns over a 36-month period for the SET sample. The findings contrast 
with the long-term abnormal returns of IPOs based on an equally-weighted portfolio.  It can 
also be seen that the IPO over-performance of SET in the long horizon is similar to the 
over-performance in the whole sample. This effect may be related to the size of the IPOs in 
the SET market. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 in Panel B report the VWCARs and VWBHARs of 
IPOs over 36 months after going public for the MAI sample. They show that slight 
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underperformance of IPOs occurred during months 1 to 3 and that it was followed 
afterwards only by a positive return not until the point at the end of year 3. The three-year 
abnormal return measured by VWCAR was 15.20% and significant (t-stat = 1.74) but when 
it was measured by VWBHAR it was 13.46% and not significant (t-stat = 1.24). The value-
weighted returns for the entire SET and MAI samples are plotted in Figures 2C and 2D (see 
Appendix 2B, Page 83). The long-term IPO performance, measured using an equally-
weighted portfolio, is different from the pattern when a market-weighted portfolio of IPOs 
is applied, especially for the MAI sample. It is noticeable that the lines representing 
VWCAR and VWBHAR for the whole sample and for the SET sample are nearly 
superimposed over the long horizon period. At the end of year 3, there was a positive 
abnormal return for both SET and MAI markets. However, the long-term abnormal return 
of the IPOs in the SET market is inferior to the return in MAI when considering VWCARs, 
and superior in the cases when VWBHARs are used. However, regardless of using equally-
weighted or value-weighted returns, the results show a similar long-term IPO price pattern 
in the MAI market data. This means that the size has a greater effect on abnormal returns in 
the main market SET than in the lower-tier market MAI. This may be the case because the 
SET requires a paid-up capital of more than 300 million Baht from the listed companies but 
the MAI requires only between 20 and 300 million Baht. Therefore, there is a size 
limitation for the MAI firms but no upper restriction in the SET market. As a result, the 
market size of SET IPOs has a wider range than that of the MAI IPOs. Thus, when this 
study uses equally-weighted and value-weighted methods, such a wide variation is 
observed in long-term abnormal returns. 
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Table 2.4 Equally- and valued-weighted cumulative market-adjusted returns for Thai IPOs listed from 2001 to 2012 
 
Panel A: Equally-Weighted Cumulative Abnormal Returns (EWCARs) 
Montht Entire sample                           SET sample            MAI sample 
 Nt  
(%) 
t-stat  Adj. t-
stat 
s-stat %AR
<0 
 Nt  
(%) 
t-stat  Adj. t-
stat 
s-stat %AR
<0 
 Nt  
(%) 
t-stat  Adj. t-
stat 
s-stat %AR
<0 
1 227 -5.39 -3.92
*** 
-2.26*** -5.53*** 71.37  147 -5.29 -3.62
*** 
-1.52 -4.09*** 68.03  80 -5.57 -1.86
* 
-1.32 -3.64*** 77.50 
2 227 -5.06 -2.73
*** 
-2.10*** -4.59*** 69.16  147 -5.66 -2.87
** 
-1.87* -3.33*** 64.63  80 -3.95 -1.03 -0.86 -3.22*** 77.50 
3 227 -5.05 -2.55
** 
-2.03*** -3.84*** 66.52  147 -5.30 -2.41
** 
-1.76* -2.94*** 64.63  80 -4.59 -1.17 -0.98 -2.46** 70.00 
4 225 -2.27 -0.93 -0.87 -2.48** 60.00  147 -2.31 -0.80 -0.71 -1.94** 58.50  78 -2.35 -0.52 -0.45 -1.57 62.82 
5 225 -0.99 -0.38 -0.37 -1.83* 60.89  147 -2.02 -0.67 -0.60 -1.65** 61.90  78 0.80 0.16 0.21 -0.88 58.97 
6 224 -0.41 -0.15 -0.27 -1.77* 58.93  147 -1.52 -0.47 -0.42 -1.68** 59.86  77 0.56 0.12 0.17 -0.71 57.14 
12 218 -0.78 -0.20 -0.23 -1.29 57.34  144 -0.14 -0.03 -0.01 -1.12 58.33  74 -2.58 -0.40 -0.35 -0.69 55.41 
24 209 -12.80 -2.58
** 
-2.62** -3.06*** 59.33  141 -19.43 -3.16
*** 
-2.76*** -3.16*** 60.28  68 -4.12 -0.50 -0.45 -0.76 57.35 
36 197 -4.86 -0.82 -1.49 -1.83* 53.57  136 -19.63 -2.92
*** 
-2.60** -2.69*** 56.62  60 13.91 1.20 1.30 0.78 46.67 
Panel B: Value-Weighted Cumulative Abnormal Returns (VWCARs) 
Montht Entire sample                            SET sample            MAI sample 
 
Nt  
(%) 
t-stat  Adj. t-
stat 
s-stat %AR
<0 
 Nt  
(%) 
t-stat  Adj. t-
stat 
s-stat %AR
<0 
 Nt  
(%) 
t-stat  Adj. 
t-stat 
s-stat %AR
<0 
1 227 0.97 0.95 11.17*** -4.69*** 71.36  147 1.28 1.05 13.09*** -3.38*** 68.03  80 -5.60 -2.11
** 
-1.81* -3.48*** 77.50 
2 227 1.45 1.00 7.15*** -4.23*** 69.16  147 1.67 0.96 7.54*** -3.16*** 64.63  80 -3.08 -0.82 -0.64 -3.09*** 77.50 
3 227 -0.94 -0.58 4.41*** -3.30*** 66.52  147 -0.92 -0.47 4.35*** -2.52** 64.63  80 -1.36 -0.36 -0.31 -2.04** 70.00 
4 225 -0.19 -0.10 3.92*** -2.37** 60.00  147 -0.26 -0.12 3.91*** -2.03** 58.50  78 1.41 0.34 0.32 -1.08 62.82 
5 225 1.42 0.65 3.46*** -1.95* 60.88  147 1.22 0.46 3.29*** -1.98** 61.90  78 5.53 1.29 1.29 0.01 58.97 
6 224 1.70 0.78 3.75*** -1.57 58.93  147 1.54 0.58 3.57*** -1.67* 59.86  77 5.06 1.26 1.33 0.05 57.14 
12 218 6.64 2.20
** 
7.39*** -1.57 57.33  144 6.68 1.81* 7.03*** -1.48 58.33  74 5.79 1.06 1.00 -0.11 55.41 
24 209 -0.94 -0.26 2.48** -2.91*** 59.33  141 -1.35 -0.31 2.52** -3.12*** 60.28  68 7.68 1.08 0.99 -0.24 57.35 
36 197 5.51 1.18 2.28** -1.67* 53.30  136 5.05 0.90 2.10** -2.37** 56.62  60 15.20 1.74
* 
2.02* 0.98 46.67 
Note: 
This table shows the equally- and value-weighted cumulative abnormal returns up to a 36-month period after listing or going public, excluding the initial return. Conventional t-statistics (t-stat) 
and bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics (Adj. t-stat) are the two-tailed test results of null hypothesis, which means they are equal to zero. The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test 
(s-stat) is used to test the null hypothesis that the median abnormal return is zero.  
 ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
 

CAR i,t

CAR i,t

CAR i,t

CAR i,t

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Table 2.5 Equally- and valued-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns and Wealth Relative (WR) for Thai IPOs listed from 2001 to 2012 
 
Panel A: Equally-Weighted Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (EWBHARs) 
Montht  Entire sample                                 SET sample                MAI sample 
 Nt  
(%) 
t-stat  Adj. t-
stat 
s-stat %AR
<0 
WR  Nt  
(%) 
t-stat  Adj. t-
stat 
s-stat %AR
<0 
 Nt  
(%) 
t-stat  Adj. t-
stat 
s-stat %AR
<0 
1 227 -5.39 -3.82*** -2.26** -5.53*** 71.36 0.97  147 -5.29 -3.62*** -1.52 -4.09*** 68.03  80 -5.57 -1.86* -1.32 -3.65*** 77.50 
2 227 -4.62 -2.39** -1.92* -4.87*** 71.36 0.97  147 -5.45 -2.80*** -1.84* -3.56*** 67.35  80 -3.09 -0.74 -0.64 -3.37*** 78.75 
3 227 -4.88 -2.43** -1.96* -4.31*** 68.72 0.97  147 -5.36 -2.38** -1.76* -3.37*** 68.03  80 -3.98 -1.01 -0.85 -2.66*** 70.00 
4 225 -1.51 -0.57 -0.52 -3.10*** 64.88 0.99  147 -0.91 -0.27 -0.23 -2.47** 63.95  78 -2.64 -0.62 -0.85 -1.89* 66.67 
5 225 -0.40 -0.15 -0.12 -2.53** 64.00 0.99  147 -0.84 -0.26 -0.22 -2.22** 65.99  78 0.42 0.09 0.13 -1.29 60.26 
6 224 -1.35 -0.50 -0.46 -2.74*** 62.5 0.99  147 -1.35 -0.40 -0.36 -2.45** 63.95  77 -1.36 -0.31 -0.25 -1.32 59.74 
12 218 5.40 1.08 1.14 -1.91* 61.92 1.00  144 7.65 1.19 1.26 -1.53 64.58  74 1.02 0.13 0.16 -1.09 56.76 
24 209 -5.81 -0.93 -0.9 -3.40*** 65.07 0.96  141 -8.45 -1.12 -1.07 -3.22*** 65.96  68 -0.34 -0.03 -0.01 -1.41 63.24 
36 197 -10.16 -1.42 -1.36 -3.72*** 66.49 0.97  136 -16.58 -2.01** -1.88* -3.84*** 69.85  60 4.51 0.33 0.35 -0.87 60.00 
Panel B: Value-Weighted Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (VWBHARs) 
Montht  Entire sample  SET sample  MAI sample 
 Nt  
(%) 
t-stat  Adj. t-
stat 
s-stat %AR
<0 
WR  Nt  
(%) 
t-stat  Adj. t-
stat 
s-stat %AR
<0 
 Nt  
(%) 
t-stat  Adj. t-
stat 
s-stat %AR
<0 
1 227 0.97 0.95 11.17*** -4.69*** 71.37 1.01  147 1.28 1.05 13.09*** -3.38*** 68.03  80 -5.60 -2.11** -1.81* -3.48*** 77.50 
2 227 1.93 1.26 7.72*** -4.60*** 71.37 1.01  147 2.12 1.16 7.98*** -3.44*** 67.35  80 -1.96 -0.46 -0.33 -3.35*** 78.75 
3 227 -0.73 -0.43 4.06*** -3.82*** 68.72 1.00  147 -0.74 -0.36 4.03*** -2.93*** 68.03  80 -0.67 -0.17 -0.14 -2.24** 70.00 
4 225 0.74 0.36 4.02*** -3.07*** 64.89 1.00  147 0.71 0.28 3.97*** -2.50** 63.95  78 1.33 0.33 0.29 -1.39 66.67 
5 225 3.17 1.32 4.26*** -2.59*** 64.00 1.01  147 3.10 1.05 4.05*** -2.40** 65.99  78 4.72 1.11 1.15 -0.41 60.26 
6 224 2.70 1.16 3.96*** -2.73*** 62.50 1.01  147 2.70 0.94 3.85*** -2.54** 63.95  77 2.68 0.69 0.69 -0.54 59.74 
12 218 17.37 3.48*** 6.23*** -2.42** 61.93 1.04  144 17.84 2.88*** 6.06*** -1.90** 64.58  74 7.46 1.06 1.04 -0.54 56.76 
24 209 9.37 2.14** 6.75*** -3.35*** 65.07 1.03  141 9.24 1.77* 6.25*** -3.15*** 65.96  68 12.13 1.23 1.23 -0.83 63.24 
36 197 26.34 3.75*** 2.81*** -3.96*** 66.50 1.06  136 26.95 3.17*** 2.73*** -3.91*** 69.85  60 13.46 1.24 1.38 -0.29 60.00 
Note: 
This table shows the equally- and value-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns and wealth relatives up to a 36-month period after listing or going public, excluding the initial return. 
Conventional t-statistics (t-stat) and bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics (Adj. t-stat) are the two-tailed test results of null hypothesis, which means they are equal to zero. The non-
parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test (s-stat) is used to test the null hypothesis that the median abnormal return is zero.  
 ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 

BHAR i,t

BHAR i,t

BHAR i,t

BHAR i,t

BHAR i,t

BHAR i,t
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2.5.2 Long-run Performance of Thai IPOs According to the Industry Benchmark  
In this section the author provides more robustness analysis by investigating industry 
effects. This study divided the entire sample into 8 sectors based on the Stock Exchange 
of Thailand’s sector classifications. The results of a cross-sectional analysis and the 
industry-specific CARs and BHARs are presented in Table 2.6 and in Figures 2E-2H (see 
Appendix 2B, Page 83). It is worth noting that the Thai companies going public in 2004-
2012 were not evenly distributed across all industries, with Property & Construction 
sector firms being most heavily represented. Nevertheless, in the analysis the researcher 
found a wide variation of the IPOs’ performance in the long-run across the industries.  
Focusing first on the three-year equally-weighted portfolios, it is evident from Table 2.6 
that the highest positive returns were achieved by the IPOs in the Agro & Food sector, for 
which the EWCARs and EWBHARs were 73.34% (t-stat = 0.68) and 55.91% (t-stat = 
0.47), respectively. IPO firms classified in the Property & Construction sector produced a 
three-year EWCAR of 32.01% (t-stat = 2.09) and a three-year EWBHAR of 27.13% (t-
stat = 1.47). These findings suggest that investors may generate significant abnormal 
returns if they buy Property & Construction IPOs at the closing price on the first trading 
day and hold them for a 36-month period. A possible reason that could explain their over-
performance is that after the Asian financial crisis a major government reform was 
implemented (between 1997 and 1999) in Thailand. The Thai government intended to 
stimulate economic growth and employment, and so it launched a number of large scale 
infrastructure projects, including the sky train (BTS) and the underground train (MRT). 
Therefore, the construction companies could benefit and earn substantial profits. As a 
result, several fledgling construction companies went public at this time.  
However, when this study applied the market value-weighted portfolio, the author found 
that the IPOs from the Agro & Food and Property & Construction sectors were still over-
performing, but less so than in the case of the equally-weighted portfolios.
23
Likewise, it 
can be clearly seen in Figure 2E that the EWCAR of IPOs in the Agro & Food sector 
increased sharply between months 29 and 31.  
                                                        
23 When a value-weighted portfolio of IPOs was employed, the three-year CAR and BHAR for the Agro & Food sector 
were reduced to 9.53% (t-stat = 0.22) and to 16.81% (t-stat = 0.27), respectively. 
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A probable reason which could explain this pattern is the effect of the KASET stock price 
manipulation.
24
 As a result, the Agro & Food sector produced a high positive return. The 
Financial sector exhibited underperformance in the long-run in the case of both equally-
weighted and value-weighted CARs, which were not statistically significant, but still 
showed over-performance when the author employed BHAR. The Consumer Product, 
and the Industrial and Technology sectors, both exhibited underperformance in the long-
run either using equally-weighted or value-weighted returns, with the exception of the 
three-year VWCARs and VWBHAR of IPOs for the Service sector which were at the 
levels 17.26% (t- stat = 1.78) and 17.11% (t-stat = 1.53), respectively. Panel B in Table 
2.6 shows the value-weighted three-year BHARs. It reveals the IPOs’ long-term 
underperformance in the Technology sector and that there is no statistical significance 
when a conventional t-test is employed. When this study applied the bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted t-test, I found that three-year VWCARs and VWBHARs of IPOs in 
Technology industry were -24.78% (Adj. t-stat = -3.06) and -27.75% (Adj. t-stat = -2.65), 
respectively, but that they showed over-performance in the Resource sector, where they 
were 4.68% (Adj. t-stat = 1.85) and 31.87% (Adj. t-stat = 2.06), respectively.
25
 
As can be seen in Table 2.6, the long-run performance of Thai IPOs varies across 
industries. For example, Resources and Property & Construction IPO firms outperform 
non-IPO companies in the same industry due to the major Thai government reforms in 
1999 and 2000. However, the performance of the IPOs in other industries relative to their 
industry indices is mixed. This study provides evidence supportive of the 
underperformance of IPOs in Service industry based on the event-time CAR and BHAR 
estimations using the industry index benchmark and the equally-weighting method. 
Interestingly, this significant underperformance disappears when a value-weighting 
method is adopted for both of the return measures. Likewise, the significant 
                                                        
24 The Thai Ha Public Company Limited (known also as: KASET) was listed on the MAI market in 2005 as a stock 
from the Agro & Food industry. Its offer price was 1.20 Baht and the closing price on the first trading day was 1.29 
Baht. The KASET stock price moved approximately in the band between 0.90 Baht and 1.28 Baht after listing during 
the subsequent 29 months. It was at the level of 1.51 Baht on 20thMarch 2008, after which it was pumped up to 7.85 
Baht (about fivefold) and reached a peak of 8.10 Baht on 14thMay 2008. This speculative effect was commonly 
attributed to increasing prices of rice in Thailand. 
25 A possible explanation of the finding that the Resource IPOs showed such over-performance could be that there were 
two large companies listed in December 2001 and in October 2004: Petroleum Authority of Thailand plc. (PTT) and 
Thai Oil plc. (TOP) (the Thai government is also a majority shareholder in both of them). Their stock price increased 
rapidly from 35.75 Baht and 44 Baht on the first day of trading to 171 Baht and 91.5 Baht, respectively, after 3 years 
(which means an increase by 378% (for PTT) and by 108% (for TOP)). Furthermore, both stocks are on a list of 
companies with the biggest market value (top ten) in the SET. The market values of PTT and TOP when they went 
public were 100,000 million Baht and 89, 167 million Baht, respectively. As a result, when I used a value-weighted 
portfolio of Resource IPOs, it shows a much higher over-performance than when using an equally-weighted portfolio of 
Resource industry IPOs. This may also explain the disappearance of the IPOs underperformance in a value-weighted 
portfolio in the entire sample as well as in the SET sample.   
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outperformance of Financial industry related IPOs using equally- and value-weighted 
BHARs vanishes when considering CAR measures.  Additionally, this finding shows that 
the significant underperformance of Technology IPOs using value-weighted CAR and 
BHAR changed when the equally-weighted returns are considered. The results are 
sensitive to any change in IPO return measures. These findings are in line with the 
argument of Gompers and Lerner (2003) that the relative performance of an IPO sample 
depends on the method used to examine performance. Furthermore, Ritter and Welch 
(2002) argue that the characteristics of the data on the IPO sample, in terms of the time 
period and the selection criteria, also contribute to the observed differences in the 
findings on long-run IPO performance.   
2.5.3 Comparing Long-run IPO Performance Based on the Alternative Benchmarks  
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 report the cumulative abnormal returns of Thai IPOs based on the 
CAPM, FF and SD benchmarks with Brown and Warner (1980) t-statistics and the non-
parametric Wilcoxon signed rank statistics for 36 months after going public (see more in 
Tables 2N-2S, Appendix 2A, Pages 77-82). These results are also illustrated graphically 
in Figures 2I-2N (see Appendix 2B, Page 84). For the entire IPO sample, the equally-
weighted portfolio of IPOs underperformed over a three-year horizon period. The 
equally-weighted CAPM, FF and SD cumulative abnormal returns (CCAR, FFCAR and 
SDCAR) at month 36 are -0.98% (t-stat = -0.12), -34.05% (t-stat = -3.86) and -21.25% (t-
stat = -2.59), respectively. Focusing first on the portfolio of IPOs in relation to the CAPM 
benchmark, the results are different when the sample is divided into the 2 markets of SET 
and MAI. For the SET IPO sample, it was found that a portfolio of IPOs underperformed 
in the long-run and the 3-year CCAR was -10.15% (t-stat = -1.13). In addition, the author 
obtained significant negative abnormal returns based on the signed rank test. In contrast, 
for the MAI IPOs, it was found that there was a positive return at the end of year 3 using 
EWCCAR but that this was one with no statistical significance. 
Comparing EWCCARs across the three samples in Figure 2I, it is clear that after month 
25, a portfolio of MAI IPOs outperformed above the CAPM benchmark and the CCAR 
increased to 19.05% at the end of year 3. These results are consistent with the findings in 
Section 2.5.1, where the author analysed the SET and MAI markets returns and used 
CAR and BHAR to measure the performance of Thai IPOs and found that in the long-run 
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the IPOs were underperforming in the case of the SET IPOs and over-performing in the 
case of the MAI IPOs. 
The equally-weighted FFCARs of SET IPOs at month 36 was -46.84 (t-stat = -4.65). 
However, the MAI FFCAR was -7.00% (t-stat = -0.64). This effect is similar to the 
findings of Espenlaub et al. (2000) who demonstrated that UK IPOs underperformed 
when the FF three-factor model was used, and that this underperformance was more 
severe in comparison to the results when other alternative benchmarks were used
26
. Table 
2.7 in Panel C, and Figure 2K (see Appendix 2B, Page 85) demonstrated that the CARs 
adjusted by the SD benchmark from month 1 to year 3 are negative. When the sample is 
segmented, the SET IPOs show a more dramatic underperformance than the MAI IPOs. 
At 36 months, the SDCARs of the SET IPOs and of the MAI IPOs are -29.29% (t-stat = -
3.18) and -4.32% (t-stat = -0.33), respectively. This study also obtained negative SD 
abnormal returns at the end of year 3 using the signed rank test for the entire sample and 
for the SET IPO sample. 
Previous studies show evidence that long-term post event return diminishes or disappears 
when a value-weighted substitute for an equally-weighted portfolio of IPOs is used. For 
example, Fama (1988) argues that the CAPM has a systematic problem to explain the 
abnormal return on categories of small stocks and that equally-weighted portfolio returns 
allocate more weight to small stocks, so that the so-called “bad model” problems are 
more severe in inferences from equally-weighted returns. Therefore, in this study an 
attempt was made to address the “bad model” issue. Value-weighted returns were 
deliberately considered because they provide the appropriate perspective and thus more 
correctly capture the entire wealth effects experienced by investors. The 36-month 
VWCCARs for the entire sample and the SET sample were -51.29% (t-stat = -4.22) and -
51.53% (t-stat = - 4.02), respectively. The researcher also documents significant negative 
abnormal returns over 36 months after listing for the entire sample and for the SET 
sample when the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test was applied. However, a 
portfolio of the MAI IPOs shows a slight over-performance based on the VWCAR using 
the CAPM as a benchmark, and remains close to a zero return at month 36 after going 
public with significance at 1% level (CCAR = 0.3% and t-stat = - 4.01).   
                                                        
26 Espenlaub et al. (2000) found a 60-month FFCAR of -42.77% (t-stat = -10.02), CCAR of 28.67% (t-stat = -4.92) and 
SDCAR of 21.32% (t-stat = -4.80) in their sample of UK IPOs issued during 1985-1992. These findings support Fama 
and French’s (1993) argument that the three-factor model overestimates average returns in cases of such firms during 
the IPO sample period. 
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Table 2.6 Summary of three-year cumulative, buy-and-hold abnormal returns and wealth relatives for Thai IPOs listed from 2004 to 2012 categorized to 8 sectors 
 
Panel A: Three-year abnormal return of IPOs disaggregated by industry (Equally-Weighted Portfolio of IPOs) 
Industry N Equally-Weighted Cumulative Abnormal Return  
(EWCARs) 
 Equally-Weighted Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return 
 (EWBHARs) 
 WR 
3-year CARs 
(%) 
t-stat Adj. t-stat s-stat %AR<0 
 
 3-year BHARs  
(%) 
t-stat Adj. t-stat s-stat %AR<0 
 
  
Agro & Food  4 73.34 0.68 0.82 1.07 25.00  55.91 0.47 0.72 1.07 25.00  1.43 
Consumer Products 8 -4.74 -0.16 -0.59 0.41 25.00  -4.33 -0.12 -0.92 0.14 25.00  0.94 
Financial 8 -0.38 -0.01 -1.60 -0.52 37.50  14.72 0.33 1.82* 0.11 37.50  1.11 
Industrial 25 -3.78 -0.21 -0.38 -0.63 48.00  -8.13 -0.53 -0.07 -1.19 52.00  1.01 
Resources 13 -23.69 -1.39 -0.11 0.62 30.77  -8.87 -0.51 0.78 1.16 30.77  0.96 
Service 22 -4.90 -0.28 -2.19** -0.79 40.90  -5.92 -0.32 -2.08** -1.70* 50.00  1.00 
Technology 15 -58.55 -1.18 -0.79 1.07 26.66  -50.71 -1.00 -0.36 0.71 33.33  0.94 
Property & Construction 38 32.01 2.09** 0.16 1.16 26.31  27.13 1.47 0.42 -0.01 44.74  1.19 
Panel B: Three-year abnormal return of IPOs disaggregated by industry (Valued-Weighted Portfolio of IPOs) 
Industry N Value-Weighted Cumulative Abnormal Return  
(VWCARs) 
 Value-Weighted Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return  
(VWBHARs) 
 WR 
3-year CARs 
(%) 
t-stat Adj. t-stat s-stat %AR<0 
 
 3-year BHARs  
(%) 
t-stat Adj. t-stat s-stat %AR<0 
 
  
Agro & Food  4 9.53 0.23 0.72 1.07 25.00  16.81 0.27 0.6 1.07 25.00  1.12 
Consumer Products 8 -47.57 -1.65 -1.52 1.21 25.00  -48.47 -1.54 -1.57 1.21 25.00  0.93 
Financial 8 -3.79 -0.14 -2.31** -0.52 37.50  1.28 0.04 2.62*** -0.31 37.50  1.04 
Industrial 25 -22.71 -0.67 -1.81* -0.93 48.00  -11.78 -0.99 -1.29 -1.45 52.00  0.90 
Resources 13 4.68 0.37 1.85* 1.07 30.77  31.87 1.88* 2.06** 1.25 30.77  1.12 
Service 22 17.26 1.78* 0.10 -0.97 40.90  17.11 1.53 0.03 -1.99** 50.00  1.06 
Technology 15 -24.78 -1.02 -3.06*** 0.89 26.67  -27.75 -1.23 -2.65*** 0.63 33.33  0.90 
Property & Construction 38 24.13 2.02** 1.48 1.46 26.32  15.90 1.17 1.81* -0.29 44.74  1.09 
Note: 
This table shows the three-year cumulative market-adjusted, buy-and-hold abnormal returns and wealth relatives after listing or going public categorized into 8 industries, excluding the initial 
return. t-statistics and bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistics (Adj. t-test) are the two-tailed test results of null hypothesis which means they are equal to zero.  The data include Thai IPOs 
listed between 2004 and 2012 because the 8 industry indices on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) were calculated since 5th January 2004. The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
test (s-stat) is used to test the null hypothesis that the median abnormal return is zero. 
***, * and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively 
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Again, when the value-weighted return was applied to calculate FFCARs, the results in 
Table 2.8 in Panel B show that Thai IPOs underperformed the benchmark over 3 years 
after going public except for the FFCARs in the entire sample and in the SET sample in 
the first month which are 1.59% (t-stat = 4.80) and 1.98% (t-stat = 4.97). However, there 
are negative abnormal returns for almost every month over 36 months after going public 
with the sole exception of the first trading month. The 3-year VWFFCARs for the entire 
sample and for both SET and MAI samples are -13.22% (t-stat = -0.83), -13.47% (t-stat = 
-0.95) and -7.88% (t-stat = -0.64), respectively. These results also support the findings of 
Chorruk and Worthington (2010) that Thai IPOs are underperformers in the long-run. In 
contrast to the findings from Allen et al. (1999)’s study, an equally-weighted cumulative 
market-adjusted return was used, and it was found that Thai IPOs outperform at the end 
of year 3 after listing. One possible reason for such IPO over-performance reported in 
Allen et al. (1999) may be perhaps the different sample period.  
The results of CARs, adjusted by a size control portfolio and value-weighted returns, are 
reported in Table 2.8 in Panel C and they are also plotted in Figure 2N (see Appendix 2B, 
Page 85). It can be clearly seen there that Thai IPOs still show a poor performance even 
in the long-run. The VWCAR after 36 months for the SD model for the entire sample and 
for both SET and MAI IPOs were -6.96% (t-stat = -0.51), -7.00% (t-stat = -0.49) and 
5.49% (t-stat = -0.46), respectively. In line with our expectations, this finding is 
consistent with the CARs related to the FF three-factor model benchmark because market 
capitalization and book-to-market value were used to construct 6 portfolios for the SD 
benchmark.  
Moreover, the patterns of FFCARs and SDCARs movement in the 36-month period were 
similar, irrespective of whether equally-weighted or value-weighted returns were used. 
Overall, the Thai IPOs’ underperformance, based on the FF three-factor model and on the 
SD model in the long-run using value-weighted returns, is in fact less severe than the 
underperformance when equally-weighted returns are used, unless the abnormal return is 
related to CAPM, in which case it shows an even poorer performance. However, the 
abnormal return of the Thai IPOs, related to the FF benchmark, displays a much greater 
underperformance than the returns related to other alternative benchmarks. 
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Table 2.7 The Equally-Weighted (EW) Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the 36 months after going public using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Fama 
and French Three-Factor Model (FF) and the Size-Decile Control Portfolio (SD) benchmarks 
 
Panel A: CAPM benchmark 
Montht Entire sample  SET sample  MAI sample 
Nt CCAR (%) t-stat s-stat %AR<0  Nt CCAR (%) t-stat s-stat %AR<0  Nt CCAR (%) t-stat s-stat %AR<0 
1 227 -5.39 -5.95*** -5.49*** 69.16  147 -4.97 -6.79*** -4.09*** 67.35  80 -6.15 -4.77*** -3.54*** 72.50 
2 227 -5.06 -3.94*** -3.06*** 62.56  147 -5.35 -4.77*** -2.12** 61.90  80 -4.52 -2.79*** -2.40** 63.75 
3 227 -5.05 -3.21*** -2.24** 59.03  147 -5.02 -3.62*** -1.28 55.10  80 -5.11 -2.54** -2.19** 66.25 
4 225 -2.29 -1.12 -2.42** 60.44  147 -1.91 -0.97 -1.84* 57.82  78 -2.99 -1.26 -1.62* 65.38 
5 225 -1.01 -0.43 -2.61*** 61.78  147 -2.33 -1.06 -3.33*** 61.90  78 1.49 0.49 0.10 61.54 
6 224 -0.44 -0.17 -4.19*** 66.96  147 -1.67 -0.68 -3.51*** 66.67  77 1.88 0.56 -2.31*** 67.53 
12 218 1.12 0.30 -2.39** 60.09  144 3.51 0.81 -1.41 59.72  74 -3.58 -0.65 -2.23** 60.81 
24 209 -8.92 -1.45 -5.04*** 69.86  141 -10.63 -1.52 -3.95*** 68.09  68 -5.33 -0.62 -3.15*** 73.53 
36 197 -0.98 -0.12 -4.77*** 70.05  136 -10.15 -1.13 -4.92*** 72.06  60 19.05 1.37 -1.18 66.67 
Panel B: Fama and French Three-Factor Model benchmark 
Montht Entire sample                    SET sample   MAI sample 
Nt FFCAR (%) t-stat s-stat %AR<0  Nt FFCAR (%) t-stat s-stat %AR<0  Nt FFCAR (%) t-stat s-stat %AR<0 
1 227 -5.75 -7.08*** -5.03*** 67.40  147 -5.34 -7.82*** -3.79*** 65.99  80 -6.51 -6.09*** -3.26*** 70.00 
2 227 -6.72 -5.84*** -2.47** 61.23  147 -7.22 -7.40*** -1.91* 61.90  80 -5.79 -3.79*** -1.70* 60.00 
3 227 -7.42 -5.27*** -1.02 55.07  147 -7.56 -6.16*** -0.56 54.42  80 -7.18 -3.77*** -1.03 56.25 
4 225 -5.67 -3.04*** -0.52 54.67  147 -5.18 -2.75*** 0.10 53.06  78 -6.59 -2.97*** -1.06 57.69 
5 225 -5.41 -2.53** -0.46 52.00  147 -5.12 -2.35** -0.57 51.70  78 -5.96 -2.39** -0.04 53.85 
6 224 -5.89 -2.51** -1.54 53.13  147 -5.37 -2.22** -1.25 54.42  77 -6.87 -2.50** -0.87 50.65 
12 218 -10.09 -2.86*** -2.21** 55.96  144 -8.54 -2.08** -1.76* 56.94  74 -13.07 -2.92*** -1.52 54.05 
24 209 -31.06 -4.99*** -1.21 53.59  141 -37.97 -5.16*** -0.99 53.90  68 -17.05 -2.10** -0.66 52.94 
36 197 -34.05 -3.86*** -0.23 50.76  136 -46.84 -4.65*** -0.74 52.94  60 -7.00 -0.53 0.83 46.67 
Panel C: Size-Decile Control Portfolio benchmark 
Montht Entire sample   SET sample                                        MAI sample 
Nt SDCAR (%) t-stat s-stat %AR<0  Nt SDCAR (%) t-stat s-stat %AR<0  Nt SDCAR (%) t-stat s-stat %AR<0 
1 227 -5.84 -6.58*** -4.88*** 67.84  147 -5.97 -6.85*** -3.73*** 66.67  80 -5.60 -6.04*** -3.13*** 70.00 
2 227 -5.80 -4.58*** -4.27*** 63.44  147 -6.84 -5.55*** -3.30*** 61.22  80 -3.88 -2.80*** -2.69*** 67.50 
3 227 -6.55 -4.23*** -4.06*** 65.20  147 -6.80 -4.44*** -3.23*** 65.31  80 -6.11 -3.38*** -2.43** 65.00 
4 225 -6.13 -3.36*** -3.67*** 64.89  147 -6.61 -3.67*** -3.06*** 63.27  78 -5.23 -2.48** -2.03** 67.95 
5 225 -7.38 -3.59*** -3.68*** 66.22  147 -9.56 -4.41*** -3.45*** 67.35  78 -3.27 -1.31 -1.56 64.10 
6 224 -7.23 -3.19*** -3.63*** 62.05  147 -8.83 -3.59*** -3.25*** 63.27  77 -4.25 -1.54 -1.71* 59.74 
12 218 -9.69 -2.83*** -3.23*** 62.84  144 -9.23 -2.32** -2.42** 63.19  74 -10.67 -2.36** -2.11** 62.16 
24 209 -24.83 -4.33*** -5.32*** 66.03  141 -28.69 -4.20*** -4.58*** 65.96  68 -17.21 -2.18** -2.66*** 66.18 
36 197 -21.25 -2.59** -4.34*** 60.41  136 -29.29 -3.18*** -4.29*** 63.24  60 -4.32 -0.33 -1.23 55.00 
Note: 
This table shows the cumulative abnormal returns from a 1-month to a 36-month period after listing, excluding the initial return (IPO underpricing). The benchmarks used are CAPM, FF and SD models. Brown and Warner’s 
(1980) t-statistics (t-stat) are the two-tailed test results of a null hypothesis that means they are equal to zero. The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the null hypothesis that the median abnormal return is 
zero.  
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 2.8 The Value-Weighted (VW) Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the 36 months after going public using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Fama 
and French Three-Factor Model (FF) and the Size-Decile Control Portfolio (SD) benchmarks 
 
Panel A: CAPM benchmark 
Montht Entire sample  SET sample  MAI sample 
Nt CCAR (%) t-stat s-stat %AR<0  Nt CCAR (%) t-stat s-stat %AR<0  Nt CCAR (%) t-stat s-stat %AR<0 
1 227 0.70 1.95* -5.00*** 69.16  147 1.05 2.50** -3.79*** 67.35  80 -6.68 -7.33*** -3.33*** 72.50 
2 227 -0.66 -1.28 -2.62*** 62.56  147 -0.46 -0.77 -1.98** 61.90  80 1.87 -3.21*** -1.81* 63.75 
3 227 -3.17 -4.52*** -1.89* 59.03  147 -3.07 -3.81*** -1.40 55.10  80 -0.37 -2.79*** -2.11** 66.25 
4 225 -4.17 -5.07*** -2.50** 60.44  147 -4.11 -4.37*** -2.19** 57.82  78 -0.23 -2.49** -1.27 65.38 
5 225 -6.55 -6.63*** -3.14*** 61.78  147 -6.73 -5.88*** -3.63*** 61.90  78 2.51 -1.02 0.10 61.54 
6 224 -9.89 -7.38*** -4.53*** 66.96  147 -10.15 -6.77*** -3.92*** 66.67  77 -1.54 -1.43 -2.28** 67.53 
12 218 -13.98 -4.82*** -3.05*** 60.09  144 -13.81 -4.34*** -2.24** 59.72  74 -1.73 -3.66*** -2.59*** 60.81 
24 209 -41.86 -5.79*** -4.60*** 69.86  141 -42.01 -5.46*** -3.62*** 68.09  68 -3.08 -4.56*** -3.16*** 73.53 
36 197 -51.29 -4.22*** -5.17*** 70.05  136 -51.53 -4.02*** -5.07*** 72.06  60 0.30 -4.01*** -0.92 66.67 
Panel B: Fama and French Three-Factor Model benchmark 
Montht Entire sample                    SET sample   MAI sample 
Nt FFCAR (%) t-stat s-stat %AR<0  Nt FFCAR (%) t-stat s-stat %AR<0  Nt FFCAR (%) t-stat s-stat %AR<0 
1 227 1.59 4.80
*** -4.42*** 67.40  147 1.98 4.97
*** -3.30*** 65.99  80 -6.65 -6.11
*** -3.01*** 70.00 
2 227 -0.75 -1.12 -2.14** 61.23  147 -0.57 -0.74 -1.71* 61.90  80 -4.44 -2.70*** -1.29 60.00 
3 227 -2.46 -2.72*** -1.15 55.07  147 -2.36 -2.30** -0.94 54.42  80 -4.55 -2.26** -1.05 56.25 
4 225 -2.83 -2.72*** -1.09 54.67  147 -2.72 -2.29** -0.90 53.06  78 -5.26 -2.25** -0.76 57.69 
5 225 -1.59 -1.21 -0.32 52.00  147 -1.51 -1.04 -0.51 51.70  78 -3.27 -1.19 0.42 52.56 
6 224 -4.84 -2.58** -1.63 53.13  147 -4.85 -2.41** -1.35 54.42  77 -4.53 -1.49 -1.05 50.65 
12 218 -1.64 -0.42 -2.44** 55.96  144 -1.42 -0.34 -2.12** 56.94  74 -6.23 -1.35 -1.39 54.05 
24 209 -15.69 -1.62 -0.67 53.59  141 -15.95 -1.55 -0.40 53.90  68 -10.22 -1.14 -0.61 52.94 
36 197 -13.22 -0.83 -0.41 50.76  136 -13.47 -0.81 -0.95 52.94  60 -7.88 -0.64 1.17 46.67 
Panel C: Size-Decile Control Portfolio benchmark 
Montht Entire sample   SET sample                                              MAI sample 
Nt SDCAR (%) t-stat s-stat %AR<0  Nt SDCAR (%) t-stat s-stat %AR<0  Nt SDCAR (%) t-stat s-stat %AR<0 
1 227 -0.46 -10.16
*** -4.37*** 67.84  147 -0.19 -23.93
*** -3.16*** 66.67  80 -6.2 -6.06
*** -3.23*** 70.00 
2 227 -1.40 -7.39*** -3.55*** 63.44  147 -1.32 -5.89*** -2.86*** 61.22  80 -2.93 -1.76* -2.46** 67.50 
3 227 -3.86 -5.48*** -3.23*** 65.20  147 -3.89 -5.20*** -2.55*** 61.90  80 -3.22 -1.58 -1.84* 65.00 
4 225 -5.65 -5.78*** -3.03*** 64.89  147 -5.80 -5.58*** -2.53*** 63.27  78 -2.50 -1.05 -1.57 67.95 
5 225 -9.06 -5.54*** -3.33*** 66.22  147 -9.52 -5.38*** -3.12*** 67.35  78 0.54 0.18 -0.91 64.10 
6 224 -10.06 -5.52*** -3.16*** 62.05  147 -10.55 -5.36*** -2.94*** 63.27  77 0.21 0.06 -0.97 59.74 
12 218 -7.48 -2.16** -3.15*** 62.84  144 -7.73 -2.10** -2.55*** 63.19  74 -2.31 -0.49 -1.51 62.16 
24 209 -20.77 -2.53** -4.65*** 66.03  141 -21.40 -2.46** -4.20*** 65.96  68 -7.49 -0.93 -2.32** 66.18 
36 197 -6.94 -0.51 -3.97*** 60.41  136 -7.00 -0.49 -4.13*** 63.24  60 -5.49 -0.46 -0.81 55.00 
Note: 
This table shows the cumulative abnormal returns from a 1-month to a 36-month period after listing, excluding the initial return (IPO underpricing). The benchmarks used are CAPM, FF and SD models. Brown and Warner’s 
(1980) t-statistics (t-stat) are the two-tailed test results of a null hypothesis that means they are equal to zero. The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test (s-stat) is used to test the null hypothesis that the median abnormal 
return is zero.  
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  
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2.5.4 Calendar-time abnormal return regression results  
The calendar-time portfolio approach using LCAPM, Fama and French’s (1993) three-
factor model and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model was also employed as a robustness 
check for our results. The dependent variable was defined as monthly returns on IPO 
portfolios between January 2003 and May 2012. The sample size covers a total of 113 
months. Monthly returns on the IPO portfolios over the preceding 36 months were 
regressed on Rpt– Rft, SMB, HML, LIQ and MOM variables. The maximum number of 
companies in the IPO portfolio was 122, which occurred in January-May 2006. The 
minimum number of companies was 30, which occurred in January 2003. The time-series 
regressions of equally-weighted and value-weighted IPO portfolios were estimated using 
weighted least squares (WLS) regression. 
Table 2.9 presents the estimated intercepts from the regressions as indicators of the risk-
adjusted performance of the Thai IPOs. Considering first the long-run performance of the 
equally-weighted portfolio, reported in Table 2.9 in Panel A, the mean intercept for the 
FF three-factor model is -2.2% per month for the entire sample. This value implies a 
three-year abnormal return of -55.1% [i.e. calculated as: (1 – 0.022)36 – 1]. The t-statistic 
of -6.23 indicates that the average monthly return is statistically significant at a 1% level. 
Table 2.8 in Panel B presents results when the IPO portfolios were value-weighted. In this 
case they underperformed by -2.6% (t-stat = -11.6) per month, indicating a negative three-
year excess return of -61.26%.  The results of similar regressions for the SET and MAI 
IPOs are also reported in the same table. The intercepts for the equally-weighted 
portfolios of SET and MAI IPOs are -2.3% (t-stat = -6.14) and -2.4% (t-stat = -5.01), 
respectively. The t-statistics indicate that the intercept is strongly significant for SET. 
Moreover, when using the value-weighted portfolio approach, this study found that the 
intercepts are still negative and are statistically significant at 1% levels in the case of 
either the SET or MAI IPOs. In addition to the FF model, the intercepts obtained from the 
LCAPM and Carhart’s models are also negative. These findings are therefore consistent 
with the studies of Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Espenlaub et al. (2000), 
Goergen et al. (2007), Su and Bangassa (2011) and Agathee et al. (2014) which all 
indicate IPO underperformance in the long horizon period in the US, UK, China and 
Mauritius markets based on calendar-time analysis. 
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In summary, this study can conclude that, based on the calendar-time approach, the Thai 
IPO firms during the three years period after the issuance significantly underperformed 
their benchmarks on a risk-adjusted basis using either the equally-weighted or the value-
weighted portfolios. These findings are consistent with long-run IPOs underperformance 
considering the event-time approach relative to the CAPM, FF and SD benchmarks. The 
author therefore concludes that the use of calendar-time analysis supports the findings 
that Thai IPOs produced negative abnormal returns. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter the researcher re-visited and re-assessed the long-term performance of 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in Thailand using the data for 227 Thai stocks in the 
period from 2001 to 2012. This research differs from previous studiess using the Thai 
market data (e.g. Allen et al., 1999; Chorruk and Worthington, 2010, among others) in the 
following five ways. First, this study used an updated new data set derived from the Thai 
stock market and considered two stock market segments, namely the SET and the MAI, 
as benchmarks. Second, this study constructed both equally-weighted and value-weighted 
portfolios of IPOs for the measurement of the long-term IPO performance, whereas other 
studies, such as e.g. Chorruk and Worthington (2010), used only equally-weighted 
portfolio returns. Third, this study presented a cross-sectional pattern of long-term 
performance by categorising the sample according to exchange and industrial sector 
classifications. Fourth, apart from the conventional t-test, this study employed a wider 
range of statistical tests including the bootstrapping simulation and non-parametric tests 
in order to verify the validity of the results for the event-time returns. Finally, the 
calendar-time approach was also used with a few different models, such as LCAPM, 
Fama-French and Carhart models, as a further robustness check. To the best of our 
knowledge, this study is the first about Thailand which presents empirical analysis using 
the Fama-French factors as well as momentum and liquidity factors, constructed 
specifically for the Thai stock market, which is another important contribution of this 
research. 
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Table 2.9 Calendar-time abnormal returns on IPO portfolio regressions, January 2003- May 2013 using Weighted Least Squares (WLS)  
Panel A: Equally-weighted portfolio    
                                                                Entire IPOs                                                                                  SET IPOs                                                                                       MAI IPOs 
  LCAPM FF CARHART  LCAPM FF CARHART  LCAPM FF CARHART 
Intercept  -0.027 (-5.05)*** -0.022 (-6.23)*** -0.023 (-6.46)***  -0.028 (-5.00)*** -0.023 (-6.14)*** -0.024 (-6.37)***  -0.033 (-5.18)*** -0.024 (-5.01)*** -0.024 (-4.82)*** 
Rm - Rf  0.261 (5.32)
*** 0.245 (5.42)*** 0.246 (5.51)***  0.274 (5.39)*** 0.261 (5.06)*** 0.261 (5.09)***  0.129 (2.05)** 0.091 (1.59) 0.091 (1.59) 
SMB   -0.047 (0.10) -0.059 (-0.63)   -0.026  (-0.25) -0.038 (-0.40)   -0.221 (-2.07)** -0.223 (-2.06)** 
HML   0.062 (0.69) 0.042 (0.45)   0.050 (0.54) 0.028 (0.29)   0.294 (4.09)*** 0.292 (3.87)*** 
MOM    -0.141 (-1.12)    -0.156 (-1.23)    -0.017 (-0.11) 
LIQ  0.004 (1.28)    0.004 (1.26)    0.008 (2.64)***   
Adj. R2  0.180 0.161 0.164  0.175 0.158 0.163  0.045 0.078 0.069 
Panel B: Value-weighted portfolio 
                                                                Entire IPOs                                                                                  SET IPOs                                                                                       MAI IPOs 
  LCAPM FF CARHART  LCAPM FF CARHART  LCAPM FF CARHART 
Intercept  -0.028 (-9.44)*** -0.026 (-11.60)*** -0.026 (-11.16)***  -0.028 (-9.62)*** -0.026 (-11.77)*** -0.026 (-11.31)***  -0.034 (-16.25)*** -0.030 (-20.96)*** -0.030 (-21.82)*** 
Rm - Rf  0.148 (5.26)
*** 0.139 (5.05)*** 0.138 (4.97)***  0.146 (5.19)*** 0.136 (4.95)*** 0.136 (4.87)***  0.083 (4.49)*** 0.073 (3.47)*** 0.073 (3.56) *** 
SMB   -0.067 (-1.37) -0.065 (-1.32)   -0.067 (-1.37) -0.064 (-1.31)   -0.067 (-1.69)* -0.061 (-1.33)  
HML   0.084 (2.20)** 0.088 (2.16)**   0.082 (2.17)** 0.087 (2.16)**   -0.003 (-0.11) 0.008 (0.31) 
MOM    0.028 (0.38)    0.032 (0.42)    0.077 (1.38) 
LIQ  0.001 (1.22)    0.001 (1.25)    0.003 (2.46)**   
Adj. R2  0.213 0.229 0.224  0.209 0.225 0.220  0.179 0.153 0.173 
Note: 
The sample period was January 2003 to May 2012, which consists of 113 months. The maximum number of event companies in the IPO portfolio was 122, which occurred in January-May 2006. The minimum number of event 
companies was 30, which occurred in January 2003. This table presents the regression results of the calendar-time monthly market adjusted abnormal returns using the market model with controlling liquidity and the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model: Rpt – Rft = β0 + β1( Rmt - Rft) + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + Ɛ, where Rpt is the return of IPO portfolio in month t; Rft is the one-month Thai T-Bill rate, observed at the beginning of month t; Rmt is the value-
weighted return on the SET index in month t; SMBt (small minus big) is the monthly return on the zero investment portfolio for the size factor in the stock returns  or the difference between the equally-weighted average of the 
returns on a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of big stock, and HMLt (high minus low) is the monthly return on the zero investment portfolio for the book-to-market equity factor in stock returns or the difference between 
the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market ratio stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market ratio stocks, constructed independently from the size portfolio. The t-statistics are calculated using the time-series standard 
deviation of the mean monthly abnormal returns. For  Carhart’s model, the MOM,  is the monthly return on past winner stocks minus the monthly return on past loser stock and, is included in the FF model as the additional 
explanatory variable. The statistical significance is generated after making White heteroskedasticity adjustments. The t-statistics are shown in brackets.    
***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.   
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Overall, this chapter provides that IPOs in Thailand underperformed in the long-run after 
their IPOs listing when measured by equally-weighted event time CARs and BHARs and 
by calendar-time returns. The findings are mostly consistent with previous studies. In 
addition, it was found that the stock prices of large firms behaved differently from those 
of small and medium-sized companies. Large IPOs were characterized by poor long-run 
returns, whereas the IPOs of smaller companies performed better. However, the findings 
are different when market value-weighted event time is used. The value-weighted returns 
of IPOs relative to the market over a three-year holding period show an over-
performance. Furthermore, when the sample was segmented into industry sectors, the 
results suggest that investors who used a value-weighted portfolio of IPOs to measure the 
long-term performance obtained positive abnormal returns in the long-run from the IPOs 
belonging to the Resource sector. Moreover, the IPOs from the Industrial and Technology 
sectors were characterised by poor performance.  
The findings concerning the performance of Thai IPOs over a long horizon period depend 
to some degree on the methodology and on the portfolio weighting. The results are 
sensitive not only to the methodology used, but also to the exact-time-period chosen and 
the size effect from big-sized companies (e.g. PTT and TOP) going public in the sample 
period. This implies that investors who measured their investment in the SET IPO 
companies using the event-time approach with value-weighted CAR and BHAR would 
conclude that they could gain positive returns in the long-run. However, if they omitted 
the two big firms from the IPO sample and considered the equally-weighted CAR and 
BHAR, the event-time returns related to CAPM, FF and SD models and the calendar-time 
approach, they would conclude that they cannot earn any abnormal returns irrespective of 
the alternative benchmarks and weighting methods used. In the same vein, after 
controlling for firm size, the long-term over-performance will disappear for Thai IPOs. 
The findings of this study may also assist investors to design active trading strategies 
aiming to generate superior returns by investing in new IPOs in Thailand (e.g. by buying 
the IPO stocks and/or by short-selling them when they are already listed on the market). 
In addition to this, any new issuers may benefit from the findings about the IPOs’ long-
term underperformance due to the higher offering price (lower cost of equity). Finally, the 
results presented in this study may have broader policy implications for many other 
emerging markets similar to Thailand, which are expanding globally by implementing 
economic, trade and financial reforms. These findings may be, therefore, also helpful for 
regulators overseeing other emerging markets beyond Thailand. 
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Appendix 2A A list of tables for long-run IPO performance 
Table 2A Average market-adjusted returns for Thai IPOs listed from 2001 to 2012, relative to two 
market benchmarks: SET and MAI and normality test 
 
Montht Nt Average market-adjusted returns (ARt) 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
1 227 -5.39 -8.57 106.59 -41.80 21.27 1.68 5.10 7.96*** 
2 227 0.33 -2.72 86.51 -28.00 15.57 2.21 7.93 10.73*** 
3 227 0.01 -1.23 64.35 -58.30 12.87 0.60 4.45 7.33*** 
4 225 2.78 -0.95 140.34 -24.69 18.22 3.84 22.04 24.52*** 
5 225 1.28 -0.30 49.31 -43.04 11.91 0.78 2.74 5.65*** 
6 224 0.58 -1.01 97.86 -67.90 14.74 1.51 11.23 13.96*** 
7 223 -3.03 -2.18 26.55 -147.00 15.17 -4.62 39.49 14610.9*** 
8 223 0.30 -0.83 63.87 -31.26 12.52 1.85 7.22 585.20*** 
9 222 0.49 -0.97 82.24 -75.75 14.5 0.73 10.79 1042.9*** 
10 222 0.96 -0.37 157.87 -41.40 18.16 4.96 36.04 12359.57*** 
11 220 0.70 -1.63 61.79 -24.12 12.8 1.88 6.08 447.76*** 
12 218 0.20 -0.51 49.92 -30.97 11.46 1.03 3.62 149.8*** 
13 218 -2.50 -1.68 30.18 -68.35 12.68 -1.46 5.82 367.78*** 
14 218 -0.72 -0.94 92.26 -35.47 11.94 2.31 17.10 2721.37*** 
15 217 -0.62 -1.51 44.24 -45.93 10.29 0.45 3.72 124.8*** 
16 217 -1.30 -1.61 39.98 -43.00 10.33 0.22 2.97 76.69*** 
17 217 -0.66 -1.20 68.32 -65.12 12.98 0.27 7.14 439.8*** 
18 214 -1.62 -1.46 35.01 -40.89 9.68 0.04 2.65 58.71*** 
19 213 -0.01 -1.22 54.75 -31.25 10.27 1.00 4.08 174.06*** 
20 211 -1.26 -2.03 106.92 -29.63 12.3 3.55 28.64 7296.59*** 
21 210 -1.97 -2.68 68.57 -35.63 10.21 1.70 11.05 1113.86*** 
22 210 -0.89 -0.70 67.35 -31.86 11.31 1.28 6.68 424.97*** 
23 209 0.61 -1.21 79.67 -32.02 12.41 2.32 11.29 1236.39*** 
24 209 -1.08 -2.69 79.20 -60.99 13.14 1.61 10.71 1035.28*** 
25 207 1.52 -0.25 254.23 -47.45 22.38 7.48 80.52 55125.57*** 
26 207 0.88 -0.35 68.87 -36.30 11.74 1.41 6.27 387.77*** 
27 207 -0.29 -0.96 54.18 -32.07 9.92 1.06 5.78 310.32*** 
28 207 0.99 -0.60 103.57 -45.68 14.41 3.02 18.67 3166.48*** 
29 206 1.39 0.38 97.43 -30.09 13.97 2.48 13.06 1595.64*** 
30 206 -0.70 -2.00 63.01 -46.38 12.26 1.05 5.25 260.63*** 
31 205 2.20 -1.45 301.46 -60.76 25.93 8.16 89.06 66709.92*** 
32 203 0.19 -0.36 34.43 -26.50 10.02 0.48 1.17 18.03*** 
33 200 0.51 -0.56 107.64 -66.09 16.78 3.52 22.07 4254.84*** 
34 199 0.33 -1.50 62.90 -30.78 92.54 1.87 7.96 609.46*** 
35 198 0.83 -0.27 50.59 -20.01 10.64 1.79 5.50 338.82*** 
36 197 0.08 -0.47 127.78 -30.16 13.34 4.75 43.60 15538.43*** 
Note: 
This table shows descriptive statistics of market-adjusted returns up to a 36-month period after listing or going public, excluding the 
initial return (IPO underpricing). Jarque-Bera test results of null hypothesis which distributions they are normal.   
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 2B Average and cumulative market-adjusted returns (equally-weighted) for Thai IPOs listed 
from 2001 to 2012, relative to two market benchmarks: SET and MAI 
 
Montht Nt 
 
(%) 
SD t-stat  
(%) 
Std. t-stat Bootstrap 
Skewness-
Adj t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Signed 
Rank test 
%AR<0 
 
1 227 -5.39 21.27 -3.82*** -5.39 21.27 -3.92*** -2.26*** -5.53*** 71.37 
2 227 0.33 15.57 0.32 -5.06 27.9 -2.73*** -2.10*** -4.59*** 69.16 
3 227 0.01 12.87 0.01 -5.05 29.81 -2.55** -2.03*** -3.84*** 66.52 
4 225 2.78 18.22 2.25** -2.27 36.53 -0.93 -0.87 -2.48** 60.00 
5 225 1.28 11.91 1.61 -0.99 38.71 -0.38 -0.37 -1.83* 60.89 
6 224 0.58 14.74 0.23 -0.41 39.81 -0.15 -0.27 -1.77* 58.93 
7 223 -3.03 15.17 -3.01*** -3.44 40.11 -1.28 -1.30 -2.13** 56.50 
8 223 0.30 12.52 0.36 -3.13 42.95 -1.09 -1.14 -1.93* 56.50 
9 222 0.49 14.5 0.47 -2.64 45.94 -0.86 -0.94 -1.63 56.76 
10 222 0.96 18.16 0.79 -1.68 49.96 -0.50 -0.60 -1.43 55.41 
11 220 0.70 12.8 1.08 -0.98 54.62 -0.27 -0.31 -1.30 57.27 
12 218 0.20 11.46 0.32 -0.78 56.79 -0.20 -0.23 -1.29 57.34 
13 218 -2.50 12.68 -2.91*** -3.28 58.26 -0.83 -0.83 -1.67* 55.96 
14 218 -0.72 11.94 -0.89 -4.00 58.42 -1.01 -1.00 -1.90* 55.96 
15 217 -0.62 10.29 -0.86 -4.62 59.58 -1.14 -1.11 -1.87* 53.00 
16 217 -1.30 10.33 -1.85* -5.92 60.88 -1.43 -1.37 -2.02* 55.30 
17 217 -0.66 12.98 -0.75 -6.58 62.18 -1.56 -1.49 -2.06* 54.84 
18 214 -1.62 9.68 -1.71* -8.19 63.55 -1.89* -1.68* -2.32* 57.94 
19 213 -0.01 10.27 -0.60 -8.21 65.6 -1.83* -1.71* -2.41* 58.69 
20 211 -1.26 12.3 -2.26** -9.47 66.13 -2.08** -2.05** -2.77* 59.24 
21 210 -1.97 10.21 -3.29*** -11.44 67.7 -2.45** -2.42** -3.03*** 60.00 
22 210 -0.89 11.31 -1.14 -12.33 70.21 -2.59** -2.50** -3.00*** 59.52 
23 209 0.61 12.41 0.07 -11.72 72.22 -2.35** -2.43** -2.95*** 60.77 
24 209 -1.08 13.14 -1.19 -12.80 71.73 -2.58** -2.62** -3.06*** 59.33 
25 207 1.52 22.38 1.16 -11.28 71.91 -2.26** -2.31** -2.83** 60.87 
26 207 0.88 11.74 1.08 -10.40 71.48 -2.09** -2.17** -2.56** 57.49 
27 207 -0.29 9.92 -0.42 -10.69 72.8 -2.11** -2.19** -2.51** 58.45 
28 207 0.99 14.41 0.99 -9.69 74.55 -1.91* -1.98** -2.29** 55.07 
29 206 1.39 13.97 0.92 -8.31 74.56 -1.60 -1.82* -1.92* 54.37 
30 206 -0.70 12.26 -0.82 -9.01 74.63 -1.78* -1.94* -1.95* 55.34 
31 205 2.20 25.93 1.28 -6.80 80.48 -1.21 -1.44 -1.61 53.66 
32 203 0.19 10.02 -0.97 -6.62 81.35 -1.16 -1.53 -1.68* 54.19 
33 200 0.51 16.78 -0.46 -6.11 81.23 -1.06 -1.61 -1.84* 55.50 
34 199 0.33 92.54 0.42 -5.77 122.7 -0.98 -1.51 -1.82* 54.77 
35 198 0.83 10.64 -0.14 -4.94 82.58 -0.84 -1.53 -1.80* 53.54 
36 197 0.08 13.34 0.14 -4.86 83.13 -0.82 -1.49 -1.83* 53.57 
Note: 
This table shows the equally-weighted market-adjusted and cumulative abnormal returns (EWCARs) up to a 36-month 
period after listing or going public, excluding the initial return. Conventional t-statistics and p-values are the two-tailed 
test results of null hypothesis which means they are equal to zero. The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is 
used to test the null hypothesis that the median abnormal return is zero.    
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 2C Cumulative abnormal returns for SET IPOs listed from 2001 to 2012 categorized by the 
board listing, relative to SET benchmark 
 
Montht Nt  
(%) 
Std. t-stat Bootstrap 
Skewness-
Adj t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Signed 
Rank test 
%AR<0 
 
1 147 -5.29 17.72 -3.62*** -1.52 -4.09*** 68.03 
2 147 -5.66 23.89 -2.87** -1.87* -3.33*** 64.63 
3 147 -5.30 26.66 -2.41** -1.76* -2.94*** 64.63 
4 147 -2.31 34.83 -0.80 -0.71 -1.94** 58.50 
5 147 -2.02 11.91 -0.67 -0.60 -1.65** 61.90 
6 147 -1.52 39.6 -0.47 -0.42 -1.68** 59.86 
7 146 -5.14 40.52 -1.53 -1.34 -2.20*** 58.22 
8 146 -4.77 44.43 -1.30 -1.16 -1.92** 59.59 
9 146 -3.98 45.57 -1.06 -0.96 -1.65* 58.22 
10 146 -1.45 50.69 -0.35 -0.31 -1.11 55.48 
11 146 -0.39 54.84 -0.09 -0.06 -1.09 58.22 
12 144 -0.14 57.67 -0.03 -0.01 -1.12 58.33 
13 144 -3.36 58.82 -0.69 -0.64 -1.47 56.94 
14 144 -5.48 60.52 -1.09 -1.01 -1.78* 56.25 
15 144 -6.69 61.69 -1.30 -1.20 -1.90* 52.78 
16 144 -8.99 62.91 -1.72* -1.57 -2.11** 55.56 
17 144 -10.62 64.18 -1.99** -1.80* -2.36** 56.94 
18 143 -1.13 9.68 -1.71* -2.06** -2.79*** 60.84 
19 143 -12.31 67.01 -2.20** -1.98** -2.66*** 59.44 
20 142 -14.10 67.61 -2.48** -2.21** -2.89*** 60.56 
21 141 -16.49 69.15 -2.83*** -2.49** -3.09*** 61.70 
22 141 -18.33 71.85 -3.03*** -2.65*** -3.19*** 62.41 
23 141 -18.51 73.2 -3.00*** -2.64*** -3.18*** 63.12 
24 141 -19.43 73.05 -3.16*** -2.76*** -3.16*** 60.28 
25 141 -20.47 72.94 -3.33*** -2.89*** -3.37*** 63.12 
26 141 -19.52 72.79 -3.18*** -2.78*** -3.19*** 60.99 
27 141 -19.70 73.9 -3.66*** -2.77*** -3.14*** 61.70 
28 141 -17.99 75.51 -2.83*** -2.52** -2.85*** 57.45 
29 140 -17.23 75.51 -2.70*** -2.41** -2.54** 56.43 
30 140 -18.36 75.48 -2.88*** -2.55** -2.68*** 58.57 
31 140 -17.76 76.55 -2.75*** -2.45** -2.47** 58.57 
32 140 -17.30 77.74 -2.63** -2.37** -2.36** 57.86 
33 139 -18.35 77.72 -2.78*** -2.49** -2.46** 58.27 
34 139 -18.40 78.74 -2.75*** -2.47** -2.48** 57.55 
35 138 -19.04 78.18 -2.86*** -2.55** -2.57** 56.52 
36 136 -19.63 78.35 -2.92*** -2.60** -2.69*** 56.62 
Note: 
This table shows the equally-weighted cumulative abnormal returns (EWCARs) up to a 36-month period after listing or 
going public, excluding the initial return. Conventional t-statistics are the two-tailed test results of null hypothesis 
which means they are equal to zero. The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the null hypothesis 
that the median abnormal return is zero. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels 
respectively. 
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Table 2D Cumulative abnormal returns for MAI IPOs listed from 2001 to 2012 categorized by the 
board listing, relative to MAI benchmark 
 
Montht Nt  
(%) 
Std. t-stat Bootstrap 
Skewness-
Adj t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Signed 
Rank test 
%AR<0 
 
1 80 -5.57 26.7 -1.86* -1.32 -3.64*** 77.50 
2 80 -3.95 34.2 -1.03 -0.86 -3.22*** 77.50 
3 80 -4.59 35.05 -1.17 -0.98 -2.46** 70.00 
4 78 -2.35 39.76 -0.52 -0.45 -1.57 62.82 
5 78 0.80 42.72 0.16 0.21 -0.88 58.97 
6 77 0.56 40.43 0.12 0.17 -0.71 57.14 
7 77 -1.48 39.45 -0.33 -0.27 -0.65 53.25 
8 77 -1.29 40.16 -0.28 -0.23 -0.63 50.65 
9 76 -1.43 46.91 -0.27 -0.22 -0.52 53.95 
10 76 -3.49 48.84 -0.62 -0.55 -0.87 55.26 
11 74 -2.86 54.51 -0.45 -0.40 -0.69 55.41 
12 74 -2.58 55.35 -0.40 -0.35 -0.69 55.41 
13 74 -3.68 57.53 -0.55 -0.50 -0.83 54.05 
14 74 -1.67 54.41 -0.26 -0.22 -0.75 55.41 
15 73 -1.03 55.39 -0.16 -0.12 -0.57 53.42 
16 73 -0.35 56.65 -0.05 -0.02 -0.48 54.79 
17 73 0.90 57.68 0.13 0.17 -0.08 50.68 
18 71 1.52 60.22 0.21 0.25 0.06 52.11 
19 70 -0.12 62.29 -0.02 0.02 -0.37 57.14 
20 69 -2.20 62.68 -0.29 -0.25 -0.77 56.52 
21 69 -4.47 64.38 -0.58 -0.53 -0.95 56.52 
22 69 -3.40 66.12 -0.43 -0.39 -0.61 53.62 
23 68 -2.70 69.43 -0.32 -0.29 -0.56 55.88 
24 68 -4.12 68.28 -0.50 -0.45 -0.76 57.35 
25 66 4.05 67.2 0.49 0.53 -0.05 56.06 
26 66 4.78 66.13 0.59 0.64 0.23 50.00 
27 66 4.27 68.09 0.51 0.55 0.20 51.52 
28 66 3.72 70.74 0.43 0.47 0.27 50.00 
29 66 4.80 70.74 0.55 0.60 0.38 50.00 
30 66 5.01 70.76 0.58 0.62 0.51 48.48 
31 65 11.25 85.66 1.06 1.14 0.82 43.08 
32 63 8.68 86.81 0.79 0.85 0.51 46.03 
33 61 9.71 86.21 0.88 0.94 0.36 49.18 
34 60 11.48 88.46 1.01 1.08 0.44 48.33 
35 60 12.46 88.73 1.09 1.17 0.59 46.67 
36 60 13.91 89.43 1.20 1.30 0.78 46.67 
Note: 
This table shows the equally-weighted cumulative abnormal returns (EWCARs) up to a 36-month period after listing or 
going public, excluding the initial return. Conventional t-statistics are the two-tailed test results of null hypothesis 
which means they are equal to zero. The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the null hypothesis 
that the median abnormal return is zero.  
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 2E Buy-and-hold abnormal returns and wealth relatives for Thai IPOs listed from 2001 to 
2012, relative to two market benchmarks: SET and MAI 
 
Montht Nt  
(%) 
Std. t-stat Bootstrap 
Skewness-
Adj t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Signed 
Rank test 
%AR<0 
 
WR 
1 227 -5.39 21.27 -3.82*** -2.26** -5.53*** 71.36 0.97 
2 227 -4.62 29.16 -2.39** -1.92* -4.87*** 71.36 0.97 
3 227 -4.88 30.3 -2.43** -1.96* -4.31*** 68.72 0.97 
4 225 -1.51 39.72 -0.57 -0.52 -3.10*** 64.88 0.99 
5 225 -0.40 40.4 -0.15 -0.12 -2.53** 64.00 0.99 
6 224 -1.35 40.09 -0.50 -0.46 -2.74*** 62.5 0.99 
7 223 -2.70 41.18 -0.98 -0.90 -2.68*** 60.09 0.98 
8 223 -2.07 44.72 -0.69 -0.64 -2.36** 60.98 0.98 
9 222 -1.12 49.06 -0.34 -0.31 -2.41** 61.26 0.98 
10 222 0.85 55.9 0.23 0.25 -2.12** 59.00 0.99 
11 220 3.92 66.93 0.87 0.91 -1.91* 61.36 1.00 
12 218 5.40 72.59 1.08 1.14 -1.91* 61.92 1.00 
13 218 4.68 76.24 0.91 0.95 -2.03** 60.09 1.00 
14 218 3.31 78.08 0.63 0.65 -2.34** 61.00 1.00 
15 217 2.08 76.96 0.40 0.42 -2.49** 60.37 0.99 
16 217 0.50 77.01 0.10 0.11 -2.57** 60.83 0.98 
17 217 -0.72 77.26 -0.14 -0.12 -2.75*** 61.75 0.98 
18 214 -1.46 80.36 -0.27 -0.25 -2.92*** 63.55 0.97 
19 213 -0.92 84.83 -0.16 -0.14 -2.99*** 62.44 0.98 
20 211 -2.62 84.5 -0.45 -0.43 -3.24*** 62.55 0.97 
21 210 -5.01 82.99 -0.88 -0.84 -3.32*** 65.23 0.96 
22 210 -4.37 86.33 -0.73 -0.71 -3.26*** 64.28 0.96 
23 209 -3.42 91.2 -0.54 -0.52 -3.12*** 64.11 0.97 
24 209 -5.81 90.05 -0.93 -0.9 -3.40*** 65.07 0.96 
25 207 -5.83 92.05 -0.91 -0.88 -3.56*** 64.25 0.95 
26 207 -6.40 88.32 -1.04 -1.00 -3.54*** 63.28 0.95 
27 207 -6.26 90.24 -1.00 -0.96 -3.48*** 63.76 0.95 
28 207 -5.84 95.62 -0.88 -0.85 -3.58*** 65.70 0.95 
29 206 -5.90 95.64 -0.89 -0.85 -3.46*** 63.10 0.96 
30 206 -6.77 98.13 -0.99 -0.96 -3.57*** 63.10 0.96 
31 205 -4.49 103.24 -0.62 -0.60 -3.24*** 62.92 0.97 
32 203 -5.24 104.18 -0.72 -0.69 -3.19*** 63.05 0.97 
33 200 -7.75 100.86 -1.09 -1.05 -3.50*** 64.50 0.96 
34 199 -6.98 107.73 -0.91 -0.89 -3.52*** 64.82 0.96 
35 198 -9.61 98.07 -1.38 -1.32 -3.53*** 64.64 0.97 
36 197 -10.16 100.05 -1.42 -1.36 -3.72*** 66.49 0.97 
Note: 
This table shows the equally-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (EWBHARs) and wealth relatives up to a 36-
month period after listing or going public, excluding the initial return. Conventional t-statistics and skewness-adjusted 
t-statistics are the two-tailed test results of null hypothesis, which means they are equal to zero. The non-parametric 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the null hypothesis that the median abnormal return is zero. 
 ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 2F Buy-and-hold abnormal returns and wealth relatives for SET IPOs listed from 2001 to 
2012, relative to SET benchmark 
 
Montht Nt  
(%) 
Std. t-stat Bootstrap 
Skewness-
Adj t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
test 
%AR<0 
 
1 147 -5.29 17.72 -3.62*** -1.52 -4.09*** 68.03 
2 147 -5.45 23.60 -2.80*** -1.84* -3.56*** 67.35 
3 147 -5.36 27.30 -2.38** -1.76* -3.37*** 68.03 
4 147 -0.91 40.83 -0.27 -0.23 -2.47** 63.95 
5 147 -0.84 39.64 -0.26 -0.22 -2.22** 65.99 
6 147 -1.35 40.76 -0.40 -0.36 -2.45** 63.95 
7 146 -3.02 43.25 -0.84 -0.77 -2.58** 62.33 
8 146 -1.94 47.24 -0.50 -0.45 -2.07** 62.33 
9 146 -1.48 49.79 -0.36 -0.32 -2.44** 63.70 
10 146 2.13 57.98 0.44 0.48 -1.74* 55.48 
11 146 5.48 68.68 0.96 1.02 -1.67* 64.38 
12 144 7.65 77.34 1.19 1.26 -1.53 64.58 
13 144 6.29 79.38 0.95 1.00 -1.75* 61.11 
14 144 4.57 84.70 0.65 0.68 -2.13** 61.81 
15 144 2.04 81.81 0.30 0.32 -2.52** 60.42 
16 144 -0.48 81.44 -0.07 -0.05 -2.65*** 61.11 
17 144 -2.81 82.07 -0.41 -0.39 -2.94*** 65.28 
18 143 -4.62 83.58 -0.66 -0.63 -3.27*** 66.43 
19 143 -3.43 88.20 -0.59 -0.44 -3.08*** 62.94 
20 142 -5.22 87.17 -0.71 -0.68 -3.09*** 64.08 
21 141 -7.67 84.58 -1.08 -1.02 -3.04*** 66.67 
22 141 -7.44 87.87 -1.01 -0.96 -3.11*** 65.96 
23 141 -6.25 93.91 -0.79 -0.76 -3.12*** 65.96 
24 141 -8.45 89.38 -1.12 -1.07 -3.22*** 65.96 
25 141 -9.94 90.48 -1.30 -1.24 -3.50*** 65.25 
26 141 -9.87 89.13 -1.32 -1.25 -3.44*** 65.25 
27 141 -9.63 92.38 -1.24 -1.18 -3.43*** 65.96 
28 141 -8.64 97.15 -1.06 -1.01 3.48*** 68.79 
29 140 -9.31 94.82 -1.16 -1.11 -3.39*** 65.71 
30 140 -10.73 95.94 -1.32 -1.26 -3.66*** 66.43 
31 140 -10.85 95.93 -1.34 -1.27 -3.44*** 67.86 
32 140 -9.74 99.43 -1.16 -1.11 -3.21*** 67.14 
33 139 -12.62 98.18 -1.52 -1.44 -3.44*** 67.63 
34 139 -11.34 107.84 -1.24 -1.19 -3.52*** 66.91 
35 138 -15.06 93.28 -1.90* -1.77* -3.53*** 67.39 
36 136 -16.58 96.35 -2.01** -1.88* -3.84*** 69.85 
Note: 
This table shows the equally-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (EWBHARs) and wealth relatives up to a 36-
month period after listing or going public, excluding the initial return. Conventional t-statistics and skewness-adjusted 
t-statistics are the two-tailed test results of null hypothesis, which means they are equal to zero. The non-parametric 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the null hypothesis that the median abnormal return is zero. 
 ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 2G Buy-and-hold abnormal returns and wealth relatives for MAI IPOs listed from 2001 to 
2012, relative to MAI benchmark 
 
Montht Nt  Std. t-stat Bootstrap 
Skewness-
Adj t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
test 
%AR<0 
 
1 80 -5.57 26.71 -1.86* -1.32 -3.65*** 77.50 
2 80 -3.09 37.41 -0.74 -0.64 -3.37*** 78.75 
3 80 -3.98 35.31 -1.01 -0.85 -2.66*** 70.00 
4 78 -2.64 37.79 -0.62 -0.85 -1.89* 66.67 
5 78 0.42 42.05 0.09 0.13 -1.29 60.26 
6 77 -1.36 39.05 -0.31 -0.25 -1.32 59.74 
7 77 -2.09 37.19 -0.49 -0.42 -0.99 55.84 
8 77 -2.31 39.79 -0.51 -0.44 -1.19 58.44 
9 76 -0.42 47.94 -0.08 -0.04 -0.79 56.58 
10 76 -1.62 51.96 -0.27 -0.23 -1.21 56.58 
11 74 0.84 63.67 0.11 0.14 -0.94 55.41 
12 74 1.02 65.94 0.13 0.16 -1.09 56.76 
13 74 1.54 70.16 0.19 0.22 -1.10 58.11 
14 74 0.85 63.72 0.12 0.15 -1.07 59.46 
15 73 2.16 66.92 0.28 0.31 -0.81 60.27 
16 73 2.43 67.92 0.31 0.34 -0.75 60.27 
17 73 3.39 67.11 0.43 0.47 -0.53 54.79 
18 71 4.92 73.60 0.56 0.61 -0.42 57.75 
19 70 4.21 77.85 0.45 0.49 -0.90 61.43 
20 69 2.73 79.07 0.29 0.32 -1.35 59.42 
21 69 0.42 79.98 0.04 0.07 -1.51 62.32 
22 69 1.9 83.36 0.19 0.22 -1.36 60.87 
23 68 2.44 85.68 0.24 0.26 -1.14 60.29 
24 68 -0.34 91.83 -0.03 -0.01 -1.41 63.24 
25 66 2.96 95.42 0.25 0.28 -1.16 62.12 
26 66 1.00 86.78 0.09 0.12 -1.24 59.09 
27 66 0.95 85.72 0.09 0.11 -1.12 59.09 
28 66 0.16 92.72 0.01 0.04 -1.17 59.09 
29 66 1.32 97.70 0.11 0.13 -1.08 57.58 
30 66 1.62 102.89 0.13 0.15 -0.92 56.06 
31 65 9.21 117.09 0.63 0.67 -0.58 52.31 
32 63 4.75 114.24 0.33 0.35 -0.83 53.97 
33 61 3.35 106.71 0.25 0.27 -1.02 57.38 
34 60 3.09 107.71 0.22 0.24 -1.00 60.00 
35 60 2.91 108.07 0.21 0.23 -1.00 58.33 
36 60 4.51 107.45 0.33 0.35 -0.87 60.00 
Note: 
This table shows the equally-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (EWBHARs) and wealth relatives up to a 36-
month period after listing or going public, excluding the initial return. Conventional t-statistics and skewness-adjusted 
t-statistics are the two-tailed test results of null hypothesis, which means they are equal to zero. The non-parametric 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the null hypothesis that the median abnormal return is zero. 
 ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 2H Cumulative abnormal returns for Thai IPOs listed from 2001 to 2012 categorized by the 
board listing, relative to two market benchmarks: SET and MAI indices 
 
Montht Nt  
(%) 
Std. t-stat Bootstrap 
Skewness-
Adj t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Signed 
Rank test 
%AR<0 
 
1 227 0.97 15.35 0.95 11.17*** -4.69*** 71.36 
2 227 1.45 21.83 1.00 7.15*** -4.23*** 69.16 
3 227 -0.94 24.38 -0.58 4.41*** -3.30*** 66.52 
4 225 -0.19 28 -0.10 3.92*** -2.37** 60.00 
5 225 1.42 32.51 0.65 3.46*** -1.95* 60.88 
6 224 1.7 32.65 0.78 3.75*** -1.57 58.93 
7 223 -0.66 33.88 -0.29 2.90*** -1.92* 56.50 
8 223 0.45 34.37 0.19 3.41*** -1.90* 56.50 
9 222 2.69 37.75 1.06 4.60*** -1.70* 56.75 
10 222 5.25 39.99 1.95* 7.82*** -1.02 55.40 
11 220 6.66 44.53 2.22** 7.67*** -1.54 57.27 
12 218 6.64 44.53 2.20** 7.39*** -1.57 57.33 
13 218 4.76 42.94 1.64 6.30*** -1.88* 55.96 
14 218 4.78 43.18 1.63 6.59*** -1.94* 55.96 
15 217 3.11 45.66 1.00 4.21*** -1.62 52.99 
16 217 3.42 47.23 1.07 4.43*** -1.70* 55.3 
17 217 0.81 46.61 0.26 3.04*** -2.25** 54.84 
18 214 2.2 48.4 0.66 3.41*** -2.71*** 57.94 
19 213 2.82 48.91 0.84 3.87*** -2.21** 58.68 
20 211 3.13 48.69 0.93 4.27*** -2.41** 59.24 
21 210 1.33 49.93 0.39 2.98*** -2.78*** 60.00 
22 210 1.12 52.22 0.32 2.81*** -2.77*** 59.52 
23 209 -0.1 52.43 -0.03 2.54** -2.97*** 60.77 
24 209 -0.94 52.77 -0.26 2.48** -2.91*** 59.33 
25 207 -2.39 54.42 -0.63 2.35** -2.99*** 60.87 
26 207 -1.62 54.24 -0.43 2.25** -2.57** 57.49 
27 207 3.77 61.25 0.88 2.19** -2.77*** 58.45 
28 207 3.11 61.15 0.75 2.10** -2.28** 55.07 
29 206 3.79 58.23 0.93 2.44** -1.84** 54.37 
30 206 3.25 58.99 0.81 2.28** -2.05** 55.34 
31 205 5.89 61.48 1.37 3.04*** -1.75* 53.66 
32 203 6.72 63.39 1.51 2.95*** -1.68* 54.19 
33 200 5.16 63.96 1.14 2.36** -1.95* 55.50 
34 199 4.33 64.48 0.95 2.15** -1.84* 54.77 
35 198 5.87 64.87 1.27 2.50** -1.80* 53.54 
36 197 5.51 65.74 1.18 2.28** -1.67* 53.30 
Note: 
This table shows the value-weighted cumulative abnormal returns (VWCARs) up to a 36-month period after listing or 
going public, excluding the initial return. Conventional t-statistics are the two-tailed test results of null hypothesis 
which means they are equal to zero. The nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the null hypothesis 
that the median abnormal return is zero. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels 
respectively. 
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Table 2I Buy-and-hold abnormal returns for Thai IPOs listed from 2001 to 2012 categorized by the 
board listing, relative to two market benchmarks: SET and MAI indices 
 
Montht Nt  Std. t-stat Bootstrap 
Skewness-
Adj t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Signed 
Rank test 
%AR<0 
 
1 227 0.97 15.35 0.95 11.17*** -4.69*** 71.37 
2 227 1.93 23.2 1.26 7.72*** -4.60*** 71.37 
3 227 -0.73 25.57 -0.43 4.06*** -3.82*** 68.72 
4 225 0.74 31.23 0.36 4.02*** -3.07*** 64.89 
5 225 3.17 35.95 1.32 4.26*** -2.59*** 64.00 
6 224 2.70 34.73 1.16 3.96*** -2.73*** 62.50 
7 223 2.19 38.91 0.84 3.13*** -2.63*** 60.09 
8 223 3.37 39.22 1.28 4.63*** -2.52** 60.99 
9 222 7.94 50.84 2.33** 5.43*** -2.69*** 61.26 
10 222 12.34 60.79 3.02*** 6.22*** -2.00** 59.01 
11 220 17.88 78.73 3.37*** 5.39*** -2.37** 61.36 
12 218 17.37 73.8 3.48*** 6.23*** -2.42** 61.93 
13 218 13.73 61.5 3.30*** 7.91*** -2.17** 60.09 
14 218 13.20 62.44 3.12*** 7.61*** -2.42** 61.01 
15 217 13.30 72.4 2.71*** 5.01*** -2.41** 60.37 
16 217 14.29 73.45 2.87*** 5.33*** -2.52** 60.83 
17 217 9.45 66.12 2.10** 4.60*** -3.00*** 61.75 
18 214 10.92 67.65 2.36** 5.06*** -3.16*** 63.55 
19 213 11.76 67.26 2.55** 6.07*** -2.69*** 62.44 
20 211 12.06 62.79 2.79*** 7.86*** -2.96*** 62.56 
21 210 9.91 59.4 2.42** 7.34*** -3.23*** 65.24 
22 210 9.88 61.63 2.36** 7.78*** -3.13*** 64.29 
23 209 8.93 61.63 2.10** 7.26*** -3.12*** 64.11 
24 209 9.37 63.14 2.14** 6.75*** -3.35*** 65.07 
25 207 10.68 68.65 2.24** 5.09*** -3.42*** 64.25 
26 207 11.48 66.25 2.49** 5.25*** -3.21*** 63.29 
27 207 29.09 100.31 4.17*** 3.12*** -3.62*** 63.77 
28 207 24.47 90.36 3.99*** 3.65*** -3.68*** 65.70 
29 206 20.89 85.65 3.50*** 3.07*** -3.35*** 63.11 
30 206 19.59 84.04 3.43*** 3.15*** -3.60*** 63.11 
31 205 23.63 88.4 3.83*** 3.49*** -3.39*** 62.93 
32 203 25.23 91.41 3.93*** 3.35*** -3.50*** 63.05 
33 200 23.85 93.45 3.61*** 2.78*** -3.77*** 64.50 
34 199 24.06 94.57 3.59*** 2.83*** -3.58*** 64.82 
35 198 24.95 93.53 3.75*** 3.01*** -3.64*** 64.65 
36 197 26.34 98.63 3.75*** 2.81*** -3.96*** 66.50 
Note: 
This table shows the value-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (VWBHARs) up to a 36-month period after listing 
or going public, excluding the initial return. Conventional t-statistics are the two-tailed test results of null hypothesis 
which means they are equal to zero. The nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the null hypothesis 
that the median abnormal return is zero. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels 
respectively. 
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Table 2J Cumulative abnormal returns for SET IPOs listed from 2001 to 2012 categorized by the 
board listing, relative to SET benchmark 
 
Montht Nt  
(%) 
Std. t-stat Bootstrap 
Skewness-
Adj t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Signed 
Rank test 
%AR<0 
 
1 147 1.28 14.76 1.05 13.09*** -3.38*** 68.03 
2 147 1.67 21.1 0.96 7.54*** -3.16*** 64.63 
3 147 -0.92 23.84 -0.47 4.35*** -2.52** 64.63 
4 147 -0.26 27.54 -0.12 3.91*** -2.03** 58.50 
5 147 1.22 32.22 0.46 3.29*** -1.98** 61.90 
6 147 1.54 32.51 0.58 3.57*** -1.67* 59.86 
7 146 -0.84 33.86 -0.30 2.90*** -2.10** 58.22 
8 146 0.28 34.27 0.10 3.33*** -1.96** 59.59 
9 146 2.56 37.54 0.82 4.33*** -1.98** 58.22 
10 146 5.30 39.84 1.61 7.49*** -1.12 55.48 
11 146 6.74 44.4 1.83* 7.34*** -1.50 58.22 
12 144 6.68 44.41 1.81* 7.03*** -1.48 58.33 
13 144 4.77 42.62 1.34 6.01*** -1.83* 56.94 
14 144 4.74 42.93 1.33 6.22*** -1.99** 56.25 
15 144 3.01 45.54 0.79 3.99*** -1.82* 52.78 
16 144 3.28 47.09 0.84 4.16*** -1.93** 55.56 
17 144 0.57 46.44 0.15 2.93*** -2.51** 56.94 
18 143 1.92 48.32 0.48 3.18*** -2.94*** 60.84 
19 143 2.60 48.81 0.64 3.61*** -2.38** 59.44 
20 142 3.04 48.63 0.74 4.05*** -2.50** 60.56 
21 141 1.21 49.85 0.29 2.89*** -2.78*** 61.70 
22 141 0.91 52.19 0.21 2.71*** -2.89*** 62.41 
23 141 -0.52 52.1 -0.12 2.51** -3.12*** 63.12 
24 141 -1.35 52.43 -0.31 2.52** -3.12*** 60.28 
25 141 -3.05 54.25 -0.67 2.49** -3.35*** 63.12 
26 141 -2.23 54.15 -0.49 2.34** -3.05*** 60.99 
27 141 3.42 61.48 0.66 2.05** -3.28*** 61.70 
28 141 2.71 61.29 0.53 1.97** -2.79*** 57.45 
29 140 3.41 58.24 0.69 2.26** -2.39** 56.43 
30 140 2.91 59.04 0.58 2.14** -2.60*** 58.57 
31 140 5.52 61.32 1.07 2.79*** -2.36** 58.57 
32 140 6.47 63.34 1.21 2.75*** -2.19** 57.86 
33 139 4.88 63.91 0.90 2.21** -2.46** 58.27 
34 139 3.92 64.27 0.72 2.00** -2.40** 57.55 
35 138 5.50 64.71 1.00 2.32** -2.37** 56.52 
36 136 5.05 65.61 0.90 2.10** -2.37** 56.62 
Note: 
This table shows the value-weighted cumulative abnormal returns (VWCARs) up to a 36-month period after listing or 
going public, excluding the initial return. Conventional t-statistics are the two-tailed test results of null hypothesis 
which means they are equal to zero. The nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the null hypothesis 
that the median abnormal return is zero. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels 
respectively. 
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Table 2K Buy-and-hold abnormal returns for Thai IPOs listed from 2001 to 2012 categorized by the 
board listing, relative to SET benchmark 
 
Montht Nt  Std. t-stat Bootstrap 
Skewness-
Adj t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Signed 
Rank test 
%AR<0 
 
1 147 1.28 14.76 1.05 13.09*** -3.38*** 68.03 
2 147 2.12 22.23 1.16 7.98*** -3.44*** 67.35 
3 147 -0.74 25.05 -0.36 4.03*** -2.93*** 68.03 
4 147 0.71 31.02 0.28 3.97*** -2.50** 63.95 
5 147 3.10 35.87 1.05 4.05*** -2.40** 65.99 
6 147 2.70 34.76 0.94 3.85*** -2.54** 63.95 
7 146 2.20 39.18 0.68 3.07*** -2.56** 62.33 
8 146 3.42 39.33 1.05 4.50*** -2.27** 62.33 
9 146 8.02 51.06 1.90* 5.20*** -2.73** 63.70 
10 146 12.67 61.17 2.50** 6.05*** -1.86* 60.27 
11 146 18.36 79.42 2.79*** 5.25*** -1.93** 64.38 
12 144 17.84 74.32 2.88*** 6.06*** -1.90** 64.58 
13 144 14.02 61.42 2.74*** 7.64*** -1.79* 61.11 
14 144 13.50 62.67 2.58** 7.36*** -2.05** 61.81 
15 144 13.60 73.03 2.23** 4.85*** -2.24** 60.42 
16 144 14.59 74.05 2.36** 5.15*** -2.39** 61.11 
17 144 9.54 66.49 1.72* 4.40*** -2.86*** 65.28 
18 143 10.97 67.96 1.93** 4.80*** -3.10*** 66.43 
19 143 11.84 67.39 2.10** 5.77*** -2.56** 62.94 
20 142 12.27 62.7 2.33** 7.54*** -2.60*** 64.08 
21 141 10.05 59.08 2.02** 7.03*** -2.84*** 66.67 
22 141 9.89 61.08 1.92** 7.33*** -2.83*** 65.96 
23 141 8.75 60.98 1.70* 6.66*** -2.92*** 65.96 
24 141 9.24 62.14 1.77* 6.25*** -3.15*** 65.96 
25 141 10.47 67.54 1.84* 4.69*** -3.43*** 65.25 
26 141 11.46 65.71 2.07** 4.95*** -3.18*** 65.25 
27 141 29.93 101.37 3.51*** 3.05*** -3.63*** 65.96 
28 141 25.08 90.93 3.27*** 3.55*** -3.53*** 68.79 
29 140 21.24 85.8 2.93*** 2.96*** -3.33*** 65.71 
30 140 19.99 84.13 2.81*** 3.05*** -3.61*** 66.43 
31 140 24.07 88.42 3.22*** 3.36*** -3.48*** 67.86 
32 140 25.85 91.63 3.34*** 3.25*** -3.43*** 67.14 
33 139 24.48 93.95 3.07*** 2.71*** -3.64*** 67.63 
34 139 24.61 94.82 3.06*** 2.75*** -3.45*** 66.91 
35 138 25.56 93.9 3.20*** 2.93*** -3.53*** 67.39 
36 136 26.95 99.22 3.17*** 2.73*** -3.91*** 69.85 
Note: 
This table shows the value-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (VWBHARs) up to a 36-month period after listing 
or going public, excluding the initial return. Conventional t-statistics are the two-tailed test results of null hypothesis 
which means they are equal to zero. The nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the null hypothesis 
that the median abnormal return is zero. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels 
respectively. 
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Table 2L Cumulative abnormal returns for MAI IPOs listed from 2001 to 2012 categorized by the 
board listing, relative to MAI benchmark 
 
Montht Nt  
(%) 
Std. t-stat Bootstrap 
Skewness-
Adj t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Signed 
Rank test 
%AR<0 
 
1 80 -5.60 23.78 -2.11** -1.81* -3.48*** 77.50 
2 80 -3.08 33.48 -0.82 -0.64 -3.09*** 77.50 
3 80 -1.36 33.77 -0.36 -0.31 -2.04** 70.00 
4 78 1.41 36.32 0.34 0.32 -1.08 62.82 
5 78 5.53 37.89 1.29 1.29 0.01 58.97 
6 77 5.06 35.15 1.26 1.33 0.05 57.14 
7 77 3.24 34.17 0.83 0.78 0.24 53.25 
8 77 4.01 36.16 0.97 0.91 0.25 50.65 
9 76 5.42 41.91 1.13 1.07 0.31 53.95 
10 76 4.16 43.11 0.84 0.81 -0.02 55.26 
11 74 4.96 46.98 0.91 0.89 -0.06 55.41 
12 74 5.79 47.08 1.06 1.00 -0.11 55.41 
13 74 4.50 49.35 0.78 0.76 -0.27 54.05 
14 74 5.52 48.2 0.99 0.88 -0.36 55.41 
15 73 5.21 48.23 0.92 0.9 -0.29 53.42 
16 73 6.33 49.92 1.08 1.03 -0.12 54.79 
17 73 5.90 49.85 1.01 1.00 -0.01 50.68 
18 71 8.12 49.77 1.37 1.40 0.28 52.11 
19 70 7.45 50.86 1.23 1.27 -0.03 57.14 
20 69 5.11 49.94 0.85 0.95 -0.27 56.52 
21 69 3.83 51.58 0.62 0.66 -0.43 56.52 
22 69 5.46 52.59 0.86 0.94 -0.14 53.62 
23 68 8.74 58.37 1.23 1.18 -0.18 55.88 
24 68 7.68 58.79 1.08 0.99 -0.24 57.35 
25 66 11.58 56.07 1.68* 1.67* 0.21 56.06 
26 66 11.43 54.53 1.70* 1.79* 0.66 50.00 
27 66 11.11 55.7 1.62 1.70* 0.51 51.52 
28 66 11.58 57.5 1.64 1.69* 0.51 50.00 
29 66 11.95 57.55 1.69* 1.77* 0.62 50.00 
30 66 10.39 57.59 1.47 1.52 0.71 48.48 
31 65 13.73 64.25 1.72* 1.87* 1.07 43.08 
32 63 12.03 64.12 1.49 1.69* 0.83 46.03 
33 61 11.28 64.71 1.36 1.52 0.57 49.18 
34 60 12.93 68.24 1.47 1.64 0.69 48.33 
35 60 13.90 67.69 1.59 1.88* 0.84 46.67 
36 60 15.20 67.52 1.74* 2.02* 0.98 46.67 
Note: 
This table shows the equally-weighted cumulative abnormal returns (EWCARs) up to a 36-month period after listing or 
going public, excluding the initial return. Conventional t-statistics are the two-tailed test results of null hypothesis 
which means they are equal to zero. The nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the null hypothesis 
that the median abnormal return is zero. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 

CAR i,t
Appendix 2A 
 
76 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2M Buy-and-hold abnormal returns and wealth relatives for MAI IPOs listed from 2001 to 
2012, relative to MAI benchmark 
 
Montht Nt  Std. t-stat Bootstrap 
Skewness-
Adj t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
test 
%AR<0 
 
1 80 -5.60 23.78 -2.11** -1.81* -3.48*** 77.50 
2 80 -1.96 38.06 -0.46 -0.33 -3.35*** 78.75 
3 80 -0.67 34.71 -0.17 -0.14 -2.24** 70.00 
4 78 1.33 35.43 0.33 0.29 -1.39 66.67 
5 78 4.72 37.59 1.11 1.15 -0.41 60.26 
6 77 2.68 34.08 0.69 0.69 -0.54 59.74 
7 77 2.05 32.78 0.55 0.52 -0.24 55.84 
8 77 2.39 36.75 0.57 0.54 -0.45 58.44 
9 76 6.20 46.11 1.17 1.12 0.04 56.58 
10 76 5.27 51.59 0.89 0.81 -0.27 56.58 
11 74 7.64 61.41 1.07 1.04 -0.33 55.41 
12 74 7.46 60.83 1.06 1.04 -0.54 56.76 
13 74 7.48 62.81 1.02 1.02 -0.52 58.11 
14 74 6.90 56.9 1.04 1.05 -0.81 59.46 
15 73 6.95 57.17 1.04 1.08 -0.64 60.27 
16 73 8.05 58.81 1.17 1.15 -0.54 60.27 
17 73 7.57 57.71 1.12 1.19 -0.44 54.79 
18 71 9.87 60.78 1.37 1.52 -0.15 57.75 
19 70 9.97 64.48 1.29 1.46 -0.55 61.43 
20 69 7.75 64.41 1.00 1.09 -1.02 59.42 
21 69 6.83 65.8 0.86 0.89 -1.09 62.32 
22 69 9.61 72.42 1.10 1.14 -0.85 60.87 
23 68 12.74 73.94 1.42 1.48 -0.65 60.29 
24 68 12.13 81.42 1.23 1.23 -0.83 63.24 
25 66 15.23 88.9 1.39 1.39 -0.68 62.12 
26 66 11.83 76.65 1.25 1.28 -0.60 59.09 
27 66 11.49 72.42 1.29 1.4 -0.62 59.09 
28 66 11.70 76.25 1.25 1.39 -0.46 59.09 
29 66 13.61 82.1 1.35 1.43 -0.38 57.58 
30 66 11.14 81.61 1.11 1.23 -0.36 56.06 
31 65 14.50 87.6 1.33 1.54 -0.03 52.31 
32 63 12.11 85.77 1.12 1.34 -0.22 53.97 
33 61 10.46 81.05 1.01 1.14 -0.57 57.38 
34 60 12.35 88.44 1.08 1.17 -0.54 60.00 
35 60 12.03 84.5 1.10 1.25 -0.36 58.33 
36 60 13.46 84.17 1.24 1.38 -0.29 60.00 
Note: 
This table shows the value-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (VWBHARs) and wealth relatives up to a 36-
month period after listing or going public, excluding the initial return. Conventional t-statistics and skewness-adjusted 
t-statistics are the two-tailed test results of null hypothesis, which means they are equal to zero. The nonparametric 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the null hypothesis that the median abnormal return is zero. 
 ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 2N The equally-weighted (EW) cumulative abnormal returns for the 36 months after going public using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) benchmark 
Month Full sample  SET sample  MAI sample 
CCAR 
(%) 
Std. t-stat Wilcoxon %AR<0   CCAR 
(%) 
Std. t-stat Wilcoxon %AR<0   CCAR 
(%) 
Std. t-stat Wilcoxon %AR<0  
1 -5.39 22.32 -5.95*** -5.49*** 69.16  -4.97 18.51 -6.79*** -4.09*** 67.35  -6.15 28.13 -4.77*** -3.54*** 72.50 
2 -5.06 17.81 -3.94*** -3.06*** 62.56  -5.35 15.66 -4.77*** -2.12** 61.90  -4.52 21.26 -2.79*** -2.40** 63.75 
3 -5.05 13.58 -3.21*** -2.24** 59.03  -5.02 14.69 -3.62*** -1.28 55.10  -5.11 11.32 -2.54** -2.19** 66.25 
4 -2.29 19.18 -1.12 -2.42** 60.44  -1.91 17.95 -0.97 -1.84* 57.82  -2.99 21.38 -1.26 -1.62* 65.38 
5 -1.01 13.7 -0.43 -2.61*** 61.78  -2.33 14.24 -1.06 -3.33*** 61.90  1.49 12.08 0.49 0.10 61.54 
6 -0.44 15.12 -0.17 -4.19*** 66.96  -1.67 16.17 -0.68 -3.51*** 66.67  1.88 12.97 0.56 -2.31*** 67.53 
7 -1.54 13.09 -0.55 -4.74*** 67.71  -2.98 12.47 -1.12 -4.04*** 68.49  1.19 14.27 0.33 -2.58** 66.23 
8 -1.24 13.75 -0.41 -4.13*** 64.57  -2.97 14.14 -1.04 -3.54*** 65.07  2.05 13.05 0.52 -2.19** 63.64 
9 -0.75 16.48 -0.23 -4.09*** 66.22  -1.82 16.35 -0.58 -3.25*** 64.38  1.27 16.77 0.30 -2.42** 69.74 
10 0.21 20.14 0.06 -4.39*** 65.77  1.49 22.91 0.39 -2.06** 58.90  -2.29 12.24 -0.46 -4.63*** 78.95 
11 0.92 15.22 0.25 -3.41*** 63.18  2.97 15.75 0.72 -2.01** 62.33  -3.12 14.11 -0.60 -3.09*** 64.86 
12 1.12 12.22 0.30 -2.39** 60.09  3.51 12.98 0.81 -1.41 59.72  -3.58 10.66 -0.65 -2.23** 60.81 
13 0.75 13.56 0.19 -4.12*** 66.97  3.42 14.58 0.76 -3.04*** 67.36  -4.48 11.38 -0.77 -2.86*** 66.22 
14 0.03 12.84 0.01 -4.79*** 69.72  2.52 11.5 0.54 -3.38*** 67.36  -4.84 15.19 -0.80 -3.62*** 74.32 
15 -0.59 11.54 -0.14 -3.99*** 63.59  1.63 11.3 0.33 -3.64*** 65.28  -4.93 12.05 -0.79 -1.70* 60.27 
16 -1.89 11.82 -0.42 -4.69*** 67.74  -0.45 12.1 -0.09 -4.49*** 71.53  -4.70 11.18 -0.73 -1.66* 60.27 
17 -2.69 13.44 -0.58 -5.28*** 72.35  -2.22 13.09 -0.41 -4.82*** 73.61  -3.60 14.01 -0.54 -2.32** 69.86 
18 -4.31 10.42 -0.87 -5.77*** 71.96  -4.26 10.61 -0.74 -5.23*** 74.83  -4.37 10.03 -0.63 -2.58** 66.20 
19 -4.32 11.88 -0.85 -3.22*** 68.08  -4.02 11.91 -0.68 -2.55** 67.83  -4.91 11.9 -0.69 -1.99** 68.57 
20 -5.59 10.82 -1.06 -5.83*** 73.93  -5.44 10.76 -0.89 -5.02*** 74.65  -5.83 11.01 -0.78 -3.02*** 72.46 
21 -7.55 11.82 -1.34 -5.49*** 73.81  -7.64 13.11 -1.19 -4.51*** 72.34  -7.32 8.66 -0.94 -3.06*** 76.81 
22 -8.44 12.34 -1.46 -6.01*** 71.43  -9.28 11.89 -1.39 -5.77*** 73.05  -6.68 13.17 -0.84 -2.22** 68.12 
23 -7.83 13.75 -1.32 -3.45*** 61.72  -9.67 11.46 -1.42 -3.19*** 61.70  -4.00 17.5 -0.48 -1.49 61.76 
24 -8.92 14.42 -1.45 -5.04*** 69.86  -10.63 13.77 -1.52 -3.95*** 68.09  -5.33 15.78 -0.62 -3.15*** 73.53 
25 -7.39 23.74 -1.15 -4.87*** 75.36  -11.11 12.67 -1.55 -4.97*** 79.43  0.47 37.6 0.05 -1.55 66.67 
26 -6.52 12.47 -0.99 -4.15*** 65.22  -10.29 12.69 -1.40 -3.96*** 67.38  1.46 12.09 0.14 -1.54 60.61 
27 -6.8 11.7 -1.01 -3.51*** 65.70  -10.53 11.57 -1.40 -2.84*** 65.25  1.06 12.07 0.10 -2.02** 66.67 
28 -5.78 14.95 -0.84 -3.41*** 63.29  -9.33 16.53 -1.20 -2.83*** 64.54  1.72 10.99 0.16 -1.80* 60.61 
29 -4.39 14.91 -0.62 -3.61*** 63.11  -8.56 15.35 -1.08 -3.23*** 63.57  4.43 13.93 0.41 -1.67* 62.12 
30 -5.10 12.44 -0.70 -4.71*** 68.93  -9.79 10.79 -1.20 -4.40*** 72.14  4.84 15.46 0.44 -1.91* 62.12 
31 -2.89 26.18 -0.38 -3.64*** 66.83  -9.58 17.17 -1.16 -3.77*** 69.29  11.48 39.3 0.91 -0.87 61.54 
32 -2.77 11.2 -0.35 -3.31*** 63.55  -9.65 11.48 -1.15 -2.68*** 65.00  12.08 10.61 0.94 -1.92** 60.32 
33 -2.26 18.15 -0.28 -5.92*** 73.50  -10.09 17.06 -1.18 -5.38*** 74.10  14.73 20.42 1.12 -2.61*** 72.13 
34 -1.92 13.17 -0.24 -3.99*** 66.83  -10.06 12.88 -1.16 -3.59*** 67.63  15.78 13.9 1.18 -1.84* 65.00 
35 -1.10 10.82 -0.13 -3.72*** 67.17  -9.75 10.13 -1.11 -3.70*** 69.57  17.78 12.24 1.30 -1.22 61.67 
36 -0.98 14.52 -0.12 -4.77*** 70.05  -10.15 16.33 -1.13 -4.92*** 72.06  19.05 9.3 1.37 -1.18 66.67 
       This table shows the CARs from a 1-month to a 36-month period after listing. The benchmark used is CAPM. Brown and Warner’s (1980) t-statistics are the two-tailed test results of a null hypothesis that means they are  
       equal to zero. The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the null hypothesis that the median abnormal return is zero.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 2O The value-weighted (VW) cumulative abnormal returns for the 36 months after going public using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) benchmark 
Month Full sample  SET sample  MAI sample 
CCAR 
(%) 
Std. t-stat Wilcoxon %AR<0   CCAR 
(%) 
Std. t-stat Wilcoxon %AR<0   CCAR 
(%) 
Std. t-stat Wilcoxon %AR<0  
1 0.70 16.14 1.95* -5.00*** 69.16  1.05 15.45 2.50** -3.79*** 67.35  -6.68 25.67 -7.33*** -3.33*** 72.50 
2 -0.66 14.01 -1.28 -2.62*** 62.56  -0.46 13.56 -0.77 -1.98** 61.90  1.87 21.24 -3.21*** -1.81* 63.75 
3 -3.17 10.4 -4.52*** -1.89* 59.03  -3.07 10.32 -3.81*** -1.40 55.10  -0.37 11.79 -2.79*** -2.11** 66.25 
4 -4.17 11.41 -5.07*** -2.50** 60.44  -4.11 10.73 -4.37*** -2.19** 57.82  -0.23 21.2 -2.49** -1.27 65.38 
5 -6.55 11.77 -6.63*** -3.14*** 61.78  -6.73 11.72 -5.88*** -3.63*** 61.90  2.51 11.78 -1.02 0.10 61.54 
6 -9.89 10.92 -7.38*** -4.53*** 66.96  -10.15 10.81 -6.77*** -3.92*** 66.67  -1.54 12.99 -1.43 -2.28** 67.53 
7 -12.62 10.93 -8.08*** -4.63*** 67.71  -12.93 10.75 -7.48*** -3.85*** 68.49  -1.57 14.18 -1.80* -2.28** 66.23 
8 -14.63 10.17 -8.64*** -3.64*** 64.57  -14.98 9.99 -8.01*** -3.08*** 65.07  -1.03 13.38 -1.97** -1.87 63.64 
9 -14.3 12.13 -7.14*** -3.59*** 66.22  -14.57 11.99 -6.64*** -2.69*** 64.38  -1.44 14.72 -2.23** -2.56** 69.74 
10 -13.15 11.61 -5.22*** -3.07*** 65.77  -13.18 11.62 -4.77*** -1.28 58.90  -4.06 10.06 -2.94*** -4.38*** 78.95 
11 -13.92 11.29 -5.22*** -2.94*** 63.18  -13.82 11.27 -4.72*** -1.66* 62.33  -3.46 11.43 -3.45*** -3.09*** 64.86 
12 -13.98 9.68 -4.82*** -3.05*** 60.09  -13.81 9.59 -4.34*** -2.24** 59.72  -1.73 11.36 -3.66*** -2.59*** 60.81 
13 -16.79 12.94 -5.36*** -4.45*** 66.97  -16.59 13.04 -4.87*** -3.33*** 67.36  -3.48 10.5 -4.06*** -3.16*** 66.22 
14 -19.73 9.68 -5.82*** -4.75*** 69.72  -19.50 9.63 -5.33*** -3.42*** 67.36  -3.38 10.65 -4.41*** -4.03*** 74.32 
15 -21.31 10.16 -6.07*** -3.75*** 63.59  -21.06 10.21 -5.56*** -2.98*** 65.28  -2.17 9 -4.62*** -2.16** 60.27 
16 -23.47 9.24 -6.41*** -4.66*** 67.74  -23.29 9.26 -5.90*** -4.17*** 71.53  -0.55 8.68 -4.55*** -1.55 60.27 
17 -29.85 12.49 -5.84*** -5.90*** 72.35  -29.88 12.53 -5.50*** -5.23*** 73.61  -1.97 10.84 -4.71*** -2.52** 69.86 
18 -30.15 7.88 -5.67*** -5.92*** 71.96  -30.13 7.84 -5.33*** -5.16*** 74.83  -1.3 8.65 -4.78*** -2.44** 66.20 
19 -32.14 9.54 -5.86*** -3.75*** 68.08  -32.13 9.51 -5.52*** -2.92*** 67.83  -1.74 10 -4.92*** -2.15** 68.57 
20 -30.79 13.28 -5.12*** -5.97*** 73.93  -30.57 13.37 -4.78*** -4.82*** 74.65  -3.12 10.38 -5.15*** -3.30*** 72.46 
21 -35.32 10.79 -5.34*** -6.15*** 73.81  -35.23 10.89 -5.02*** -5.13*** 72.34  -1.92 7.98 -5.28*** -3.48*** 76.81 
22 -38.25 8.45 -5.57*** -6.12*** 71.43  -38.24 8.23 -5.25*** -5.72*** 73.05  -1.19 12.05 -5.32*** -2.23*** 68.12 
23 -40.73 8.34 -5.75*** -3.34*** 61.72  -40.97 7.27 -5.45*** -3.17*** 61.70  2.98 19.81 -4.35*** -1.59 61.76 
24 -41.86 8.23 -5.79*** -4.60*** 69.86  -42.01 8.01 -5.46*** -3.62*** 68.09  -3.08 11.75 -4.56*** -3.16*** 73.53 
25 -42.77 13.96 -5.78*** -5.80*** 75.36  -42.94 13.52 -5.46*** -5.60*** 79.43  -0.52 21.24 -4.51*** -1.50 66.67 
26 -44.73 9.61 -5.92*** -4.83*** 65.22  -44.87 9.56 -5.59*** -4.32*** 67.38  -2.45 10.52 -4.67*** -1.79* 60.61 
27 -39.90 23.55 -4.22*** -3.82*** 65.70  -39.75 23.96 -3.97*** -3.35*** 65.25  -1.41 10.01 -4.74*** -1.86* 66.67 
28 -42.78 10.77 -4.40*** -3.54*** 63.29  -42.74 10.78 -4.15*** -3.00*** 64.54  -0.51 10.24 -4.70*** -1.40 60.61 
29 -39.49 16.77 -3.66*** -3.77*** 63.11  -39.27 16.97 -3.45*** -3.46*** 63.57  -0.60 11.09 -4.67*** -1.56 62.12 
30 -41.87 7.13 -3.80*** -5.30*** 68.93  -41.62 6.84 -3.59*** -4.57*** 72.14  -2.86 11.73 -4.83*** -2.13 62.12 
31 -42.61 15.56 -3.80*** -3.61*** 66.83  -42.53 15.04 -3.60*** -3.38*** 69.29  2.58 23.85 -4.21*** -0.60 61.54 
32 -44.98 8.73 -3.94*** -3.45*** 63.55  -44.98 8.69 -3.74*** -2.99*** 65.00  -0.61 9.37 -4.20*** -1.67 60.32 
33 -46.38 11.19 -4.00*** -5.84*** 73.50  -46.42 10.76 -3.80*** -4.89*** 74.10  -0.73 17.99 -4.19*** -2.88 72.13 
34 -48.38 10.05 -4.10*** -4.08*** 66.83  -48.48 9.89 -3.90*** -3.63*** 67.63  -0.69 13.06 -4.19*** -1.48 65.00 
35 -49.30 7.2 -4.12*** -3.80*** 67.17  -49.42 7.05 -3.92*** -3.56*** 69.57  -0.26 9.83 -4.13*** -0.63 61.67 
36 -51.29 12.89 -4.22*** -5.17*** 70.05  -51.53 13.09 -4.02*** -5.07*** 72.06  0.30 7.35 -4.01*** -0.92 66.67 
     This table shows the CARs from a 1-month to a 36-month period after listing. The benchmark used is CAPM. Brown and Warner’s (1980) t-statistics are the two-tailed test results of a null hypothesis that means they are  
       equal to zero. The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the null hypothesis that the median abnormal return is zero.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 2P The equally-weighted (EW) cumulative abnormal returns for the 36 months after going public using the Fama and French three factor model benchmark 
Month Full sample  SET sample  MAI sample 
FFCAR 
(%) 
Std. t-stat Wilcoxon %AR<0   FFCAR 
(%) 
Std. t-stat Wilcoxon %AR<0   FFCAR 
(%) 
Std. t-stat Wilcoxon %AR<0  
1 -5.75 23.39 -7.08*** -5.03*** 67.40  -5.34 19.74 -7.82*** -3.79*** 65.99  -6.51 29.05 -6.09*** -3.26*** 70.00 
2 -6.72 17.55 -5.84*** -2.47** 61.23  -7.22 15.54 -7.40*** -1.91* 61.90  -5.79 20.74 -3.79*** -1.70* 60.00 
3 -7.42 14.61 -5.27*** -1.02 55.07  -7.56 15.7 -6.16*** -0.56 54.42  -7.18 12.42 -3.77*** -1.03 56.25 
4 -5.67 19.76 -3.04*** -0.52 54.67  -5.18 19.22 -2.75*** 0.10 53.06  -6.59 20.8 -2.97*** -1.06 57.69 
5 -5.41 14.18 -2.53** -0.46 52.00  -5.12 15.07 -2.35** -0.57 51.70  -5.96 12.4 -2.39** -0.04 53.85 
6 -5.89 17.95 -2.51** -1.54 53.13  -5.37 19.89 -2.22** -1.25 54.42  -6.87 13.61 -2.50** -0.87 50.65 
7 -7.63 14.13 -2.98*** -2.28** 56.95  -8.03 14.04 -2.99*** -2.81*** 63.01  -6.86 14.22 -2.31** 0.08 45.45 
8 -7.96 14.7 -2.89*** -1.46 54.26  -8.60 14.32 -2.97*** -1.57 56.16  -6.74 15.49 -2.12** -0.21 50.65 
9 -7.82 15.59 -2.63*** -0.96 57.66  -8.16 15.55 -2.56** -0.84 57.53  -7.17 15.76 -2.12** -0.55 57.89 
10 -8.02 19.02 -2.54*** -2.42** 59.46  -6.65 21.74 -1.80* -1.34 57.53  -10.66 11.63 -2.68*** -2.27** 63.16 
11 -8.25 15.23 -2.47*** -1.41 56.36  -6.77 15.35 -1.72* -0.98 54.79  -11.09 15.09 -2.66*** -1.04 59.46 
12 -10.09 14.89 -2.86*** -2.21** 55.96  -8.54 15.8 -2.08** -1.76* 56.94  -13.07 13.05 -2.92*** -1.52 54.05 
13 -12.39 14.65 -3.29*** -2.94*** 61.01  -11.33 15.82 -2.59** -2.65*** 61.11  -14.43 12.1 -3.06*** -1.41 60.81 
14 -13.72 13.94 -3.51*** -1.98** 55.05  -13.69 12.68 -2.99*** -1.76* 54.86  -13.73 16 -2.79*** -0.88 55.41 
15 -15.12 13.04 -3.73*** -2.01** 54.84  -15.99 12.22 -3.34*** -2.78*** 58.33  -13.38 14.43 -2.62*** 0.36 47.95 
16 -16.83 13.34 -3.98*** -2.31** 58.53  -18.65 13.84 -3.71*** -2.80*** 63.19  -13.21 12.19 -2.50** 0.01 49.32 
17 -18.97 15.16 -4.28*** -3.28*** 63.59  -22.4 13.71 -4.10*** -3.75*** 68.06  -12.13 17.38 -2.20** -0.46 54.79 
18 -21.68 12.78 -4.58*** -3.87*** 63.55  -25.37 12.92 -4.42*** -3.52*** 62.94  -14.33 12.54 -2.44** -1.75* 64.79 
19 -22.52 13.43 -4.63*** -1.09 52.58  -26.03 13.11 -4.40*** -0.97 53.85  -15.53 14.14 -2.56** -0.47 50.00 
20 -25.03 12.68 -4.88*** -3.36*** 59.72  -28.67 12.44 -4.66*** -2.86*** 59.15  -17.76 13.24 -2.77*** -1.72* 60.87 
21 -28.12 14.58 -5.10*** -4.02*** 64.76  -32.05 15.38 -4.92*** -3.75*** 65.96  -20.26 12.88 -2.98*** -1.61 62.32 
22 -30.89 15.05 -5.30*** -3.14*** 60.48  -36.16 14.26 -5.15*** -3.75*** 63.12  -20.26 16.3 -2.91*** -0.26 55.07 
23 -30.24 15.99 -4.96*** -0.36 53.11  -37.19 13.51 -5.17*** -1.19 56.03  -16.16 19.85 -2.03** 1.06 47.06 
24 -31.06 15.62 -4.99*** -1.21 53.59  -37.97 14.65 -5.16*** -0.99 53.90  -17.05 17.59 -2.10** -0.66 52.94 
25 -32.15 23.77 -5.06*** -2.32** 57.00  -40.75 15.23 -5.35*** -2.44** 58.87  -14.54 35.67 -1.69* -0.65 53.03 
26 -33.34 15.81 -5.14*** -1.47 53.62  -41.84 15.22 -5.39*** -1.06 54.61  -15.95 17.11 -1.80* -1.07 51.52 
27 -34.63 14.87 -5.24*** -1.46 55.56  -43.07 15.1 -5.44*** -1.10 53.90  -17.37 14.49 -1.91* -1.02 59.09 
28 -34.7 18.11 -5.12*** -0.78 52.17  -42.32 19.02 -5.12*** -0.45 51.77  -19.20 16 -2.05** -0.62 53.03 
29 -34.65 17.26 -4.98*** -1.39 57.28  -42.61 17.37 -5.04*** -1.23 56.43  -18.43 17.13 -1.93* -0.71 59.09 
30 -36.06 15.21 -5.08*** -1.86* 55.83  -44.39 13.31 -5.15*** -2.04** 56.43  -19.04 18.7 -1.95* -0.41 54.55 
31 -34.61 27.19 -4.58*** -1.15 55.61  -45.01 19.15 -5.13*** -1.95* 59.29  -13.06 39.27 -1.13 0.87 47.69 
32 -34.71 14.73 -4.50*** -0.16 48.28  -44.95 14.22 -4.99*** 0.20 47.14  -13.52 15.9 -1.16 -0.61 50.79 
33 -35.99 19.62 -4.59*** -2.61*** 60.00  -47.38 19.21 -5.14*** -2.64*** 62.59  -12.17 20.45 -1.02 -0.76 54.10 
34 -36.12 15.03 -4.51*** -1.26 57.29  -47.78 15.24 -5.08*** -1.28 58.27  -11.69 14.65 -0.96 -0.41 56.67 
35 -34.10 14.85 -3.94*** 0.61 50.51  -46.53 14.67 -4.71*** 0.12 50.72  -7.89 15.21 -0.61 0.84 50.00 
36 -34.05 17.82 -3.86*** -0.23 50.76  -46.84 19.97 -4.65*** -0.74 52.94  -7.00 11.6 -0.53 0.83 46.67 
       This table shows the CARs from a 1-month to a 36-month period after listing. The benchmark used is FF model. Brown and Warner’s (1980) t-statistics are the two-tailed test results of a null hypothesis that means they are  
       equal to zero. The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the null hypothesis that the median abnormal return is zero.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 2Q The equally-weighted (VW) cumulative abnormal returns for the 36 months after going public using the Fama and French three factor model benchmark 
Month Full sample  SET sample  MAI sample 
FFCAR 
(%) 
Std. t-stat Wilcoxon %AR<0   FFCAR 
(%) 
Std. t-stat Wilcoxon %AR<0   FFCAR 
(%) 
Std. t-stat Wilcoxon %AR<0 
1 1.59 18.22 4.80*** -4.42*** 67.40  1.98 17.64 4.97*** -3.30*** 65.99  -6.65 26.51 -6.11*** -3.01*** 70.00 
2 -0.75 15.24 -1.12 -2.14** 61.23  -0.57 14.86 -0.74 -1.71* 61.90  -4.44 21.35 -2.70*** -1.29 60.00 
3 -2.46 11.76 -2.72*** -1.15 55.07  -2.36 11.69 -2.30** -0.94 54.42  -4.55 13.14 -2.26** -1.05 56.25 
4 -2.83 12.06 -2.72*** -1.09 54.67  -2.72 11.51 -2.29** -0.90 53.06  -5.26 20.44 -2.25** -0.76 57.69 
5 -1.59 12.19 -1.21 -0.32 52.00  -1.51 12.16 -1.04 -0.51 51.70  -3.27 12.69 -1.19 0.42 52.56 
6 -4.84 16.59 -2.58** -1.63 53.13  -4.85 16.72 -2.41** -1.35 54.42  -4.53 13.4 -1.49 -1.05 50.65 
7 -4.34 12.04 -2.11** -2.75 56.95  -4.34 11.95 -1.96* -2.65*** 63.01  -4.34 13.88 -1.32 -0.23 45.45 
8 -5.96 11.45 -2.61** -1.56 54.26  -6.05 11.22 -2.47** -1.62 56.16  -3.99 15.47 -1.13 -0.21 50.65 
9 -2.96 14 -1.00 -1.30 57.66  -2.98 13.99 -0.95 -0.99 57.53  -2.60 14.21 -0.68 -0.84 57.89 
10 -0.33 11.95 -0.09 -1.89 59.46  -0.11 11.95 -0.03 -0.95 57.53  -4.84 10.95 -1.16 -1.95 63.16 
11 -1.25 11.9 -0.33 -1.55 56.36  -1.01 11.85 -0.25 -1.15 54.79  -6.23 13.03 -1.41 -1.39 59.46 
12 -1.64 10.94 -0.42 -2.44** 55.96  -1.42 10.76 -0.34 -2.12** 56.94  -6.23 14.19 -1.35 -1.39 54.05 
13 -3.24 11.36 -0.79 -3.30*** 61.01  -2.98 11.4 -0.69 -2.74*** 61.11  -8.73 10.22 -1.74* -1.89* 60.81 
14 -3.92 9.01 -0.92 -2.00** 59.17  -3.63 8.83 -0.80 -1.63 54.86  -10.00 12.23 -1.91* -1.53 55.41 
15 -5.09 11.99 -1.15 -2.17** 54.84  -4.83 12.02 -1.03 -2.24** 58.33  -10.47 11.11 -1.93* -0.02 47.95 
16 -1.80 14.46 -0.34 -2.56** 58.53  -1.42 14.66 -0.25 -2.63*** 63.19  -9.77 9.07 -1.73* 0.13 49.32 
17 -3.58 9.7 -0.65 -3.89*** 63.59  -3.28 9.47 -0.57 -3.99*** 68.06  -9.87 13.55 -1.70* -0.43 54.79 
18 -3.62 11.48 -0.64 -3.54*** 63.55  -3.23 11.51 -0.54 -2.99*** 62.94  -11.84 10.67 -1.94* -1.77* 64.79 
19 -6.70 11.07 -1.09 -0.81 52.58  -6.39 11.02 -0.99 -0.54 53.85  -13.32 11.96 -2.10** -0.43 50.00 
20 -2.90 15.34 -0.41 -2.71*** 59.72  -2.33 15.47 -0.31 -2.18** 59.15  -14.85 10.98 -2.25** -1.65* 60.87 
21 -8.64 11.16 -1.04 -4.59*** 64.76  -8.27 11.1 -0.95 -4.42*** 65.96  -16.46 11.68 -2.41** -1.48 62.32 
22 -10.25 11.6 -1.19 -2.60*** 60.48  -9.99 11.39 -1.11 -2.75*** 63.12  -15.60 15.17 -2.21** 0.06 55.07 
23 -15.11 11.82 -1.59 -0.70 53.11  -15.35 10.96 -1.53 -1.34 56.03  -9.78 20.87 -1.12 1.11 47.06 
24 -15.69 10.84 -1.62 -0.67 53.59  -15.95 10.64 -1.55 -0.40 53.90  -10.22 14.52 -1.14 -0.61 52.94 
25 -17.34 14.14 -1.74* -2.57** 57.00  -17.69 13.79 -1.68* -2.60*** 58.87  -9.81 20.11 -1.07 -0.68 53.03 
26 -20.94 14.61 -1.99** -1.48 53.62  -21.36 14.63 -1.92* -1.09 54.61  -12.00 13.95 -1.27 -1.08 51.52 
27 -14.11 23 -1.13 -1.39 55.56  -14.19 23.34 -1.08 -1.22 53.90  -12.38 11.89 -1.28 -0.84 59.09 
28 -14.53 13.76 -1.14 -0.45 52.17  -14.59 13.77 -1.09 -0.15 51.77  -13.28 13.62 -1.35 -0.67 53.03 
29 -8.94 18.77 -0.63 -1.80* 57.28  -8.71 18.9 -0.59 -1.48 56.43  -13.88 14.53 -1.39 -1.14 59.09 
30 -9.31 9.16 -0.65 -1.71* 55.83  -9.00 8.78 -0.60 -1.47 56.43  -15.81 15.01 -1.53 -0.62 54.55 
31 -9.99 17.18 -0.69 -1.35 55.61  -9.87 16.73 -0.64 -1.61 59.29  -12.51 24.43 -1.14 0.66 47.69 
32 -9.84 11.07 -0.66 -0.16 48.28  -9.71 10.94 -0.62 -0.16 47.14  -12.58 13.55 -1.13 -0.50 50.79 
33 -11.19 14.44 -0.74 -2.60 60.00  -11.17 14.2 -0.70 -2.37 62.59  -11.51 18.7 -1.01 -0.77 54.10 
34 -12.59 13.21 -0.82 -1.55 57.29  -12.65 13.2 -0.78 -1.30 58.27  -11.44 13.38 -0.99 -0.70 55.00 
35 -11.51 12.14 -0.74 -0.19 50.51  -11.59 12.16 -0.70 -0.59 50.72  -9.97 11.71 -0.84 0.65 50.00 
36 -13.22 15.08 -0.83 -0.41 50.76  -13.47 15.26 -0.81 -0.95 52.94  -7.88 9.98 -0.64 1.17 46.67 
      This table shows the CARs from a 1-month to a 36-month period after listing. The benchmark used is FF model. Brown and Warner’s (1980) t-statistics are the two-tailed test results of a null hypothesis that means they are  
       equal to zero. The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the null hypothesis that the median abnormal return is zero.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 2R The equally-weighted (EW) cumulative abnormal returns for the 36 months after going public using the Size Decile (SD) model benchmark 
Month Full sample  SET sample  MAI sample 
SDCAR 
(%) 
Std. t-stat Wilcoxon %AR<0   SDCAR 
(%) 
Std. t-stat Wilcoxon %AR<0  SDCAR 
(%) 
Std. t-stat Wilcoxon %AR<0  
1 -5.84 23.46 -6.58*** -4.88*** 67.84  -5.97 19.57 -6.85*** -3.73*** 66.67  -5.60 29.44 -6.04*** -3.13*** 70.00 
2 -5.80 19.19 -4.58*** -4.27*** 63.44  -6.84 17.63 -5.55*** -3.30*** 61.22  -3.88 21.78 -2.80*** -2.69*** 67.50 
3 -6.55 15.4 -4.23*** -4.06*** 65.20  -6.80 16.5 -4.44*** -3.23*** 65.31  -6.11 13.09 -3.38*** -2.43** 65.00 
4 -6.13 19.76 -3.36*** -3.67*** 64.89  -6.61 18.95 -3.67*** -3.06*** 63.27  -5.23 21.29 -2.48** -2.03** 67.95 
5 -7.38 14.86 -3.59*** -3.68*** 66.22  -9.56 15.49 -4.41*** -3.45*** 67.35  -3.27 13.1 -1.31 -1.56 64.10 
6 -7.23 15.9 -3.19*** -3.63*** 62.05  -8.83 17.13 -3.59*** -3.25*** 63.27  -4.25 13.3 -1.54 -1.71* 59.74 
7 -9.03 14.41 -3.60*** -3.77*** 63.23  -10.57 14.67 -3.93*** -3.44*** 65.07  -6.15 13.99 -2.00** -1.70* 59.74 
8 -8.73 14.39 -3.21*** -3.43*** 60.99  -10.61 15.26 -3.66*** -3.16*** 64.38  -5.23 12.65 -1.57 -1.33 54.55 
9 -8.95 16.16 -3.10*** -3.28*** 62.16  -10.68 17.47 -3.45*** -3.00*** 65.75  -5.72 13.44 -1.62 -1.34 55.26 
10 -8.64 18.59 -2.80*** -3.17*** 57.66  -8.73 21 -2.43** -2.52** 60.27  -8.56 12.27 -2.14** -1.78* 52.63 
11 -8.54 14.45 -2.62*** -3.00*** 61.36  -8.51 15.05 -2.23** -2.25** 62.33  -8.71 13.28 -2.07** -1.94** 59.46 
12 -9.69 13.76 -2.83*** -3.23*** 62.84  -9.23 14.05 -2.32** -2.42** 63.19  -10.67 13.23 -2.36** -2.11** 62.16 
13 -11.21 12.82 -3.11*** -3.59*** 62.84  -10.89 13.44 -2.61** -2.74*** 63.19  -11.92 11.62 -2.51*** -2.33** 62.16 
14 -12.75 10.62 -3.37*** -4.00*** 64.22  -12.61 10.99 -2.89*** -3.05*** 63.89  -13.12 9.93 -2.64** -2.50** 64.86 
15 -13.18 11.21 -3.36*** -4.00*** 62.21  -13.77 11.28 -3.04*** -3.16*** 61.11  -12.13 11 -2.33** -2.46** 64.38 
16 -15.19 11.76 -3.65*** -4.20*** 63.13  -17.09 12.03 -3.44*** -3.50*** 63.89  -11.55 10.83 -2.14** -2.28** 61.64 
17 -16.62 13.96 -3.84*** -4.31*** 63.13  -19.81 13.06 -3.74*** -3.82*** 63.19  -10.38 15.37 -1.84* -1.98** 63.01 
18 -18.55 10.87 -4.07*** -4.60*** 65.42  -22.28 10.68 -4.00*** -4.24*** 68.53  -11.24 11.23 -1.93*** -1.89* 59.15 
19 -18.93 12.3 -4.04*** -4.70*** 65.26  -21.59 11 -3.70*** -4.11*** 67.13  -13.8 14.46 -2.21** -2.36** 61.43 
20 -21.4 10.66 -4.27*** -5.25*** 67.30  -23.95 10.38 -3.93*** -4.50*** 68.31  -16.51 11.28 -2.46** -2.68*** 65.22 
21 -22.92 11.84 -4.42*** -5.25*** 67.14  -25.11 12.21 -4.01*** -4.50*** 67.38  -18.75 11.08 -2.66*** -2.62*** 66.67 
22 -24.82 11.6 -4.59*** -5.37*** 66.67  -27.57 11.4 -4.22*** -4.58*** 68.09  -19.51 12.01 -2.69*** -2.75*** 63.77 
23 -24.19 13.81 -4.31*** -5.23*** 67.46  -27.90 11.79 -4.17*** -4.59*** 68.09  -16.91 17.19 -2.19** -2.49** 66.18 
24 -24.83 13.4 -4.33*** -5.32*** 66.03  -28.69 13.89 -4.20*** -4.58*** 65.96  -17.21 12.41 -2.18** -2.66*** 66.18 
25 -24.50 21.25 -4.15*** -5.20*** 67.63  -29.85 12.88 -4.27*** -4.78*** 68.79  -13.71 32.53 -1.59 -2.20** 65.15 
26 -24.93 13.65 -4.14*** -5.21*** 64.73  -30.00 13.08 -4.20*** -4.77*** 67.38  -14.75 14.88 -1.67* -2.16** 59.09 
27 -25.57 13.18 -4.16*** -5.20*** 63.77  -30.50 13.17 -4.19*** -4.78*** 65.25  -15.68 13.31 -1.74* -2.18** 60.61 
28 -24.99 14.61 -3.94*** -5.07*** 63.29  -29.50 16.24 -3.88*** -4.60*** 65.25  -16.00 10.37 -1.74* -2.23** 59.09 
29 -24.85 15.64 -3.83*** -5.08*** 64.56  -29.37 16.37 -3.78*** -4.66*** 66.43  -15.81 14.09 -1.69* -2.13** 60.61 
30 -26.14 14 -3.94*** -5.12*** 61.65  -30.43 12.84 -3.84*** -4.62*** 62.86  -17.58 16.29 -1.82* -2.26** 59.09 
31 -24.40 25.55 -3.44*** -4.67*** 60.49  -30.79 15.86 -3.82*** -4.49*** 62.86  -11.26 38.96 -0.97 -1.72* 55.38 
32 -23.52 12.13 -3.20*** -4.61*** 60.59  -29.88 11.47 -3.58*** -4.30*** 62.14  -10.46 13.58 -0.89 -1.86* 57.14 
33 -23.93 18.29 -3.21*** -4.79*** 63.00  -31.10 17.64 -3.66*** -4.52*** 65.47  -9.03 19.71 -0.75 -1.90* 57.38 
34 -23.17 13.22 -3.02*** -4.64*** 62.81  -30.75 12.48 -3.54*** -4.42*** 64.75  -7.32 14.85 -0.59 -1.708* 58.33 
35 -22.17 11.12 -2.79*** -4.49*** 61.62  -29.90 10.86 -3.33*** -4.38*** 65.22  -5.95 11.78 -0.47 -1.45 53.33 
36 -21.25 15.5 -2.59** -4.34*** 60.41  -29.29 17.28 -3.18*** -4.29*** 63.24  -4.32 10.44 -0.33 -1.23 55.00 
       This table shows the CARs from a 1-month to a 36-month period after listing. The benchmark used is SD model. Brown and Warner’s (1980) t-statistics are the two-tailed test results of a null hypothesis that means they are  
       equal to zero. The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the null hypothesis that the median abnormal return is zero.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 2S The value-weighted (VW) cumulative abnormal returns for the 36 months after going public using the Size Decile (SD) model benchmark 
Month Full sample  SET sample  MAI sample 
SDCAR 
(%) 
Std. t-stat Wilcoxo
n 
%AR<0   SDCAR 
(%) 
Std t-stat Wilcoxon %AR<0   SDCAR 
(%) 
Std. t-stat Wilcoxon %AR<0  
1 -0.46 17.38 -10.16*** -4.37*** 67.84  -0.19 16.77 -23.93*** -3.16*** 66.67  -6.2 26.59 -6.06*** -3.22*** 70.00 
2 -1.40 17.4 -7.39*** -3.55*** 63.44  -1.32 17.15 -5.89*** -2.86*** 61.22  -2.93 21.76 -1.76* -2.45** 67.50 
3 -3.86 12.33 -5.48*** -3.23*** 65.20  -3.89 12.3 -5.20*** -2.55*** 61.90  -3.22 12.75 -1.58 -1.84* 65.00 
4 -5.65 14.57 -5.78*** -3.03*** 64.89  -5.80 14.19 -5.58*** -2.53*** 63.27  -2.50 20.98 -1.05 -1.57 67.95 
5 -9.06 14.37 -5.54*** -3.33*** 66.22  -9.52 14.4 -5.38*** -3.12*** 67.35  0.54 12.11 0.18 -0.91 64.10 
6 -10.06 12.43 -5.52*** -3.16*** 62.05  -10.55 12.39 -5.36*** -2.94*** 63.27  0.21 13.25 0.06 -0.97 59.74 
7 -12.07 11.62 -5.67*** -3.37*** 63.23  -12.6 11.53 -5.52*** -3.11*** 65.07  -0.77 13.45 -0.22 -0.92 59.74 
8 -10.65 11.27 -4.43*** -3.24*** 60.99  -11.17 11.19 -4.36*** -3.10*** 64.38  0.35 12.67 0.09 -0.36 54.55 
9 -9.09 14.47 -3.36*** -3.31*** 62.16  -9.54 14.5 -3.32*** -3.15*** 65.75  0.46 13.58 0.11 -0.48 55.26 
10 -6.81 11.88 -2.17** -2.73*** 57.66  -7.12 11.91 -2.13** -2.58*** 60.27  -0.29 10.88 -0.06 -0.83 52.63 
11 -6.79 11.41 -2.06** -3.18*** 61.36  -7.05 11.45 -2.01** -2.77*** 62.33  -1.33 10.66 -0.29 -1.35 59.46 
12 -7.48 10.81 -2.16** -3.15*** 62.84  -7.73 10.74 -2.10** -2.55*** 63.19  -2.31 12.17 -0.49 -1.50 62.16 
13 -9.84 10.7 -2.57** -3.40*** 62.84  -10.14 10.7 -2.50** -2.84*** 63.19  -3.54 10.63 -0.72 -1.84* 62.16 
14 -10.18 8.98 -2.56** -3.71*** 64.22  -10.42 8.99 -2.48** -3.16*** 64.58  -5.1 8.68 -0.98 -2.17** 64.86 
15 -9.28 9.81 -2.22** -3.58*** 62.21  -9.45 9.84 -2.14** -2.99*** 61.11  -5.76 9.17 -1.07 -2.25** 64.38 
16 -10.59 8.43 -2.42** -3.66*** 63.13  -10.86 8.4 -2.34** -3.16*** 63.89  -4.94 8.91 -0.88 -1.90* 61.64 
17 -15.64 10.62 -2.77*** -4.10*** 63.13  -16.13 10.52 -2.71*** -3.70*** 63.19  -5.41 11.7 -0.94 -1.76* 63.01 
18 -12.37 13.81 -1.95* -4.27*** 65.42  -12.69 13.95 -1.90* -3.88*** 68.53  -5.76 9.54 -0.97 -1.43 59.15 
19 -11.86 8.14 -1.82* -4.24*** 65.26  -12.05 7.91 -1.75* -3.75*** 67.13  -7.81 11.7 -1.25 -1.73* 61.43 
20 -11.27 10.88 -1.68* -4.75*** 67.30  -11.32 10.9 -1.60 -4.12*** 68.31  -10.18 9.98 -1.53 -2.17** 65.22 
21 -13.13 9.66 -1.87* -4.99*** 67.14  -13.25 9.62 -1.79* -4.40*** 67.38  -10.68 10.32 -1.57 -2.46** 66.67 
22 -15.43 11.14 -2.10** -4.99*** 66.67  -15.66 11.12 -2.02** -4.40*** 68.09  -10.63 11.17 -1.53 -2.23** 63.77 
23 -17.98 8.61 -2.32** -4.91*** 67.46  -18.51 7.72 -2.25** -4.40*** 68.09  -6.76 18.4 -0.86 -2.20** 66.18 
24 -20.77 8.46 -2.53** -4.65*** 66.03  -21.40 8.38 -2.46** -4.20*** 65.96  -7.49 9.63 -0.93 -2.31** 66.18 
25 -19.53 16.74 -2.30** -4.90*** 67.63  -20.19 16.67 -2.26** -4.44*** 68.79  -5.66 18.14 -0.67 -2.17** 65.15 
26 -19.49 9.18 -2.25** -4.56*** 64.73  -20.05 8.99 -2.20** -4.20*** 67.38  -7.5 12.4 -0.87 -1.79* 59.09 
27 -13.44 24.38 -1.29 -4.33*** 63.77  -13.66 24.78 -1.24 -4.04*** 65.25  -8.69 11.14 -0.98 -1.80* 60.61 
28 -15.69 12.3 -1.46 -4.45*** 63.29  -16.03 12.39 -1.41 -4.19*** 65.25  -8.58 9.99 -0.95 -1.68* 59.09 
29 -10.73 16 -0.90 -4.45*** 64.56  -10.8 16.15 -0.86 -4.28*** 66.43  -9.43 10.63 -1.02 -1.66* 60.61 
30 -9.59 9.97 -0.79 -4.34*** 61.65  -9.42 9.76 -0.73 -4.14*** 62.86  -13.25 12.71 -1.33 -1.71* 59.09 
31 -8.73 12.69 -0.70 -3.92*** 60.49  -8.71 11.88 -0.66 -3.89*** 62.86  -9.36 23.98 -0.86 -1.12 55.38 
32 -9.42 9.39 -0.74 -3.89*** 60.59  -9.45 9.28 -0.71 -3.94*** 62.14  -8.84 11.32 -0.80 -1.22 57.14 
33 -8.94 11.54 -0.69 -4.34*** 63.00  -8.98 11.19 -0.66 -4.20*** 65.47  -7.97 17.32 -0.71 -1.36 57.38 
34 -8.28 10.65 -0.63 -4.28*** 62.81  -8.32 10.49 -0.60 -4.13*** 64.75  -7.49 13.54 -0.65 -1.39 58.33 
35 -7.90 8.96 -0.59 -3.99*** 61.62  -7.95 8.96 -0.56 -3.95*** 65.22  -7.04 9.04 -0.60 -0.86 53.33 
36 -6.94 13.97 -0.51 -3.97*** 60.41  -7.00 14.2 -0.49 -4.13*** 63.24  -5.49 7.63 -0.46 -0.81 55.00 
       This table shows the CARs from a 1-month to a 36-month period after listing. The benchmark used is SD model. Brown and Warner’s (1980) t-statistics are the two-tailed test results of a null hypothesis that means they are  
       equal to zero. The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the null hypothesis that the median abnormal return is zero.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  
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Appendix 2B A List of Figures for Long-Run Performance of IPOs 
    
 
Figure 2A Long-run performance of Thai IPOs 2001-2012 using an Equally-Weighted 
Cumulative Abnormal return (EWCAR) 
 
 
Figure 2B Long-run performance of Thai IPOs 2001-2012 using Equally-Weighted Buy-
and-Hold abnormal return (EWBHAR) 
 
 
Figure 2C Long-run performance of Thai IPOs 2001-2012 using Value-Weighted 
Cumulative Abnormal return (VWCAR) 
 
Figure 2D Long-run performances of Thai IPOs 2001-2012 using Value-Weighted Buy-
and-Hold abnormal return (VWBHAR) 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ix 2
B
 
  
84 
A
p
p
en
d
ix 2
B
 
 
Figure 2E Long-run performance of Thai IPOs 2004-2012 categorized into 8 sectors by 
using Equally-Weighted Cumulative Abnormal returns (EWCARs) 
 
 
Figure 2F Long-run performance of Thai IPOs 2004-2012 categorised into 8 sectors by 
using Value-Weighted Cumulative Abnormal returns (VWCARs) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2G Long-run performance of Thai IPOs 2004-2012 categorized into 8 sectors by 
using Equally-Weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (EWBHARs) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2H Long-run performance of the 227 Thai IPOs 2001-2012 categorized into 8 
sectors by using Value-Weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (VWBHARs) 
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Figure 2I  Long-run performance of Thai IPOs 2001-2012 using an 
Equally-Weighted Cumulative Abnormal return (EWCCAR) by 
CAPM benchmark 
 
 
 
Figure 2J Long-run performance of Thai IPOs 2001-2012 using an 
Equally-Weighted Cumulative Abnormal return (EWFFCAR) by 
FF model benchmark 
 
 
 
Figure 2K Long-run performance of Thai IPOs 2001-2012 using 
an Equally-Weighted Cumulative Abnormal return (EWSDCAR) 
by SD model benchmark 
 
 
 
Figure 2L Long-run performance of Thai IPOs 2001-2012 using a 
Value-Weighted Cumulative Abnormal return (VWCCAR) by 
CAPM benchmark 
 
 
Figure 2M Long-run performance of Thai IPOs 2001-2012 using a 
Value-Weighted Cumulative Abnormal return (VWFFCAR) by  
FF model benchmark 
 
 
 
Figure 2N Long-run performance of Thai IPOs 2001-2012 using a 
Value-Weighted Cumulative Abnormal return (VWSDCAR)  
by SD model benchmark 
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Chapter 3 
Endogenous Disclosure of Use-of-Proceeds and Performance of IPOs 
3.1 Introduction 
Many theoretical and empirical works suggest that companies may decrease the cost of 
capital by reducing information asymmetry or by increasing voluntary disclosure
27
.   
Recently, a number of authors have concentrated on the role of information disclosures in 
IPO prospectuses on the IPO pricings (e.g., Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003; Leone et al., 
2007; Wyatt, 2014; Nielsen et al., 2015).  
Under the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s rules and regulations, when a 
firm issues an IPO, they have to disclose the intended uses of IPO proceeds in the 
prospectus. However, the issuers have considerable latitude with respect to the level or 
amount of information they would like to provide to the public. A related strand of 
literature focused on explaining why companies choose to disclose more information than 
is required by regulation from an information-economics perspective (Jenkinson and 
Ljungquist, 2001). For companies that have not been previously publicly traded and are 
unknown to the stakeholders (i.e. investors and analysts), the rationale for a detailed 
disclosure during the IPO phase is to help investors to build up their knowledge of the 
company and reduce information asymmetry and the ex-ante uncertainty regarding the 
value of their shares, as well as the extent of IPO underpricing. Obviously, the potential 
drawbacks of a detailed disclosure can restrict their flexibility over how to spend the 
money, or may release proprietary information (e.g., Dye, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Leone et al., 2007). In this chapter, the author builds on this literature and empirically 
examine the impact of endogenous disclosure on the stock market performance of IPO 
firms listed in Thailand as well as measuring and interpreting the information contained 
in Thai IPO prospectus texts and files.  
                                                        
27 See Chahine and Filatochev, 2008; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Healey and Palepu, 2001; Leone et al., 2007; 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003; Schrand and Verrecchia, 2002; and among others. 
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This chapter mainly aims to examine the effects of the levels of the intended use-of-
proceeds disclosures, the use-of-proceeds purposes, and information asymmetry on  IPO 
underpricing and the long-run performance of IPOs.  
The remainder of this chapter consists of five sections. Section 3.2 gives an overview of 
the existing literature on the endogenous disclosure of intended use-of-proceeds relevant 
to this study. Data and methodology are explained in Section 3.3, while the empirical 
results and a discussion of the findings are provided in Section 3.4. Robustness checks are 
reported in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 then concludes this chapter. 
3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
There is considerable empirical evidence showing that IPOs were generally underpriced 
(Jelic et al., 2001; Ritter and Welch, 2002; Lyn and Zychowicz, 2003; Burrowes and 
Jones, 2004; Chen et al., 2004; Chi and Padgett, 2005; Kirkulak and Davis, 2005; Bayley 
et al., 2006; Yu and Tse, 2006; Guo and Brooks, 2008; Bradley et al., 2009; Gao, 2010; 
Dimovski et al., 2011; Costa et al., 2013 and among others). Notably, for emerging 
markets, the IPO underpricing was much more severe compared to the developed markets 
(Costa et al., 2013)
28
. However, most of the prior empirical studies have found that IPOs 
show underperformance in the long-run or have negative abnormal returns over different 
holding periods after the IPO issue date (Ritter, 1991; Kooli and Suret, 2004; Álvarez and 
González, 2005; Akhigbe et al., 2006; Mazouz et al., 2008; Su and Bangassa, 2011; 
Thomadakis et al., 2012; Wen and Cao, 2013; Agathee et al., 2014). This remarkable 
empirical evidence from considerable theoretical literature in previous decades is trying 
to rationalize why IPOs are underpriced. Information asymmetry
29
 is  one of the well-
known key reasons for explaining the IPO underpricing phenomenon
30
 (Ritter and Welch, 
2002; Ljungqvist, 2007). Much research focuses on the factors affecting the stock market 
performance of IPO companies
31
. Typical explanatory factors of IPO performance 
include underwriters’ reputation (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Carter et al., 1998; Jelic et al., 
                                                        
28 In a recent study, Costa et al. (2013) have analyzed the impact of six fundamental cultural dimensions on IPO 
underpricing and used a huge IPO data set from 39 countries. Their results showed an average initial return of 27.6%. 
The Chinese IPO is the most severely underpriced or 156.1%. In the Russia, however, the IPO underpricing is smallest 
at merely 4.2%. 
29 Asymmetric information models assume that one of issuers, underwriters, marketing the deal and investors knows 
more than others.   
30 IPO underpricing is the phenomenon where the pricing of IPO is lower than the market value. 
31 See Arthurs et al., 2009; Bessler and Bittelmeyer, 2008;
 
Chen et al., 2004; Durukan, 2002; Guo et al., 2004; Brooks, 
2008; Kenourgios et al., 2007;
 
Lowry and Shu, 2002; Su and Bangassa, 2011;Thomadakis et al., 2012; Wen and Cao, 
2013; among others. 
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2001; Kirkulak and Davis, 2005; Kenourgios et al., 2007; Kirkulak and Davis, 2005; 
Dimovski, et al., 2011; Su and Bangassa, 2011), ownership structure (Chen et al, 2004; 
Su, 2004; Ahmad et al., 2011), and culture differences (Costa et al., 2013). However, 
these factors have been left outside the scope of this chapter as the author focuses here on 
the effects of disclosing use-of-proceeds information on information asymmetries. 
Schrand and Verrechia (2004) argue that information asymmetry between corporate 
management and the financial markets at the time of the IPO leads to higher costs of 
capital. They argue that companies can directly apply voluntary disclosure as a tool to 
reduce these costs. Further, they find disclosure to be negatively associated with bid–ask 
spread as a proxy for a company’s cost of capital. 
The seminal literature related to the concept of information disclosure suggested that 
voluntary disclosures are expected to lower the cost of equity capital (see Verrecchia, 
2001) because increased disclosure reduces information asymmetry and tends to enhance 
stock market liquidity by exceeding demand for a firm’s stocks. This, in turn, may 
facilitate a more precise valuation of the company. Both Botosan (1997) and Richardson 
and Welker (2001) confirm that there is a negative relationship between the quantity and 
quality of information disclosure and the firms’ cost of equity capital. In the same vein, 
information can reduce investors’ perceived risk when predicting a firm’s future 
performance (Nielsen et al., 2015). In the recent study of Andriansyah and Messinis 
(2016), they investigated the relation between the use-of-proceeds and the operating 
performance in the Indonesian IPO market. They classified motivation for the IPO issue 
into 5 groups such as fixed assets investment, working capital financing, investment in 
shares of stock, debt repayments, and secondary shares and suggested that this led the 
companies that used the proceeds for investment in fixed assets and in stock market 
shares to a better operating performance but other usages led to a poor performance. An 
important subset of this research suggests the existence of information asymmetries 
between the IPO’s firm, underwriters, and external investors that in itself creates a set of 
agency costs impacting on IPO pricing and long-run abnormal return after going public. 
This chapter is related to the following four strands of literature on the performance of 
IPOs: 1) Intended use-of-proceeds disclosure and cost of capital; 2) Use-of-proceeds 
purposes and IPO performance; 3) Ex-ante uncertainty, information disclosure and IPO 
discount; 4.) Signalling and Impresario hypotheses for IPOs. The following sections also 
suggest a number of testable hypotheses.   
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3.2.1 Intended Use-of-Proceeds Disclosure and IPO Underpricing 
A number of scholars focused on examining the level/amount and number of use-of-
proceeds disclosures on the stock market performance of IPOs. For instance, Jenkinson 
and Ljungquist (2001)’s study was among the first to show how lower information 
asymmetry via improved information disclosure became proxies for reducing ex-ante 
uncertainty. Furthermore, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) suggest that new issuers 
disclosing vague information about the use-of-proceeds show a higher IPO discount rate. 
However, the literature provides mixed findings concerning the roles of information 
disclosure in the use-of-proceeds section in prospectuses. For example, Beatty and Ritter 
(1986) found a positive relation between the numbers of use-of-proceeds and 
underpricing. Leone et al. (2007) examined the specificity of the use-of-proceeds in the 
IPO prospectus and found that an increase in specificity was associated with a decline in 
underpricing. This is in line with Schrand and Verrecchia (2002), who also suggested that 
an increase in disclosure was negatively correlated with IPO underpricing. In the same 
vein, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) showed that firms citing the funding of operating 
expenses (less specificity) as the primary use have higher underpricing. Companies may 
try to reduce information asymmetries at the time of their IPOs by disclosing strategic 
information such as operations, acquisition strategy, finance and the like, in the 
prospectuses (Schrand and Verrecchia, 2002; Healey and Palepu, 2001; Chahine and 
Filatochev, 2008). However, Beatty and Welch (1996) found no relationship between the 
number of uses of IPO proceeds and subsequent initial returns. Another vital aspect of the 
disclosure of intended use-of-proceeds and the stock market performance of IPOs relates 
to the details in the use-of-proceeds disclosure and their impact on IPOs’ underpricing. 
Thus, previous voluntary disclosure studies imply that information disclosure reduces the 
cost of equity capital, especially when there is a large information asymmetry in the IPO 
process because IPO companies can reduce ‘money left on the table’ by setting up a 
higher offering price and also can use the proceeds for their own purposes (e.g. fixed 
assets investment, working capital financing, research and development, investment in 
shares of stock, debt repayments and so on). 
In addition, a recent study by Nielsen et al. (2015) studied the effects of the disclosure 
practices in Japanese IPO prospectuses on long-term stock performance. They found that 
intellectual capital information leads to a significantly better long-term performance. In 
another study, Bessler and Bittelmeyer (2008) found that innovation, patents, and 
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intellectual capital are important factors that have a positive impact on the valuation and 
on the long-run financial performance of especially young technology firms.  
Based on the above discussions, it can be expected that companies that disclose 
substantial amounts of information on use-of-proceeds will reduce the cost of equity and 
will be associated with better transparency and therefore also have a better long-term 
performance. The hypotheses can be stated as follows: 
H1.1 The level of intended use-of-IPO proceeds disclosure has a negative impact on 
IPO underpricing, ceteris paribus.  
H1.2 The level of intended use-of-IPO proceeds disclosure has a positive impact on 
firms’ long-term performance of the stock price, ceteris paribus.  
3.2.2 Use-of-Proceeds Purposes and IPO Performance 
Companies raise external equity capital for different reasons.  One of the basic tenets of 
financial theory is that companies with potentially value-adding investment projects have 
inadequate internal funds to finance the projects. Therefore, they should raise external 
capital to invest and expand. The stock markets play a significant role for companies 
enabling them to offer shares and use the proceeds for investment purposes, such as 
capital expenditure, research and development, acquisition, and for other purposes. On 
the other hand, firms can issue equity and use the proceeds to repay debt obligations 
(recapitalization).  However, Wyatt (2014) argued that designating the use-of-proceeds 
for working capital, in cases of companies that conceal specific information about capital 
expenditure, is an opaque disclosure (ceteris paribus).   
In this section, the author discusses the literature on a variety of use-of-proceeds purposes 
affecting IPO underpricing and long-run performance differently. According to Wyatt 
(2014), using proceeds to pay off their own loans is a negative signal that may increase 
the ex-ante uncertainty of their offerings and the subsequent uncertainty associated with 
expected future cash flows. Pagano et al. (1998) and Leone et al. (2007) showed that 
firms using the proceeds for repaying debt tend to be large and mature companies with 
growth opportunities and companies that are going public to exploit mispricing. 
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Furthermore, firms stating their use-of-proceeds to be for debt repayment may take 
advantage of overvalued stocks by timing IPOs to be during periods of high returns to pay 
off their debts (Autore et al., 2009). As a consequence, they are more likely to 
underperform in the long-run. The conflicts of interest effect is a well-known concept 
explaining the return around the offering announcement and the post-performance of 
issuers underwritten by the bank and the stated intended use-of-proceeds for debt 
repayment. This effect suggests that a bank underwriter with superior information about 
an issuing company can misrepresent the true value of stocks and require the issuer to use 
the proceeds to pay off its loan (Benston, 1990). In a recent study, Suzuki and Yamada 
(2012) find that firms underwritten by the bank have higher returns at the SEO 
announcement in Japan. Additionally, they report that firms that stated their intended use-
of-proceeds to be to repay bank loans underwritten by investment houses have lower 
returns compared with their matching portfolios.       
On the other hand, for companies stating investment as the intended use-of-proceeds were 
able to signal their future investment opportunities better (Autore et al., 2009; Hertzel and 
Li, 2007). Hence, they should not be expected to be underperforming in the long-run. In 
contrast, Jeanneret (2005) studied the relationship between the long-term performance of 
French SEOs and their intended use-of-proceeds. He found that firms that stated their use-
of-proceeds to be for investment underperform in the long-run and there is no abnormal 
performance for firms, the stated purpose of which is for recapitalization.  Nevertheless, 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) suggested that companies intending to use their proceeds 
for operating expenses rather than for investment and debt repayment are potentially more 
riskier. In another study, Bessler and Bittelmeyer (2008) found that innovation, patents, 
and intellectual capital are important factors that have a positive impact on the valuation 
and on the long-run financial performance of especially young technology firms.  
In Thailand the companies that stated their use-of-proceeds to be for investment provide 
more specific information (e.g. increasing subsidiaries, expanding factories, research and 
development, improving service and merchandise quality and others) than companies that 
stated their intention was to pay off their short- or long-term debts. Accordingly, less and 
opaque disclosure may be associated with a high ex-ante uncertainty of the offer and the 
expected future cash flows. Thus, a positive (negative) relation is expected between the 
use of proceeds for repaying debt and underpricing (the aftermarket performance of 
IPOs).  
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H2.1 The intended use-of-IPO-proceeds for repaying debt (investment) is positively 
(negatively) related to the magnitude of IPO underpricing, ceteris paribus.  
H2.2 The intended use of IPO proceeds for repaying debt (investment) is negatively 
(positively) related to the long-run performance of IPOs, ceteris paribus. 
3.2.3 Ex-ante Uncertainty, Information Disclosure and IPO Underpricing 
In an extension of Rock’s (1986)32 model of underpricing, Beatty and Ritter (1986), 
demonstrated that greater ex-ante uncertainty of a new issue was related to greater 
information asymmetry, which then resulted in higher underpricing. Beatty and Ritter 
provide further interpretation, namely following intuition. An investor who engages in 
information production implicitly invests in a call option on the new issues, which will be 
exercised if the ‘true’ price exceeds the strike (offering) price. They also suggested that 
issues that are subject to information asymmetry, such as those from a small company, 
will tend to be underpriced. As a result, such companies then have to face the problem of 
having to retain the shares themselves. Similarly, Rock (1986), Ritter (1998) and Ritter 
and Welch (2002) suggested that ex-ante uncertainty about future cash flows is related to 
a lower offer price than would otherwise be expected, and to more severe IPO 
underpricing. Thus, company characteristics, including age and size, are popular proxies 
of IPO underpricing (Ljungqvist, 2007).  Furthermore, the findings of Chi and Padgett 
(2005) and Cheung et al. (2009), as well as the studies of Su and Bangassa (2011) and 
Lin and Tian (2012) also showed that the offering size or the flotation size of an IPO has 
a negative effect on an IPO’s underpricing.  
For the public information, many researchers have used the age of a firm at the time of 
offering a proxy for measuring the ex-ante uncertainty of the IPOs. In this line, the 
empirical evidence of Carter et al. (1998), Chen et al. (2004), Yu and Tse (2006) and 
Sullivan and Unite (2009) represented the offer size and age of firms as being significant 
and providing negative correlation in explaining IPO underpricing. They also suggested 
                                                        
32 ‘The ‘winner’s curse model’ by Rock (1986) assumes that informed investors, such as issuing firms and their 
underwriters, have an informational advantage as compared to general and retail investors about the firms’ present 
value and the risk of the future cash flows. Hence, informed investors invest only in attractively priced IPOs, while 
uninformed investors invest randomly. In order to attract less informed investors to preempt the new IPO, shares must 
on average be underpriced. “The uninformed compete with the informed, and the issuer must ultimately compensate 
them for their disadvantage” (Rock, 1986, p. 207).  
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that there is a lower information asymmetry for older firms due to a greater amount of 
public information concerning them being available. In a key study, Sullivan and Unite 
(1999) also found that, due to asymmetric information, IPOs of new start-up firms have 
been shown to be subject to greater underpricing than those of established firms. 
Likewise, Kirkulak and Davis (2005) suggested that younger firms have a higher ex-ante 
uncertainty. They even indicated a negative relationship between the age variable and the 
initial return. In addition, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) found that large firms prefer to 
disclose more information since they benefit most.  Disclosure reduces the risk-bearing 
capacity available through market-makers.  If the initial information asymmetry is less, it 
will decrease the current price of the security.   
In this chapter, the author argues that disclosing information on the offer size and age of 
the firm has a negative impact on uncertainties and reduces initial returns. Hence, the 
hypotheses can be stated as follows: 
H3.1 The information on offer size of the firm is negatively related to level of 
uncertainty and IPO underpricing, ceteris paribus. 
H3.2 The information on age of the firm is negatively related to level of 
uncertainty and IPO underpricing, ceteris paribus. 
Furthermore, the time gap between the offer date and the first day of trading may affect 
the level of ex-ante uncertainty and IPO underpricing. The firms that have an extended 
period of time (from the establishment date to the IPO offer date) have less information 
asymmetry. This argument has been theoretically developed by Chowdhry and Sherman 
(1996) and Su and Fleisher (1999). The time-lag represents a return for the marketability 
risk of equity. Here, Chen et al. (2004) indicate that a long time-lag increases the risk to 
IPO subscribers because investors are not informed about the share value. Similarly, Yu 
and Tse (2006) and Uddin (2008) also demonstrate that an extended time-lag results in 
IPO underpricing and high ex-ante uncertainty. Based on the above discussion, H3.3 is 
stated as follows: 
H3.3 The information disclosure on time-lag between the IPO date and the first trading 
date is positively related to IPO underpricing, ceteris paribus. 
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3.2.4 Earnings Management and Government Ownership 
Teoh et al. (1998) and Pastor-Llorca and Poveda-Fuentes (2006) demonstrated that 
several firms are more aggressive in pushing earnings upwards around their IPO phase 
than in any other period due to large information asymmetries between investors and 
issuers. Thus, companies have incentives to manipulate earnings upwards to support high 
stock prices after going public. The IPO process is susceptible to earnings management 
because of information asymmetry, when investors have little knowledge of the company 
and security analysts are only initiating their coverage of the company. In this context, 
firms have incentives to engage in opportunistic behaviour reporting high earnings to 
maximize the offering pricing. As a consequence, the return on assets (ROA) and return 
on equity (ROE) present their maximum value in the year of the IPOs, and it then reverts 
in subsequent years (Pastor-Llorca and Poveda-Fuentes, 2006). In addition, Chen et al. 
(2004) suggested that firms with high profitability and growth rate are of interest to 
investors. Consequently, the IPO underpricing should therefore be greater when there is 
higher investor demand. Similarly, Cheung et al. (2009) and Su and Bangassa (2011) find 
a positive relationship between a firm’s performance and IPO underpricing. In addition, 
in the Chinese IPO market, Chen et al. (2004) also indicated that high government 
ownership is perceived as an increasing agency cost for private stockholders. There are 
marketability and liquidity problems when IPOs start trading if many shares are held by 
the state. However, the same researchers also found that government ownership is 
positively related to the initial return. Thus, the author favours the arguments for a 
positive relationship between the shares owned by the Thai government and the earning 
performance, and IPO performance:  
 
H4 The percentage of shares owned by the government is positively related to 
IPO underpricing and to the long-run performance, ceteris paribus. 
H5 Firm performance (ROA, ROE and delta EPS) has a positive (negative) 
impact on underpricing (aftermarket return), ceteris paribus. 
Moreover, Ritter (1998) found that only 26% of individual investors analyzed 
fundamental discrepancies between the intrinsic value and the offer price of IPOs.  In a 
key study Eng and Aw (2000) reported that retail investors do not pay attention to the 
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fundamental aspects of IPOs. The researcher can therefore presume that individual and 
foreign investors are uninformed investors. In contrast, Lonkani and Firth (2005) and 
Marisetty and Subrahmanyam (2010) suggested that institutional investors are better 
informed about IPO quality. Furthermore, they presumed that a higher level of 
institutional investor participation is signalled with a higher quality of company making 
an IPO. Similarly, Rock (1986) and Beatty and Ritter (1986) demonstrated that informed 
investors always subscribe to the issues that are underpriced, whereas uninformed 
investors tend to receive a larger proportion of the overpriced issues. In addition to this, 
institutional investors reveal their information during book building. Underwriters use the 
information from informed investors to determine the offering price and its allocation. In 
return, the underwriter would distribute larger portions of IPOs to institutional investors. 
The more private information received, the greater is the underpricing the informed 
investors should earn (Aggarwal et al., 2002; Boonchuaymetta and Chuanrommanee, 
2013). Hence, hypothesis (H6) can be stated as follows: 
H6 The proportion of issues subscribed by foreigners (institutions) is negatively 
(positively) related to the initial return. 
3.2.5 Impresario Hypothesis  
For a different hypothesis, Ritter (1991 and 1998) proposed an impresario hypothesis to 
explain the phenomenon of IPO underperformance in the long-run.  Investment bankers 
(the impresarios) underprice IPOs to stimulate an excess of IPO demand. Broadly 
speaking, the impresario, so-called ‘fad’ hypothesis demonstrates that the market for IPOs 
is subject to fads and that IPO are underpriced by investment bankers to create the 
appearance of excess demand, just as the promoter of a rock concert attempts to make it 
an event. This hypothesis suggests that the lowest subsequent returns should follow the 
highest initial returns. There is in fact some evidence to support this hypothesis (see 
Bradley et al., 2009 for a comprehensive review).  Thus, hypothesis (H7) can be 
identified as follows:  
H7 The IPO underpricing is negatively related to the long-run performance of 
IPOs, ceteris paribus. 
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Table 3.1 Testable Hypotheses to Explain Underpricing and Long-Run Performance 
 
Hypothesis Explanatory Variable Variable 
name 
IPO 
underpricing 
Long-run 
Performance 
Expected Sign Expected Sign 
1. Use of IPO 
Proceeds 
Use-of-proceed disclosure index UDI (-) (+) 
Intended use of IPO proceeds for repaying debt DEBT (+) (-) 
Intended use of IPO proceeds for working capital 
and investment 
INV (-) (+) 
2. Ex-ante 
uncertainty 
The offer size of IPO firm SIZE (-)  
The age of IPO firm AGE (-)  
The time-lag between the firm establish date and 
the first trading date 
LAG (+)  
3. Earnings 
management 
and 
government 
ownership 
The proportion of IPO shares owned by 
government  
GOV (+) (+) 
Change in the earnings per share from the IPO issue 
date to the date just prior to the listing date 
EPS (+) (-) 
Return on asset ROA (+) (-) 
Return on equity ROE (+) (-) 
The proportion of issues subscribed by foreigner PFS (-)  
The proportion of issues subscribed by institution INS (+)  
4. Impresario Market-Adjusted Initial Return or IPO underpricing MAIR  (-) 
Note: 
The variables below are employed in the literature and in this study as explanations for the IPO underpricing in Thailand. Sections 3 
and 4 of this chapter provide further detailed definitions of the explanatory variables. 
 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
The purpose of this section is threefold. First, the author provides a brief description and 
analysis of the data over the past decade and analyzes some of the key factors that seem 
to contribute to shaping its behaviour. Second, this study formulates a use-of-proceeds 
disclosure index for unique Thai data derived from the information in the prospectus files. 
The author also introduces the classification of the intended uses of the IPO proceeds as a 
discriminating variable to measure both the IPO underpricing and the performance of 
IPOs in the long-run. Third, the author presents the models that will be used in this study 
to measure the impact of the use-of-proceeds on IPO pricing.  
3.3.1. Data 
The database consists of all IPOs listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) and 
Market for Alternative Investments (MAI) during the period from January 2001 to April 
2012. Note that the listing criteria and regulations (e.g., capital requirement, and the 
number of consecutive years prior to the qualifying period required for listing minority 
shareholders) are more flexible in the MAI market compared to the SET market. Notice 
also this study starts its sample from 2001 because the annual volume of the IPO issues in 
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the earlier years was very low, in particular, in the years from 1997 to 1999 when there 
were no IPOs issued at all in Thailand.  
The sources of information about the issued IPOs are the official prospectus filing forms 
(Form 69-1) available from the IPO filing database provided by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in Thailand.
33
 The information concerning IPO companies 
listed on the SET and MAI during the period 2001 to 2012 was obtained from several 
other sources (SEC, Thailand database, SET database and SETSMART). The author 
collected stock prices and stock market indices from DataStream.  
3.3.2 Use-of-Proceeds Disclosure Index  
In this study, the author focuses on the effect of all types of information contained in the 
narrative use-of-proceeds section of the IPO prospectus. However, in regard to the SEC, 
Thailand Database, the IPO prospectus is provided in the Thai language version only. 
Therefore, the researcher constructs a disclosure index for measuring the levels of use-of-
proceeds information reported in the unique Thai prospectuses. Firstly, this study extends 
disclosure of non-accounting information by classifying the intended use-of-proceeds into 
six major different issues, namely, working capital, general operation issues, research and 
development, service improvement, expanding businesses and paying down loans. 
Furthermore, the researcher places importance on the magnitude of use-of-proceeds 
disclosure. The author also subdivides the information level related to working capital 
and loan repayment into 2 levels (high and low) and investment into 3 levels (high, 
moderate and low) of disclosures (See more details and examples of the use-of-proceed 
disclosure index calculation in Appendix 3A, Pages 119-121).  
The contents of each use-of-proceeds were compared to the items on the disclosure 
scoreboard and coded as 1 or 0, depending upon whether the IPO prospectus contained or 
did not contain the voluntary disclosure.  For example, if a company revealed the use-of-
proceeds to be for a specific investment project and an amount of money to be for 
                                                        
33 The listed companies are obliged to publish a prospectus detailing to all investors their company profiles, including 
the history of the firm, the organizational structure, the offer size, the proportion of shareholders, the financial 
statements covering 5-year periods and the risks involved in their operations etc. This study obtained the prospectuses 
for all the IPOs in the sample from the SEC (http://sec.or.th). Additional information about the IPOs in database was 
obtained from the SET website (http://set.or.th). Further data was obtained from the SET SMART website 
(http://www.setsmart.com).  
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expanding their business as well, the author would give a score of 3 for the level of 
disclosure. The intended use-of-proceeds index was quantified as the percentage of 
recorded information items reported in the prospectus. The following formula is used to 
calculate the index score of each IPO company.  
    𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑖 = (
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐷𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) × 100                                             (3.1) 
Where 𝐷𝑖 expresses item i with the value found in the IPO prospectus in use-of-proceeds 
section, otherwise 0. 𝑛 expresses the maximum of a uses-of-proceed total score in the 
IPO, which could be 10 scores.  
 
Figure 3.1 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) with intended use of the proceeds in Thailand between 2001 and 2012 
The total sample includes 245 IPOs – 152 ‘Investment’ issues and 93 ‘Debt repayment’ issues. The use of the 
proceeds is taken from the IPO prospectuses. 
 
Table 3.2, Panel A summarises the sample by exchange and by year of listing. The author 
finds about 65% (159 out of 245 total IPOs) of IPO listings are on the SET market, 
whereas only 35% are listed on the MAI market. Next, this study reports the number of 
IPOs by industry category in Panel B, and most of the IPOs in this sample pertained to the 
property & construction sector (47 firms). For the SET market, the researcher finds that 
about 19% is dominated by firms from the service sector, 14% by financial sector, and 
11.95% and 11.32% by industrial and technological sectors respectively.  For the MAI, 
the majority of IPOs are dominated by service and industrial sectors.  
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Table 3.2 Sample Size 
Panel A: sample size disaggregated by exchange and by IPO offering year 
Year Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) 
Market for Alternative 
Investment (MAI) 
             Total 
Number      % Number      % Number    % 
      2001 6             3.77 3             3.49 9 3.67 
      2002 19           11.95 3             3.49 22 8.98 
      2003 21           13.21 6             6.98 27 11.02 
      2004 37           23.27 12   13.95 49 20.00 
      2005 31           19.50 14 1           6.28 45 18.37 
      2006 10             6.29 5              5.81 15 6.12 
      2007 6          3.77 6             6.98 12   4.90 
      2008 8              5.03 3             3.49 11   4.49 
      2009 5          3.14 11           12.79 16   6.53 
      2010 4              2.52 7             8.14 11   4.49 
      2011 3              1.89 7             8.14 10 4.08 
      2012 9              5.66 9           10.46 18 7.35 
Total       159 100.00        86 100.00 245 100.00 
Panel B: sample size disaggregated by exchange and by industry group 
Industry Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) 
Market for Alternative 
Investment (MAI)            
              Total 
Number      % Number      % Number    % 
      Agro & Food Industry 7 4.40 3   3.49 10 4.08 
      Consumer Products 3 1.89 11 12.79 14 5.71 
      Financial 22 13.84 1  1.16 23 9.39 
      Industrial 19 11.95 25 29.07 44 17.96 
      Property & Construction 46 28.93 10 11.63 56 22.86 
      Resources 14 8.81 2   2.33 16 6.53 
      Services 30 18.87 25 29.07 55 22.45 
      Technology 18 11.32 9 10.46 27 11.02 
Total       159 100.00 86 100.00 245 100.00 
 
In addition, following Jeanneret (2005), this study divides the full sample into two 
categories according to the purposes of the use-of-proceeds; namely, investment (153 
IPOs) and debt repayment (92 IPOs). While the firms in the ‘Investment’ sample 
explicitly state that their main motives for issuing equity are expanding their factories or 
subsidiaries including working capital and general operation issues, the main motives for 
‘Debt repayment’ use-of-proceed are stated to be paying off their loans. However, the 
Thai IPOs prefer to state use-of-proceeds for investment rather than for paying off loans. 
Figure 3.1 plots the composition of the use of IPO proceeds each year.  
3.3.3 Research Methodology 
In what follows, the author first presents the model where the author considers a set of 
potential determinants of IPO underpricing. Next, this study examines to what extent a 
firm’s characteristics and intended use-of-proceeds could influence the stock market 
performance of Thai IPOs in the long-run. 
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A. Measuring the Intended Use-of-Proceeds on the Underpricing 
 In order to measure the intended use-of-proceeds and factors affecting IPOs issue 
discount, a panel linear regression model was used to test the ex-ante uncertainty, 
signalling and impresario hypotheses as well as the factors known to affect underpricing. 
The model takes the following form:  
   
i
j j
jjjj
iiiiiii
iiiiiiii
YearIndustry
BULLGOVINSPFSDEROEROA
EPSLAGAGESIZEUDIINVDEBTMAIR



 
 



21
15
32
22
141312111098
76543210 lnln
    
(3.2) 
where 𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖  is the market-adjusted initial return 𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖   or the IPO underpricing 
calculated by [(𝑃𝑖,1 − 𝑃𝑖,0)/𝑃𝑖,0] – 𝑅 𝑖,𝑚 or percentage change between offer price and 
IPO closing price on the first trading day; Pi,1 is the closing price on the first day of 
trading, 𝑃𝑖,0 is the IPO offering price, and 𝑅𝑖,𝑚 is the stock market index return from the 
IPO date to the first trading date
34
. 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖  (𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
IPO reported use-of-proceeds for repaying debt (investment) and 0 otherwise. 𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑖 is the 
use-of-proceeds disclosure index.  
The proxies for ex-ante uncertainty are 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 and 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖, where 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 is the number of 
shares offered at the IPO multiplied by the IPO offer price, and 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 is the age of a firm 
in years from the establishment date to the date of the IPO. 𝐿𝐴𝐺𝑖 is the time-lag between 
the IPO date and the first trading date or; 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖 is the government ownership; 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖, 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖, 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖 and 𝐷𝐸𝑖 are firm performance measures
35,36
; 𝑃𝐹𝑆𝑖 and 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 are percentages 
of foreign and institution investors subscribing for the IPOs respectively. 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖  and 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 
are the types of intended use-of-proceeds. Other variables include 𝐵𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑖, jIndustry  and 
                                                        
34 Ri,m is calculated by (SET1-SET0)/SET0 or (MAI1-MAI0)/MAI0. SET1 (MAI1) is the closing price of the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (Market for Alternative Investment) index on the first trading date and SET0 (MAI0) is the 
closing price of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (Market for Alternative Investment) index on the IPO date. 
35 As mentioned in Section 3.2.4, in order to control for the accounting earnings for the normal amount of mean 
reversion, this study employed the ROA and ROE to the models as control variables. Accounting ratios, rather than net 
income, are used to control for variations in size across firms (Kao et al., 2009). Also, ROA which measures the 
marginal benefit of an investment (Sulva and Bilinski, 2015); intuitively, given a firm’s discount rate and, high 
profitability indicating a high net present value of projects which itself stimulates new investment,     
36 In cases of the Thai IPO prospectuses, the ROA is calculated by net income/total assets; ROE is calculated by net 
income/total equity and EPS is calculated by net income (- dividends on preferred stocks)/the number of outstanding 
shares.   
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jYear are control variables for bull market conditions, industry and year effects; and i  is 
the regression error term. 
B. Measuring the Intended Use of Proceeds on the long-run performance of IPOs 
Next, this study further examines the impact of the intended use-of-proceeds disclosure 
on the stock market performance of Thai IPOs in the long-run.  Note that the literature 
provides mixed suggestions on whether to use cumulative abnormal returns  tiCAR ,  or 
buy-and-hold abnormal return  tiBHAR ,  to measure the IPO performance in the long-run. 
For example, Barber and Lyon (1997), Lyon et al. (1999) indicated that to compare the 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 against market performance may result in misspecification. However, by contrast, 
Fama (1998) in particular argues in favour of the use of 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 rather than 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑠. Hence, 
this study considers both and the model is identified as follows:
  
i
k
j
ijjiiiii XUDIINVDEBTCARBHAR   
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where 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 are measures of 3-year post abnormal IPOs returns, respectively; 
UDIi is the use-of-proceeds disclosure index; 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖 (𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖) is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if the IPO stated use of proceed for repaying debt (investment) and 0 otherwise. 𝑋𝑖,𝑗 is a 
vector of factors including IPO underpricing known to define the long-run performance of 
IPOs; the researcher also uses a range of dummy variables to control the market 
movement and industry effects as seen in equation (3.2).  
The dependent variable in (3.3) has been calculated as follows:  
 
 
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T
t
T
t
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1 1
,,, )1()1(                               (3.4)      
where Ri,t  and Rm,t are the monthly returns on stock i and the market index in the event 
month t respectively. 
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The market-adjusted abnormal returns of company i in event month t (𝐴𝑅i,t) are 
calculated for each event month t as follows: 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡  =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 – 𝑅𝑚,𝑡. Thus, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  (𝑃𝑖,𝑡 −
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1)/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1, where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the last traded price of the company in event month t and 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1is the last traded price of the company in event month t-1. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡is the return on the 
market index (SET or MAI indices) in month t and is calculated as𝑅𝑚,𝑡 =  (𝑃𝑚,𝑡 −
𝑃𝑖,𝑚−1)/𝑃𝑚,𝑡−1 where 𝑃𝑚,𝑡 is the last closed stock market index in month t and 𝑃𝑚,𝑡−1 is 
the last closed market index in event month t-1.
 
The average market-adjusted return for a sample of n firms in month t is defined as 
follows: 
                                         (3.5)                        
The cumulative average abnormal return of company i from event month 1 to event 
month T is defined as follows: 
                              (3.6) 
This study uses the ‘Robust Standard Errors’ in finite samples to overcome the 
heteroscedasticity problem referred to as Huber/White estimators. For the robust standard 
errors
37
, an apparent improvement is possible. For example, Davidson and MacKinnon 
(1993) report two variance-covariance estimation methods that seem, at least in their 
Monte Carlo simulations, to converge more quickly, as sample size n increases, to the 
correct variance/covariance estimates. Thus their methods seem valid, although they 
require more computational time problems. Overall, the use of robust S.E. does not 
change the coefficient estimates, but it makes changes in the standard errors and provides 
reasonably accurate p-values
38
.  
 
                                                        
 
38 For more details on Huber/White estimators see White, H. (1980). 
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
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3.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
In this section, the author first reports the descriptive statistics of the data. Next, the 
author presents the findings on the determinants of IPO underpricing and long-term stock 
performance, respectively. All models allow for industry-specific and year fixed effects 
and all tables report robust standard errors. 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This study starts the analysis by reporting the descriptive statistics. Table 3.3 presents the 
IPO transactions disaggregated by stock market and by the IPO offering year and 
provides a snapshot of the annual variation in issuing firm characteristics between 2001 
and 2012. This study also assesses the significance of changes over time by using the 
non-parametric test for trend across different groupings. As can be seen from Table 3.3, 
the average SET issuer was approximately 11 to 28 years old versus 7 to 28 years old for 
the average MAI issuer. The mean offering size almost tripled over the period (328 
million Baht in 2001 versus 1,110 million Baht in 2012). It can clearly be seen in the 
MAI IPOs that they are more likely to use the IPO proceeds for investment (about 70% of 
IPOs) in comparison with using them for debt repayment (30%). The use-of-proceeds 
disclosure indices are on average at 31.57%, 31.38% and 31.92% for the entire, SET and 
MAI samples respectively. Furthermore, it is noticeable that the large-sized (SET) 
companies are more likely to state their use-of-proceeds to be for debt repayment or re-
capital structure,; this is in direct contrast with the data reported by Carpenter and Rondi 
(2006) on recent Italian use of proceeds where small firms utilized their IPO proceeds for 
re-balancing their capital structure.   
Furthermore, IPO underpricing is evident across almost all the years in the sample period 
and across both stock markets. This study finds that the means of IPOs underpricing are 
25.36%, 20.61% and 34.16% for the entire, the SET and the MAI samples respectively, 
suggesting that our data share a common feature with other markets around the world, 
i.e., noticeable underpricing (see Ritter, 1998; Ljungqvist, 2007). These findings indicate 
that the underpricing is more intense in the MAI compared to the other market. The 
average levels of Thai IPO underpricing are slightly larger than those reported in earlier 
research (Chorruk and Worthington, 2010; Boonchuaymetta and Chuanrommanee, 2013). 
Chapter 3: Endogenous Disclosure of Use-of-Proceeds and Performance of IPOs 
 
105 
A
p
p
en
d
ix 2
B
 
However, the underpricing of IPOs in Thailand is still lower than that in developing 
markets (Jelic et al., 2001; Yu and Tse, 2006; Ahmad-Zaluki et al., 2007; Gao, 2010). The 
lower proportion of institutional and foreign investors subscribing for IPOs suggeststhat 
there are many uninformed investors, both retail and individual, in the sub-market. It 
indeed requires a higher degree of underpricing in order to attract uninformed investors to 
subscribe for MAI IPOs.  The author believes that the lower underpricing in SET is 
justified as the size of the firms in the SET is larger than those in the MAI. In line with 
the previous literature, a higher offer size was related to lower IPO underpricing as a 
result of asymmetric information (Carter et al., 1998; Chen et al., 2004; Chi and Padgett, 
2005; Yu and Tse, 2006; Cheung et al., 2009; Sullivan and Unite, 2009; Su and Bangassa, 
2011). For the Thai IPO market trend across different time periods, this study finds that 
the initial return was, on average, negative or as low as -1.01% only in 2006, whereas it 
was positive for the other year-periods, in particular the average IPO underpricing turning 
out to be significantly higher in 2011 and 2012 (73.82%), which is clearly an indication 
of the impact of information disclosure (amount and type) on underpricing. Overall, this 
implies that the Thai disclosure was mainly used to provide information on investments. 
From the sample, the author also formed two-groups according to the use of the proceeds 
following that by Jeanneret (2005)
39
. Table 3.4 reports the estimates associated with the 
type of disclosure (investment and loan as the intended use-of-proceeds. It is worth noting 
that 152 of Thai IPOs (62.04%) have discloses information in the intended use-of-
proceeds section for investment including working capital and general corporate purposes 
and 38% for the use of debt repayment. Based on the disclosure index (UDI), the IPOs 
stated use-of-proceeds for investment disclose more information (38.71%) than debt 
repayment IPOs (20.35%). For the average issue size, the author finds that the size of IPO 
firms that use disclosure for repaying debt as their use-of-proceeds is smaller than those 
associated with investment use-of-proceeds. The subscription details for IPOs for foreign 
and institutional investors are also reported in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 for each individual 
market and for the full sample respectively. However, the average foreign and 
institutional participation percentage, clearly indicates that such investors prefer to 
preempt the IPOs in the SET rather than in the MAI. The average foreign and institutional 
investors’ subscriptions for SET are 9.82% and 20.52%, but are only 4.83% and 7.99% in 
                                                        
39 Jeanneret (2005) studied the use-of-proceeds of 232 French SEOs. He formed two-subsamples: ‘Capital Structure’ 
and ‘Financing New Investment’. To be ranked in the ‘Finance new investment’, the issuer must specify that the 
proceeds will be spent on internal growth projects (a new plant, a new product or a new market segment) or on external 
growth opportunities (acquisitions). Companies in the ‘Capital Structure’ sample explicitly stating that their main 
motives for issuing equity are to improve their capital structure or debt repayment.   
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the MAI respectively. Notably, there was a significant increase in the number of investors 
that subscribed for new issues between 2005 and 2006. In contrast, the proportion of 
foreign (institution) investors subscribing for IPOs immediately decreased over time, 
from 9.42% (16.16%) in 2007 to 2.63% (4.15%) in 2012.  
Moving on to the underpricing and long-run IPOs returns, the first two columns of Table 
3.4 show the means and medians of both sub-samples. The findings show that the average 
market-adjusted initial return of IPOs stated use of proceeds for investment (25.79%) is 
slightly higher than those for debt repayment (24.67%). Furthermore, this study finds that 
the 6-month, 1-, 2- and 3-year BHARs of IPOs stating their  IPO proceeds to be used for 
investment are 5.41%, 16.51%, 14.58% and 13.70% respectively and all are statistically 
significant at 1% higher than the BHARs of IPOs stating their IPO proceeds to be for 
repaying debt (-10.55%, -11.64%, -36.15% and -45.04% respectively). For CARs the 
same pattern of results holds. It can be clearly seen that the initial return and the long-run 
returns of the ‘Investment’ IPOs are higher than those of the ‘Debt Repayment’ IPOs. 
These findings are in line with Autore et al. (2009) and Sulva and Bilinski (2015) who 
reported that issuers stated their use-of-proceeds to be for investments perform better than 
those who aim for recapitalization in the long-run. As for firms’ characteristic, the 
researcher finds insignificant differences between the two types of intended use-of-
proceeds. 
Overall, this study finds no convincing evidence or statistical difference between intended 
use-of-proceeds for ‘Investment’ and ‘Debt repayment’ IPOs based on the magnitudes of 
IPO underpricing.  The researcher nevertheless, finds evidence supporting the claim that 
‘Investment’ IPO firms perform better than ‘Debt repayment’ IPO firms in the long-run.  
  
107 
Table 3.3 Summary statistics for Thai IPOs 
 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2001-2012 Trend 
Sig. 
Stock Exchange of Thailand                
    Use-of-proceeds disclosure index (%) 15.15 29.18 30.30 29.23 36.36 30.90 21.21 35.22 27.27 34.09 54.54 38.38 31.38 *** 
    Intended use-of-proceeds for investment  0 13 12 19 20 5 2 6 3 3 2 7 92 * 
    Intended use-of-proceeds for debt repayment 6 6 9 18 11 5 4 2 2 1 1 2 67 - 
    Average offering size (million Baht) 489 506 821 2050 854 3,520 1,800 2,910 879 1,510 1,260 1,940 1,630 *** 
    Average firm age (year) 13.40 10.60 14.33 12.49 17.55 12.70 14.17 25.62 27 14.75 21.67 12.88 14.97 ** 
    Average foreigner investor subscription (%) 3.50 7.94 7.45 12.52 12.68 16.73 11.55 9.36 3.26 1.06 2.66 4.00 9.82 *** 
    Average institution investor subscription (%) 10.80 18.17 21.75 24.53 25.81 27.78 20.98 17.00 8.52 8.16 3.33 7.11 20.52 *** 
    IPO underpricing (%) 43.47 14.34 50.21 12.46 8.24 4.28 27.41 3.88 1.90 27.75 12.94 63.99 20.61 ** 
Market for Alternative Investment                
    Use-of-proceeds disclosure index (%) 21.21 42.42 25.75 34.09 24.02 32.72 28.78 33.33 32.23 41.55 28.57 41.41 31.92 * 
    Intended use-of-proceeds for investment 0 3 4 8 8 5 4 2 9 5 5 7 60 - 
    Intended use-of-proceeds for debt repayment 3 0 2 4 6 0 2 1 2 2 2 2 26 - 
    Average offering size (million Baht) 43.76 72.06 127 107 130 149 128 125 119 98.42 166 463 156 *** 
    Average firm age (year) 7.39 28.11 12.33 11.17 13.28 19.80 13.83 17.33 13.18 20.43 13.57 24.11 15.52 ** 
    Average foreigner investor subscription (%) 12.33 1.94 5.19 8.11 10.63 4.06 7.29 0.41 1.27 0.32 0.26 1.26 4.83 *** 
    Average institution investor subscription (%) 1.66 0.66 5.48 13.45 19.36 12.36 11.35 15.67 1.64 0.57 0.71 1.19 7.99 *** 
    IPO underpricing (%) 15.76 -0.04 56.66 33.44 2.73 -11.61 33.17 24.70 16.58 49.62 87.59 83.64 34.16 *** 
Entire sample                
    Use-of-proceeds disclosure index (%) 17.17 30.99 29.29 30.42 32.52 31.51 25.00 34.71 30.68 38.84 36.36 39.89 31.57 *** 
    Intended use-of-proceeds for investment 0 16 16 27 28 10 6 8 12 8 7 14 152 *** 
    Intended use-of-proceeds for debt repayment 9 6 11 22 17 5 6 3 4 3 3 4 93 * 
    Average offering size (million Baht) 328 447 667 1,570 629 2,390 963 2,150 357 613 495 1200 1,110 *** 
    Average firm age (year) 11.39 12.98 13.88 12.16 16.22 15.06 14.00 23.36 17.50 18.36 16.00 18.50 15.16 *** 
    Average foreigner investor subscription (%) 6.47 7.12 6.94 11.44 12.04 12.51 9.42 6.91 1.89 0.5 0.98 2.63 8.06 *** 
    Average institution investor subscription (%) 7.74 15.78 18.13 21.81 23.80 22.64 16.16 16.63 3.78 3.33 1.50 4.15 16.12 *** 
    IPO underpricing (%) 34.23 12.37 51.64 17.59 6.52 -1.01 30.29 9.55 11.99 41.67 65.19 73.82 25.36 *** 
Note: 
This table summarizes the data on 245 initial public offerings (IPOs) issued in Thailand between 2001 and 2012. The data are classified into 2 groups, based on the stock market listing: Stock Exchange of Thailand 
and Market for Alternative Investment groups. The issued size of IPOs is presented in Thai Baht.  The non-parametric test for trend across ordered groups, which is an extension of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, is 
employed. Lack of significance is indicated as ˗. 
    *
 Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
  **
 Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***
 Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables 
 
UDI: Use-of-Proceeds disclosure index (%); MAIR: the market-adjusted initial return or the IPO underpricing (%); 6-month, 1-, 2- and 3-year BHARs and CARs: six-month, one-, 
two-, three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (%) and cumulative abnormal returns (%); SIZE: the offer size of IPO firms (million Baht); AGE: the age of the firm in years from 
the establishment date to the year of IPO (year); LAG: the time-lag between IPO date and the first trading date (day); EPS: change in the earnings per share from the IPO issue date 
to the date just prior to the listing date (%); ROA: the return on assets for the most recent year prior to or in the year of the offering (%); ROE: the return on equity for the most 
recent year prior to or in the year of the offering (%); DE: debt/equity ratio for the most recent year prior to or in the year of the offering (times); PFS: the percentage of foreigners 
subscribing for the issues (%); INS: the percentage of institutions subscribing for the issues (%); GOV: the proportion of shares owned by the government (%). The significance of 
the difference in the mean (median) of variables between ‘Investment’ and ‘Debt repayment’ IPO sample measures is computed using the independent-sample t-test (the non-
parametric test namely two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test). 
 
 
Variable Intended uses of IPO proceeds for  
‘Investment’ 
 Intended uses of IPO proceeds for  
‘Debt repayment’ 
 Different 
Mean Median Std. N  Mean Median Std. N  t-stats z-stats 
UDI 38.71 36.36 0.94 152  20.35 18.18 1.22 93  -11.87*** -9.88*** 
MAIR 25.79 8.88 47.28 152  24.67 9.94 40.42 93  -0.20 -0.14 
6-month BHAR   5.41 -3.26 3.48 140  -10.55 -15.44 38.11 88  -2.98*** -3.23*** 
1-year BHAR   16.51 -4.70 77.06 132  -11.64 -22.34 72.07 86  -2.91*** -3.60*** 
2-year BHAR  14.58 -2.47 100.15 125  -36.15 -41.30 61.48 84  -4.53*** -4.03*** 
3-year BHAR  13.7 -3.60 108.86 117  -45.04 -48.61 73.22 80  -4.52*** -4.06*** 
6-month CAR  5.50 -0.30 38.34 140  -1.46 -14.76 42.00 88  -2.90*** -3.06*** 
1-year CAR  10.64 3.91 57.80 132  -2.66 -18.71 55.29 86  -3.65*** -3.86*** 
2-year CAR 3.18 4.02 74.15 125  -19.18 -38.12 69.88 84  -4.82*** -4.54*** 
3-year CAR  8.97 9.66 89.79 117  -14.48 -38.95 73.31 80  -4.55*** -4.13*** 
AGE  15.13 13.00 11.07 152  15.2 12.00 12.98 93  0.04 -0.01 
SIZE  1,137.85 235.40 3,885.2 152  1,073.9 300.00 3,215.86 93  0.13 1.50 
LAG  12.34 11.00 5.57 152  12.62 11.00 8.29 93  0.28 -0.76 
EPS  55.32 0.03 616.45 152  127.59 0.13 381.11 93  1.02 1.01 
ROA  14.84 0.10 20.01 152  13.65 0.09 26.11 93  -0.37 -0.83 
ROE  27.41 0.25 37.59 152  27.96 0.25 25.99 93  0.13 -0.24 
DE  1.71 1.50 1.36 146  3.49 2.07 5.45 91  3.06*** 3.82*** 
GOV  2.06 0.03 12.18 152  2.03 0.03 11.6 93  -0.02 0.25 
PFS  7.5 0.06 11.46 152  8.99 0.12 14.43 93  0.85 0.44 
INS  15.36 0.00 19.01 152  17.37 0.00 18.14 93  0.82 1.16 
Note: 
The sample consists of 245 IPOs made during the entire sample period (2001-2012). The significance of the difference in mean and median between ‘Investment’ IPOs and ‘Debt repayment’ IPOs  
    *
 Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
  **
 Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***
 Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
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3.4.2 Determinants of IPO Underpricing  
The results from Equation (3.2) for the full sample are presented in Table3.5. Overall, this 
study shows that the models (1) to (9) with a representative profile of IPO underpricing in 
the stock market of Thailand explain about 38.5% to 50.99% of variations in  IPO 
underpricing
40
. The robust standard error is further employed to ensure that all regression 
models do not suffer from the heteroscedasticity problem and to improve the small-
sample robust estimators for OLS. In order to detect the potential influence of 
multicollinearity in the regression, the author used the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs)
41
  
and found that none of the estimates exceed the accepted threshold of 10 (Neter et al., 
1985). Thus, there is no clear evidence of multicollinearity in the data.  
The author first examines the relationship between the levels of intended use-of-proceeds 
disclosures and IPO pricing. The findings support H1.1 and imply that firm managers can 
indeed reduce underpricing (cost of equity capital) by disclosing more information. To 
confirm this finding, the author constructs a use-of-proceeds disclosure index (𝑈𝐷𝐼) for 
Thai data and inserts it into the model. The result shows that the 𝑈𝐷𝐼 has a statistical 
negative impact on IPO underpricing. This is consistent with the results from prior 
empirical studies (e.g., Schrand and Verrecchia, 2002; Healey and Palepu, 2001; Leone et 
al., 2007; Chahine and Filatochev, 2008). This chapter also considers the types of use-of-
proceeds affecting the cost of equity. The author therefore examines the relationship 
between ‘Investment’ use-of-proceeds and IPO underpricing. The findings show that 𝐼𝑁𝑉 
has a negative effect on IPO underpricing. Furthermore, in line with Leone et al. (2007) 
this study finds that the use-of-proceeds disclosure assists investors in evaluating IPOs by 
narrowing their estimate of the dispersion of the stock’s secondary value. This implies a 
reduction in ex-ante uncertainty, and IPOs with such disclosures go public at offering 
prices closer to ‘intrinsic’ values and, as a result, are subject to less IPO underpricing on 
the first trading day (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Leone et al., 2007).  These findings also 
support H2.1 that when issuers disclose that they are to use the IPO proceeds for 
investment, operating expenses, expanding factories and subsidiaries or working capital, 
there is lower ex-ante uncertainty. In contrast, for the use-of-proceeds for debt 
                                                        
40 The author further uses a simple regression of initial returns on intended use-of-proceed dummy variables for 
‘Investment’ and ‘Debt repayment’ IPOs. The univariate results are not reported on this study. However, this study 
finds that there is no statistically significant between use of proceeds disclosure and the IPO underpricing. 
41 VIF is calculated as 1/(1 - R2) where R2 is obtained from the regression of the variable on all other regressors 
specified in the model. 
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repayment,𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇, the author finds that 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 is positively related to the underpricing and 
is significant. Once issuers intend to use the IPO proceeds for recapitalization (repaying 
their debts), there is greater uncertainty about the financial sustainability of their business 
model. A possible justification for the difference between ‘Investment’ and ‘Debt 
Repayment’ IPOs in terms of underpricing is that the Thai IPO companies that intend to 
use the proceeds for investment disclose more information on their future operation 
proposals than the ‘Debt Repayment’ IPO companies that merely provide information on 
their use of proceeds for repaying short-term or long-term debts. Consequently, the cost 
of equity capital is high (leaving more money on the table with discount IPO issues at the 
higher rate) for the latter.  
As firm characteristics, the author finds that the offer size (𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) of an IPO firm is 
negatively related to the IPO underpricing and is significant at the 1% and 5% levels of 
significance for the entire SET and MAI IPOs markets, which support   H2.1 that the 
coefficient on 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is negative and significant. These findings are in line with Rock 
(1986), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Vichakorn and Kennedy (2005), Yu and Tse (2006), 
Chin and Padgett (2005), Guo and Brooks (2008), Authurs et al. (2009), Su and Bangassa 
(2011) and Lin and Tian (2012). Other variables (lnAGE and lag LAG) failed to yield 
reasonable significant parameters, which does not support H3.2-H3.3. These results are  
in contrast to the findings of Sullivan and Unite (1999), Chen et al. (2004), Kirkulak and 
Davis (2005), Yu and Tse (2006), Uddin (2008) and Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012) 
amongst others. For the signalling hypothesis measured by 𝐺𝑂𝑉, 𝐸𝑃𝑆, 𝑅𝑂𝐸, 𝑃𝐹𝑆 and 
𝐼𝑁𝑆 and the degree of underpricing, the author finds an insignificant relationship in the 
Thai market leading us to reject H4-H5. Nevertheless, the 𝑅𝑂𝐴 variable has a 
significantly positive coefficient in models (5) and (6), confirming that the return on asset 
has a significant influence on underpricing in the SET.  
For market sentiments (bull-market dummy variable BULL), as seen in Table 3.5 (across 
models (1) through (3)), the author finds a positive relationship with IPO underpricing for 
the entire and MAI IPOs. This is in line with the previous literature that found a 
correlation between IPO underpricing and market sentiment and movement (Loughran 
and Ritter, 2002; Su, 2004; Yu and Tse, 2006; Kirkulak and Davis, 2005; Ekkayokkaya 
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and Pengniti, 2012)
42
. Furthermore, this study finds that DE has a negative impact on the 
magnitude of IPO underpricing for the entire and the SET IPOs.  
Using bootstrap standard error, the findings in Table 3.5 indicate that the bootstrap 
simulation produces a similar pattern of results, where the intended use-of-proceeds for 
investment (debt repayment) has a negative (positive) impact on IPO underpricing as well 
as insignificant results for the majority of other controlling variables. 
3.4.3 Use-of-proceeds and factors impacting on the long-term performance of IPOs 
This section examines the long-run return performance of Thai IPOs using Equation (3.2). 
As a starting point for this long-term performance analysis, we estimate a simple 
regression of the aftermarket abnormal returns on dummy variables for ‘Investment’ and 
‘Debt Repayment’. For the univariate results, the researcher finds that the intended use-
of-proceeds for investment (debt repayment) has a positive (negative) effect on three-year 
buy-and-hold abnormal return.  
Controlling for a fixed set of firm and offer characteristics, Table 3.6 presents OLS 
estimates using the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) as the dependent 
variable. The author finds that the disclosure index (𝑈𝐷𝐼) is positively related to the 
three-year aftermarket return and is statistically significant apart from the MAI IPOs. The 
finding is in line with H1.2 and supports the previous accounting studies that intellectual 
capital disclosure in IPO prospectuses is a significant factor and has a positive effect on 
the long-run financial performance of firms (e.g. Guo et al., 2004; Bessler and 
Bittelmeyer, 2008; Neilson et al., 2015). This finding implies that a Thai company that 
discloses substantial amounts of information on the intended use-of-proceeds will be 
associated with better transparency and thus perform better in the long-run.     
                                                        
42 Furthermore, Lowry and Schwert (2000) suggested that public information about market conditions during the 
register period should be predictably related to initial returns. 
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Table 3.5 OLS Estimates-Robust and Bootstrap Standard Errors (MAIR) 
 
Variables Entire IPOs  SET IPOs  MAI IPOs 
  (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS  (4) OLS (5) OLS (6) OLS  (7) OLS (8) OLS (9) OLS 
 β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
 β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
 β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
Constant 2.290 (0.580)
*** 
2.358 (0.539) 
***
 2.309 (0.531)
*** 
 
 
1.771 (0.867)
** 
1.917 (0.752)
**
 1.787 (0.730)
**
 
 
3.518 (2.150)
* 
3.770 (1.651)
**
 3.759 (1.670)
**
 
  [0.592]
*** 
 [0.573]
 ***  [0.546]
***
 
 
 [0.843]
** 
 [0.818]
**
  [0.788]
**
 
 
 [2.083]
* 
 [2.247]
* 
 [2.413]
* 
UDI -0.003 (0.002)
* 
    
 
-0.003 (0.002)     
 
-0.004 (0.005)     
  [0.002]
* 
    
 
 [0.002]     
 
 [0.005]     
INV   
  
-0.094 
 
(0.056) 
[0.057] 
 
  
 
  
-0.166 
 
(0.065)
** 
[0.073]
**
   
 
  
0.130 
 
(0.140) 
[0.170] 
 
  
DEBT  
  
 
 
0.096 
 
(0.054)
*
 
[0.056]
*
 
 
  
 
 
0.163 
 
(0.062)
*** 
[0.066]
**
 
 
  
 
 
-0.088 
 
(0.135) 
[0.185] 
lnSIZE -0.120 (0.029)
*** 
-0.126 (0.027)
***
 -0.126 (0.027)
*** 
 
 
-0.087 (0.042)
** 
-0.095 (0.037)
**
 -0.093 (0.037)
**
 
 
-0.183 (0.112)
* 
-0.198 (0.088)
**
 -0.195 (0.087)
**
 
  [0.030]
*** 
 [0.029]
 ***  [0.028]
***
 
 
 [0.042]
** 
 [0.041]
**
  [0.041]
**
 
 
 [0.112]
* 
 [0.115]
*
  [0.130] 
lnAGE 
0.048 (0.037) 0.041 (0.034) 
0.041 
(0.034) 
 
0.056 (0.046) 0.041 (0.039) 0.039 (0.038) 
 
-0.003 (0.082) -0.022 (0.064) -0.020 (0.064) 
  [0.038]  [0.035]  [0.035]   [0.044]  [0.045]  [0.042]   [0.092]  [0.104]  [0.094] 
LAG -0.002 (0.005) -0.003 (0.004) -0.003 (0.004)  0.001 (0.007) 0.001 (0.006) 0.001 (0.006)  -0.002 (0.012) -0.005 (0.007) -0.004 (0.007) 
  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.005]   [0.009]  [0.008]  [0.008]   [0.013]  [0.015]  [0.015] 
EPS 0.001 (0.007) 0.001 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005)  0.004 (0.008) 0.003 (0.005) 0.003 (0.005)  -0.024 (0.050) -0.017 (0.044) -0.021 (0.044) 
  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.007]   [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.007]   [0.059]  [0.052]  [0.058] 
ROA 0.034 (0.186) 0.023 (0.160) 0.028 (0.157)  -0.290 (0.239) -0.295 (0.138)
**
 -0.292 (0.138)
*
  0.153 (0.383) 0.211 (0.241) 0.190 (0.245) 
  [0.236]  [0.190]  [0.180]   [0.240]  [0.214]  [0.211]   [0.486]  [0.524]  [0.580] 
ROE  0.074 (0.123) 0.076 (0.108) 0.079 (0.108)  0.046 (0.127) 0.040 (0.076) 0.042 (0.076)  0.114 (0.329) 0.034 (0.268) 0.024 (0.272) 
  [0.171]  [0.121]  [0.119]   [0.131]  [0.116]  [0.119]   [0.419]  [0.418]  [0.462] 
DE -0.019 (0.008)
** 
-0.018 (0.006)
***
 -0.018 (0.006)
***
  -0.020 (0.009)
** 
-0.022 (0.008)
***
 -0.022 (0.008)
***
  -0.058 (0.051) -0.033 (0.048) -0.039 (0.048) 
  [0.007]
** 
 [0.009]
**
  [0.009]
**
   [0.010]
* 
 [0.010]
**
  [0.010]
**
   [0.055]  [0.061]  [0.066] 
PFS 0.144 (0.293) 0.180 (0.275) 0.177 (0.275)  -0.043 (0.405) 0.034 (0.346) 0.026 (0.348)  0.212 (1.526) 0.269 (0.559) 0.266 (0.588) 
  [0.320]  [0.296]  [0.287]   [0.413]  [0.389]  [0.390]   [1.326]  [1.209]  [1.379] 
INS -0.001 (0.192) -0.002 (0.187) 0.004 (0.188)  -0.011 (0.256) -0.026 (0.220) -0.016 (0.223)  -0.272 (0.499) -0.138 (0.421) -0.139 (0.416) 
  [0.206]  [0.194]  [0.184]   [0.248]  [0.235]  [0.238]   [0.538]  [0.555]  [0.632] 
GOV 0.345 (0.262) 0.359 (0.182) 0.360 (0.193)  0.196 (0.300) 0.223 (0.253) 0.204 (0.268)        
  [0.200]
* 
 [0.282]  [0.279]   [0.354]  [0.334]  [0.397]        
BULL  0.127 (0.059)
** 
0.138 (0.057)
**
 0.139 (0.057)
*
 
 
0.068 (0.074) 0.088 (0.063) 0.094 (0.063) 
 
0.198 (0.128) 0.198 (0.114)
* 
0.198 (0.112)
* 
  [0.063]
** 
 [0.058]
**
  [0.059]
**
 
 
 [0.074]  [0.069]  [0.067] 
 
 [0.140]  [0.147]  [0.143] 
Year  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 237 237 237  153 153 153  84 84 84 
MAX 
VIF. 
6.79 6.56 6.55  6.79 6.56 6.55  6.41 6.56 6.55 
R2 (%) 38.57 38.50 38.59  38.57 41.18 41.16  51.11 50.99 50.59 
F-stats 3.15
*** 3.28
***
 3.27
***
  1.75 1.84
**
 1.80
**
  1.66
* 1.96
**
 1.91
**
 
Note:   
Other estimators shown here include Davidson and MacKinnon’s (1993) improved small-sample robust estimators for OLS, cluster-robust estimators useful when errors may be arbitrarily correlated within groups (one 
application is across time for an individual).  
*
, 
** and *** Statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. Robust standard errors (RSE) are reported in parentheses, and bootstrap standard errors (BSE) are reported within brackets. 
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Table 3.6 OLS Estimates-Robust and Bootstrap Standard Errors (BHARS) 
 
Variables Entire IPOs  SET IPOs  MAI IPOs 
 (10) OLS (11) OLS (12) OLS  (13) OLS (14) OLS (15) OLS  (16) OLS (17) OLS (18) OLS 
 β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
 β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
 β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
Constant 2.079 (1.837) 1.617 (1.769) 2.100 (1.817)  0.969 (2.558) 0.518 (2.565) 1.213 (2.754)  7.456 (5.998) 6.882 (6.401) 7.765 (5.590) 
  [1.726]  [1.616]  [1.719]   [2.447]  [2.217]  [2.551]   [6.877]  [6.145]  [6.791] 
UDI 0.009 (0.005)
* 
    
 
0.018 (0.006)
*** 
    
 
-0.003 (0.018)     
  [0.005]
* 
    
 
 [0.006]
*** 
    
 
 [0.019]     
INV   
  
0.470 
 
(0.149)
*** 
[0.142]
**
   
 
  
0.508 
 
(0.196)
*** 
[0.171]
***
 
 
 
 
  
0.595 
 
(0.399)
** 
[0.413]   
DEBT  
    
-0.333 
 
(0.156)
**
 
[0.142]
**
 
 
    
-0.280 
 
(0.188)
* 
[0.167]
*
 
 
    
-0.667 
 
(0.374)
* 
[0.454] 
 
MAIR -0.622 (0.246)
** 
-0.542 (0.250)
**
 -0.568 (0.258)
**
 
 
-0.701 (0.282)
** 
-0.586 (0.282)
** 
 
-0.657 (0.302)
** 
 
-0.478 (0.505) -0.449 (0.527) -0.411 (0.490) 
  [0.224]
*** 
 [0.218]
**
  [0.221]
**
 
 
 [0.242]
*** 
 [0.247]
**
  [0.264]
**
 
 
 [0.636]  [0.448]  [0.465] 
lnSIZE 
-0.114 (0.085) -0.086 (0.080) -0.101 (0.082) 
 
-0.047 (0.127) -0.017 (0.123) 
-0.042 
(0.131) 
 
-0.391 (0.316) -0.367 (0.316)
** 
-0.394 (0.286)
*
 
  [0.083]  [0.077]  [0.082]   [0.123]  [0.114]  [0.126]   [0.370]  [0.343]  [0.381] 
lnAGE 0.043 (0.102) 0.071 (0.096) 0.071 (0.098)  0.052 (0.121) 0.095 (0.122) 0.077 (0.122)  0.198 (0.227) 0.135 (0.251) 0.117 (0.226) 
  [0.094]  [0.095]  [0.092]   [0.113]  [0.121]  [0.122]   [0.289]  [0.263]  [0.277] 
EPS 
0.004 (0.010) 0.006 (0.013) 0.005 (0.012) 
 
0.007 (0.017) 0.011 (0.014) 
0.010 
(0.012) 
 
0.080 (0.123) 0.051 (0.217) 0.048 (0.133) 
 
 [0.014]  [0.015]  [0.015] 
 
 [0.018]  [0.015] 
 
[0.013] 
 
 [0.171]  [0.182]  [0.198] 
ROA -0.914 (0.865) -0.847 (0.655)
**
 -0.886 (0.717)
**
  -1.048 (0.961) -0.930 (0.854)
**
 -0.939
 
(0.933)
**
  0.394 (2.205) 0.455 (2.788) 0.095 (2.243) 
  [0.719]  [0.683]  [0.721]   [0.873]  [0.869]  [0.901]   [3.012]  [2.504]  [2.703] 
ROE  0.222 (0.419) 0.212 (0.320) 0.195 (0.350) 
 
0.143 (0.536) 0.144 (0.478) 0.135 (0.521) 
 
-1.464 (0.821)
* 
-1.376 (1.041)
*** 
-1.336 (0.739)
* 
  [0.371]  [0.340]  [0.374]   [0.503]  [0.520]  [0.513]   [2.203]
* 
 [1.689]  [1.974] 
DE -0.006 (0.030) 0.001 (0.032) -0.005 (0.030)  0.006 (0.029) 0.006 (0.036) -0.002 (0.034)  -0.165 (0.146) -0.067 (0.118) -0.060 (0.109) 
  [0.031]  [0.031]  [0.031]   [0.032]  [0.037]  [0.035]   [0.190]  [0.139]  [0.159] 
PFS -0.141 (0.610) -0.250 (0.512) -0.237 (0.503)  -0.397 (0.780) -0.850 (0.798) -0.733 (0.798)  -0.296 (1.579) -0.153 (1.677) -0.052 (1.459) 
  [0.608]  [0.556]  [0.536]   [0.774]  [0.826]  [0.763]   [2.767]  [2.042]  [2.113] 
INS 0.454 (0.532) 0.489 (0.510) 0.466 (0.520)  0.661 (0.561) 0.744 (0.640) 0.683 (0.641)  0.403 (1.941) 0.450 (1.990) 0.475 (1.735) 
  [0.505]  [0.493]  [0.492]   [0.519]  [0.563]  [0.553]   [1.937]  [1.711]  [1.596] 
GOV 1.473 (0.923)
* 
1.349 (0.937)
* 
1.444 (1.032)
*
  0.937 (0.676)
* 
0.942 (0.918)
* 1.077 (1.006)*        
  [0.889]
* 
 [0.947]  [1.048]   [0.863]  [0.870]  [1.045]        
Year  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 190 190 190  133 133 133  57 57 57 
MAX VIF. 5.78 6.05 6.05  5.78 6.05 6.05  5.78 5.81 5.81 
R2 (%) 26.41 29.06 27.14  41.79 41.86 38.73  66.81 71.45 72.88 
F-stats 1.73
** 2.86
***
 2.68
***
  2.97
*** 4.42
***
 6.31
***
  1.83
* 2.86
***
 3.07
***
 
Note:   
Other estimators shown here include Davidson and MacKinnon’s (1993) improved small-sample robust estimators for OLS, cluster-robust estimators useful when errors may be arbitrarily correlated within groups (one 
application is across time for an individual). *, 
** and *** Statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is employed to detect multicollinearity problem and is 
calculated as 1/(1 - R2) where R2 is obtained from the regression of the variable on all other regressors specified in the model. Robust standard errors (RSE) are reported in parentheses, and bootstrap standard errors 
(BSE) are reported within brackets. 
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In addition, the findings support H2.2 that 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 is negatively related to the BHAR and is 
statistically significant. This indicates that companies that, stated their intended use-of-
proceeds to be for repaying debt experience long-run underperformance after going 
public. These findings are in line with Autore et al. (2009) that the issuers declaring debt 
repayment (making no mention of investment) as their intended use-of-proceeds show 
underperformance in the long-run. These IPO companies benefit from overvalued stocks 
by timing IPOs for periods of high returns to pay off their debt. As a consequence, they 
are more likely to underperform in the long-run.  
This study finds that while the 𝐼𝑁𝑉 is positively related to the three-year aftermarket 
return and strongly statistically significant, the intended use-of-proceeds for debt 
repayment is ambiguous or without any clear specification. This implies that increased 
investment expenditures should be viewed favourably as they are associated with higher 
investment opportunities. These findings are in line with Autore et al. (2009)’s assertion 
that underperformance is stronger when debt repayment is the intended purpose.   
In addition, this study finds that 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 and 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐺𝐸 are not statistically significant for the 
performance of SET IPOs in the long-run. These findings are in line with Su and 
Bangassa (2011) who found no relationship between offer size and three-year BHAR 
based on an event-time approach. For MAI IPOs, the author finds that the offering size of 
IPOs had an inverse relationship with long-run IPO performance. However, the author 
also finds that IPO underpricing is negatively and significantly related to a 3-year BHAR 
for the entire sample and for the SET sample, but insignificant for MAI. This suggests 
that the larger the initial return of IPOs is, the lower its accumulated after-market return is 
during the first three years after going public. In particular, a 1% increase in MAIR leads 
to a decrease of about 0.54% and 0.57% for the Thai IPOs in the 3-year after-market 
return. This finding supports the studies of Ritter (1991, 1998) and Bradley et al. (2009). 
Thus, the findings lead us to accept H7 as well as the impresario hypothesis. These results 
are in contrast to the findings of Su (2004), who found that the degree of IPO 
underpricing is positively related to the after-market return for 250 trading days.  
For models (10) to (15), the author finds that the information about government 
ownership reported in the prospectus is significantly positive, for a 1% increase in 
government ownership leads to an increase of about 1.50% and 1% in 3-year buy-and-
hold abnormal returns for the entire sample and for the SET sample respectively. This 
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finding implies that issuers with higher government ownership have on average a higher 
performance in the long-run. Thus, government ownership at the IPO time can be a signal 
of long-run performance for SET IPOs. As can be seen in Table 3.7, this study has more 
evidence indicating that the proportions of Thai IPOs subscribed to by foreigners (𝑃𝐹𝑆) 
and institutional investors (𝐼𝑁𝑆) have no effect on the long-run performance of IPOs. For 
CAR, the same patterns of results hold (see Table 3B in Appendix 3B, Page 122).    
3.5 Robustness Tests 
According to Rock’s model (1986), investors will participate in an IPO endogenously and 
informed investors tend to only subscribe for IPOs with underpricing. The performance of 
IPOs is a function of endogenously related ownership variables, and a simple OLS 
regression may overestimate their explanatory roles (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003). It 
seems straightforward to presume that a government ownership variable would be 
exogenous to a theoretical model. That is, the causal effect is such that ownership 
structure determines performance. This is because the share issue privatization of Thai 
companies is an event which fundamentally changes ownership structure and is expected 
to influence the firm’s performance as a result. This is a common presumption where the 
performance is considered endogenous. However, there is always an empirical question 
as to whether the model is adequate, and thus whether variables that are theoretically 
exogenous are in fact endogenous to the system being modeled. Indeed, government 
ownership and IPO performance could both be endogenous to the Thai post-IPO system. 
In this section, the author provides more robustness analysis by investigating endogeneity 
considerations and identification problems.  
To avoid the endogeneity problem and a sample selection bias, this study has adopted a 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach to derive unbiased estimates of relationship 
among government ownership, IPO underpricing, firm quality and primary use-of-
proceeds. Firstly, the author regressed the percentage of issues owned by the government 
or state (𝐺𝑂𝑉) against the exogenous variables 𝑈𝐷𝐼, 𝐼𝑁𝑉, 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇, 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸, 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐺𝐸, 𝐸𝑃𝑆, 
𝑅𝑂𝐴, 𝑅𝑂𝐸 and 𝐷𝐸, and then regressd the model in Equation (3.2).  Table 3.7 presents the 
2SLS estimates for all issuers and SET issuers.
43
  
                                                        
43 The MAI IPOs are not undertaken in consideration for robustness checks due to a lack of state ownership. 
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Table 3.7 2SLS Estimates - Three-year Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) 
 
The regressions are also aimed at testing the relationship between the BHAR and factors of interest: UDI: Use-of-Proceeds disclosure 
index; DEBT (INV): a dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO reported use of proceed for repaying debt (investment) equal to 1 and is 
equal to 0 otherwise; MAIR: the market-adjusted initial return or the IPO underpricing;  lnSIZE: the logarithm of the offer size of IPO 
firms; lnAGE: the natural logarithm of the age of the firm in years from the establishment date to the year of IPO; GOV: the proportion 
of shares owned by the government; EPS: change in the earnings per share from the IPO issue date to the date just prior to the listing 
date; ROA: the return on assets for the most recent year prior to or in the year of the offering; ROE: the return on equity for the most 
recent year prior to or in the year of the offering; DE: debt/equity ratio for the most recent year prior to or in the year of the offering; 
PFS: the percentage of foreigners subscribing for the issues; INS: the percentage of institutions subscribing for the issues; In the first 
stage, we regress the percentage of issues owned by the government or state (GOV) against the exogenous variables UDI, INV, DEBT, 
lnSIZE, lnAGE, EPS, ROA, ROE and DE. In the second stage, we estimate Equation (2). Statistical significance is corrected for 
heteroskedasticity using the White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. The standard errors are shown in the 
brackets.  
 
Variables Entire IPOs  SET IPOs 
 (28) 2SLS (29) 2SLS (30) 2SLS  (31) 2SLS (32) 2SLS (33) 2SLS 
 β 
 (S.E.) 
β  
(S.E.) 
β  
(S.E.) 
 β  
(S.E.) 
β  
(S.E.) 
β  
(S.E.) 
Constant 1.742 0.927 1.407  0.770 1.546 1.790 
 (1.596) (1.262) (1.323) 
 
(2.180) (1.776) (1.992) 
UDI 0.136   
 
0.158   
 (0.061)**   
 
(0.065)**   
INV    0.546  
 
 0.429  
  (0.132)***  
 
 (0.167)**  
DEBT    -0.377    -0.239 
   (0.140)***    (0.162) 
MAIR -0.625 -0.632 -0.663 
 
-0.724 -0.873 -0.922 
 (0.210)*** (0.183)*** (0.186)*** 
 
(0.230)*** (0.225)*** (0.254)*** 
lnSIZE -0.086 -0.088 -0.087 
 
-0.020 -0.115 -0.112 
 (0.073) (0.064) (0.065) 
 
(0.103) (0.091) (0.099) 
lnAGE 0.057 0.143* 0.148  0.039 0.217 0.215 
 (0.090) (0.085)* (0.083)*  (0.109) (0.109)** (0.101)** 
EPS 0.005 0.003 0.002  0.011 0.009 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.007)   (0.005)** (0.014) (0.009) 
ROA -0.843 -0.674 -0.654  -0.945 -1.072 -1.068 
 (0.367)** (0.363)* (0.375)*  (0.330)** (0.465)** (0.370)*** 
ROE  0.211 0.352 0.364  0.124 0.155 0.168 
 (0.200) (0.179)* (0.184)**  (0.217) (0.255) (0.217) 
DE -0.019 -0.005 -0.015  -0.011 -0.005 -0.015 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.018)  (0.016) (0.029) (0.018) 
PFS -0.330 0.009 -0.010  -0.766 -0.368 0.693 
 (0.481) (0.538) (0.546)  (0.680) (0.928) (0.511) 
INS 0.383 0.481 0.475  0.608 0.733 -0.333 
 (0.471) (0.491) (0.497)  (0.492) (0.608) (0.718) 
GOV 1.443 1.097 1.050  1.052 1.422 1.292 
 (0.637) (0.751) (0.764)  (0.473)** (0.639)** (0.747)* 
Year  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 190 190 190  133 133 133 
Adj. R2 (%) 12.9 14.4 10.7  22.6 16.6 13.6 
F-stats 2.12*** 3.928*** 3.096***  2.55*** 3.427*** 2.913*** 
 Note: 
     *
 Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
  **
 Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***
 Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
The results for the SET issuers show an insignificant change (robust) in the influence of 
the underpricing, the intended use of IPO proceeds, government ownership, and the firm 
and offer characteristics. Apart from the entire sample, the researcher finds no evidence 
supporting the relationship between government ownership and the long-run performance 
of IPOs. For SET IPOs, this study shows an insignificant relationship between the 
intended use-of-proceeds for debt repayment and three-year buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns. 
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In addition, to check the effects of the 2006 Military Coup, the author divides the entire 
sample into 2 samples: the pre-coup period (1
st
 January, 2001 to 18
th
 September, 2006) 
and the post-coup period (19
th
 September 2006 to the end of 2012)
44
.  Overall, for the 
post-coup period IPOs, this study finds evidence supporting underpricing, occurring 
related to the decreasing proportion of foreigners and institutions subscribing to the new 
issue, , and the provision of compensation for the expropriation risk faced by individual 
investors. These findings are in line with the Winner Curse’s Model (Rock, 1986) that 
uninformed investors require IPO underpricing to offset their information disadvantage. 
The researcher also found that after-market returns such as six-month, one-, two-, three-
year buy-and-hold abnormal returns in terms of means were significantly higher during 
the post-period than before the military coup. In addition, the results show that the use-of-
proceeds disclosure index increases from 30.26% in the pre-coup period to 34.28% in 
post-coup period and is statistically significant.  This indicated that after the military coup 
IPO companies showed better transparency by disclosing more information about their 
use-of-proceeds in order to reduce the cost of capital.   
3.6 Conclusions 
This study examined the impact of endogenous disclosure on the stock market 
performance of initial public offering (IPO) firms in Thailand and also measured and 
interpreted the information contained in the IPO prospectus text. The effects of voluntary 
information disclosures in the prospectus on IPO underpricing and the performance of 
IPOs in the long-run were examined. This study constructed a use-of-proceeds disclosure 
index and also develop a classification of ‘use-of-proceeds’ disclosures that aimed to 
capture information embedded in the disclosures relating to the purpose (Investment and 
Debt payments) and amount committed to specific assets. These measures are then related 
to IPO underpricing, survival prediction and the expected and realized prospects of the 
IPOs. This study uses a unique methodology and hand-collected data for 245 IPOs from 
the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) and also from the Market for Alternative 
Investments (MAI) in a 12-year period between 2001 and 2012. 
                                                        
44 The results of the Thai military coup 2006 effects are not detailed in the Appendix 3C (Page 123). However, this 
study briefs that the IPO underpricing registered an 18.65% in the pre-coup period and 39.73% in the post-coup period. 
In addition, the author finds that 6-month, 1-, 2- and 3-year BHARs of Thai IPOs going public in pre-coup period are -
4.50, 0.03%, -11.94% and -16.49% respectively. For the IPOs going public in post-coup period, their 6-month, 1-, 2- 
and 3-year BHARs are 9.53%, 21.84%, 18.55% and 25.13% respectively. However, the proportion of IPO subscribed by 
foreigners (institutional investors) is 10.13% (20.28%) in the pre-coup period but 3.63% (7.23%) in the post-coup 
period respectively. 
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Overall, this study documents a significant association between the level of use-of-
proceeds disclosure and IPO underpricing and the long-run performance of IPOs. The 
analysis of the impact of ‘uses of IPO proceeds’ using two types of disclosures on three-
year aftermarket abnormal returns indicates that an IPO company stating its use-of--
proceeds to be for investments performs in the long-run better than IPOs that specify 
‘Debt Repayment’ as their use-of-proceeds.  However, when new issuers intend to use the 
proceeds to repay their bank loan, this study found a significantly negative relationship 
with the long-run IPO performance. The results show that the ex-ante uncertainty and 
signalling hypotheses partially explain the IPO underpricing phenomenon in the Thai IPO 
market. In addition, this study supports the impresario hypothesis, as shown by a negative 
relation between underpricing and three-year aftermarket abnormal returns. Furthermore, 
the present study finds that government or state ownership in the IPO filing period has a 
positive impact on the long-run performance of SET IPOs. The researcher documents that 
the size of the issue, the return on equity and the bull-market conditions are significant 
determinants of underpricing. Other factors failed to yield significant statistics 
parameters. 
This study has several implications for research and practice. The Thai exchange is a 
relatively small and thinly traded market but it is quite well integrated into the global 
financial system. Hence, the results presented in this study may have broader implications 
for many other small emerging markets, which are also trying to go global by 
implementing economic, trade and financial reforms. Therefore, the findings may be 
useful for investors and regulators in many other emerging markets beyond Thailand in 
terms of short-term and long-term investment planning. IPO firms may choose a number 
of signalling mechanisms. More specifically, endogenous information disclosure of 
Intended Use-of-Proceeds may be used as another signalling factor, but it creates a trade-
off between the benefits of reducing information asymmetry and the costs associated with 
revealing information and possible litigation. These findings could be of interest to 
policy-makers who are continually imposing regulations to curb possible conflicts of 
interest. 
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Table 3A The percentage of IPO companies disclosing use-of-proceeds information 
 
 Use-of-Proceed items % 
1. Working capital (WC) without details 72.7 
2. Working capital with details (including the amount money and the proportion of 
IPO proceeds used for WC) 
20.4 
3. General operation issues (e.g. sales and marketing supports and factories and 
equipment) 
48.2 
4. Research and development 13.5 
5. Service improvement 10.6 
6. Expanding business without or low details  64.5 
7. Expanding business with moderate details (e.g. use the IPO proceeds for which 
projects) 
47.3 
8. Expanding business with more details (e.g. use the IPO proceeds for which 
projects with amount money) 
15.5 
9. Paying down loans without details 43.7 
10. Paying down loans with more details (including the amount money and the 
proportion of IPO proceeds allocated for debt repayment) 
11.0 
 
 
 
Examples for use-of-proceeds disclosure index calculation 
 
In order to show how to calculate the disclosure scores in this study, the author selects the information of 
use-of-proceeds from the ‘Executive Summary’ section in the IPO prospectuses. However, there is only a 
Thai version for the prospectus. I have translated the Thai (highlighted in yellow) into English as shown 
belows:  
 
CASE A: Prinsiri Public Company Limited ‘PRIN’
 
(Source: PRIN’s IPO prospectus downloaded from www.sec.or.th) 
“At present, the Prinsiri Public Company Limited (PRIN) has a fully-paid registered capital worth 670 
million Baht or 670,000,000 common stocks (Par value at 1 Baht per a stock). This Initial Public Offering is 
Appendix 3A 
 
120 
a total of 155 million common stocks or 23.13% of paid-up capital. The offer price is 2.80 Baht. The 
company intends to use its IPO proceeds for working capital and research development.” (Unofficial 
translation) 
 
 
A list of Use-of-Proceeds: ‘PRIN’  Scores 
□ General Operation Issues (1 point) - 
■ Research & Development (1 point) 1 
□ Service Improvement (1 point) - 
■ Working Capital without details (1 point)  □Working capital with details (2 points) 1 
□ Paying down loans without details (1 point) □ Paying down loans with details (2 points)  - 
□ Expanding Business without details (1 point) □ Expanding Business without moderate details (2 points) - 
□ Expanding Business without more details (3 points) 
Total (11 scores) 2 
Use-of-Proceeds Disclosure Index (UDI)  18.18 
Note: see the UDI formula in section 3.3.2 (Page 98-99) 
 
 
CASE B: Cyber Planet Company Limited ‘CYBER’ 
 
 
 
(Source: CYBER’s IPO prospectus downloaded from www.sec.or.th) 
 
“The Cyber Planet Company intends to  use the IPO proceeds (about 90 million Bahts after deducting 
expenditure) to be as follows:” (unofficial translation) 
 
Use-of-Proceeds Purposes Proportion of offering size (%) Approximate period of using the proceeds 
1. Research and software development ~40% Quarter 3 in 2010 
2. Working capital ~25% Quarter 3 in 2010 
3. Inventment in solfware improvement ~10% Quarter 3 in 2010 
4. Improve the institution of skill 
development for children 
~25% Quarter 3 in 2010 
Total ~100%  
(Investors should research information in sections 2 and 3 before make a decision to subscribe for IPOs) 
 
 
A list of Use-of-Proceeds: ‘CYBER’  Scores 
□ General Operation Issues (1 point) - 
■ Research & Development (1 point) 1 
■ Service Improvement (1 point) 1 
■ Working Capital without details (1 point)  □Working capital with details (2 points) 1 
□ Paying down loans without details (1 point) □ Paying down loans with details (2 points)  - 
□ Expanding Business without details (1 point) □ Expanding Business without moderate details (2 points) 3 
■ Expanding Business without more details (3 points) 
Total (11 scores) 6 
Use-of-Proceeds Disclosure Index (UDI)  54.54 
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CASE C: Ticon Industrial Connection Company Limited ‘TICON’ 
 
 
 
(Source: TICON’s IPO prospectus downloaded from www.sec.or.th) 
 
 “Ticon Company will receive a total of 303.23 million Baht (which is the fund from investors after offering 
expenditure has been deducted. The company intends its use of the proceeds to be for buying properties, 
factory construction and working capital.” (Unofficial translation)   
 
  
A list of Use-of-Proceeds: ‘TICON’  Scores 
■ General Operation Issues (1 point) 1 
□ Research & Development (1 point) - 
□ Service Improvement (1 point) - 
■ Working Capital without details (1 point)  □Working capital with details (2 points) 1 
□ Paying down loans without details (1 point) □ Paying down loans with details (2 points)  - 
■ Expanding Business without details (1 point) □ Expanding Business without moderate details (2 points) 1 
□ Expanding Business without more details (3 points) 
Total (11 scores) 3 
Use-of-Proceeds Disclosure Index (UDI)  27.27 
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Table 3B OLS Estimates-Robust and Bootstrap Standard Errors (CARS)  
 
Variables Entire IPOs  SET IPOs  MAI IPOs 
 (19) OLS (20) OLS (21) OLS  (22) OLS (23) OLS (24) OLS  (25) OLS (26) OLS (27) OLS 
 β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
 β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
 β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
Constant 3.019 (1.577)* 2.682 (1.614) 3.118 (1.469) 
 
0.073 (1.773) -0.314 (1.599) 0.245 (1.639) 
 
8.079 (5.214) 8.399 (5.353)* 9.333 (5.361)* 
  [1.463]**  [1.448]*  [1.453]**   [1.762]  [1.837]  [1.792]   [4.973]  [5.307]  [5.475]* 
UDI 0.014 (0.004)***      0.019 (0.005)***      0.012 (0.016)     
  [0.004]***       [0.005]***       [0.015]     
INV   
  
0.478 
 
(0.116)*** 
[0.111]***   
 
  
0.484 
 
(0.132)*** 
[0.142]***   
 
  
0.692 
 
(0.406)* 
[0.389]**   
DEBT  
    
-0.417 
 
(0.111)*** 
[0.119]*** 
 
    
-0.370 
 
(0.131)*** 
[0.141]*** 
 
    -0.648 
(0.336)* 
[0.374]* 
MAIR -0.372 (0.185)** -0.298 (0.173)* -0.307 (0.164)* 
 
-0.401 (0.206)** -0.296 (0.179)* -0.332 (0.188)* 
 
-0.326 (0.554) -0.377 (0.306) -0.343 (0.389) 
  [0.173]**  [0.157]*  [0.163]*   [0.193]**  [0.188]*  [0.203]*   [0.518]  [0.493]  [0.463] 
lnSIZE -0.135 (0.066) -0.110 (0.067) -0.120 (0.062)  0.018 (0.086) 0.045 (0.079) 0.027 (0.081)  -0.390 (0.244)* -0.394 (0.211)* -0.424 (0.294)* 
  [0.066]  [0.065]*  [0.064]*   [0.089]  [0.093]  [0.091]   [0.276]  [0.288]  [0.292] 
lnAGE -0.033 (0.084) 0.008 (0.080) 0.010 (0.075)  -0.026 (0.105) 0.022 (0.100) 0.015 (0.103)  0.178 (0.224) 0.155 (0.128) 0.148 (0.211) 
  [0.082]  [0.075]  [0.081]   [0.101]  [0.105]  [0.110]   [0.225]  [0.243]  [0.255] 
EPS 0.000 (0.006) 0.002 (0.007) 0.002 (0.006)  0.007 (0.006) 0.01 (0.005)** 0.010 (0.005)**  0.030 (0.127) 0.001 (2.115) 0.004 (0.125) 
  [0.011]  [0.013]  [0.011]   [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.009]   [0.144]  [0.157]  [0.145] 
ROA -0.927 (0.498)* -0.833 (0.460)* -0.882 (0.367)*  -1.412 (0.452)*** -1.304 (0.287)*** -1.309 (0.290)***  1.148 (2.896) 1.301 (0.769) 0.937 (1.910) 
  [0.498]*  [0.470]*  [0.513]   [0.485]***  [0.466]***  [0.553]**   [2.701]  [2.659]  [2.519] 
ROE  0.223 (0.250) 0.205 (0.234) 0.183 (0.192)  -0.002 (0.267) -0.008 (0.182) -0.014 (0.183)  -1.232 (1.100) -1.092 (0.107) -1.070 (0.754) 
  [0.246]  [0.253]  [0.247]   [0.302]  [0.304]  [0.311]   [1.813]  [1.910]  [1.885] 
DE -0.017 (0.028) -0.016 (0.029) -0.018 (0.021)  -0.005 (0.029) -0.008 (0.018) -0.012 (0.017)  -0.140 (0.145) -0.093 (1.007) -0.103 (0.102) 
  [0.027]  [0.027]  [0.025]   [0.028]  [0.030]  [0.029]   [0.156]  [0.146]  [0.140] 
PFS 0.631 (0.403) 0.437 (0.461) 0.458 (0.432)  -0.296 (0.652) -0.824 (0.663) -0.725 (0.666)  0.253 (2.205) 0.291 (1.768) 0.367 (0.871) 
  [0.430]  [0.483]  [0.510]   [0.683]  [0.702]  [0.714]   [2.069]  [1.965]  [2.498] 
INS 0.063 (0.383) 0.095 (0.391) 0.078 (0.361)  0.446 (0.389) 0.542 (0.388) 0.490 (0.394)  0.275 (1.635) 0.237 (0.353) 0.255 (1.712) 
  [0.386]  [0.366]  [0.386]   [0.388]  [0.415]  [0.436]   [1.553]  [1.448]  [1.293] 
GOV 0.952 (0.468)** 0.892 (0.550)* 0.956 (0.498)*  0.438 (0.335) 0.490 (0.307)* 0.580 (0.327)*        
  [0.558]*  [0.575]  [0.615]   [0.563]  [0.634]  [0.695]        
Year  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 190 190 190  133 133 133  57 57 57 
MAX VIF. 5.78 6.05 6.05  5.78 6.05 6.05  5.78 5.81 5.81 
R2 (%) 29.92 31.28 30.05  44.76 42.88 40.19  62.48 67.21 67.01 
F-stats 2.78*** 3.41*** 3.97***  5.26*** 10.65*** 20.24***  2.76*** 1.87* 1.98** 
Note:   
Other estimators shown here include Davidson and MacKinnon’s (1993) improved small-sample robust estimators for OLS, cluster-robust estimators useful when errors may be arbitrarily correlated within groups (one application is 
across time for an individual). *, 
** and *** Statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is employed to detect multicollinearity problem and is calculated as 1/(1 - R2) where R2 is 
obtained from the regression of the variable on all other regressors specified in the model. Robust standard errors (RSE) are reported in parentheses, and bootstrap standard errors (BSE) are reported within brackets. 
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Appendix 3C 
 
A Robustness check for the Effects of the Military Coup 
Table 3C Descriptive statistics on selected variables and different t-test (unequal variance) 
 
The sample consists of 245 IPOs made during the entire sample period (2001-2012). The pre-coup period is the period 
from Jan 1, 2001 to Sep 19, 2006. The post-coup period is the period from Sep 20, 2006 to Dec 31, 2012. 
 
 Pre-coup period Post-coup period 
Mean Std. N Mean Std. N 
Use-of-Proceeds disclosure index 30.26 14.33 167 34.38** 15.41 78 
Market adjusted initial return or IPO underpricing 
(%) 
18.65 38.17 167 39.74*** 54.73 78 
Six-month buy-and-hold abnormal return (%) -4.50 41.84 167 9.53** 38.76 61 
One-year buy-and-hold abnormal return (%) 0.03 72.52 167 21.84* 78.46 51 
Two-year buy-and-hold abnormal return (%) -11.94 90.50 167 18.55** 85.95 42 
Three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return (%) -16.49 99.74 167 25.13** 95.91 30 
The age of firm in years from establishment date 
to the date of IPO (year) 
13.86 10.33 167 17.95** 14.16 78 
Offer size of IPO firm (million Baht) 1,190.00 4,213.00 167 952.00 1,914.00 78 
The proportion of shares owned by the 
government (%) 
2.87 14.36 167 0.28** 1.57 78 
The time-lag between IPO date and the first 
trading date (day) 
12.88 7.48 167 11.53* 4.63 78 
Change in the earnings per share from the IPO 
issue date to the date just prior to the listing date 
(%) 
111.94 576.94 167 20.23* 139.16 78 
The return on assets for the most recent year prior 
to or in the year of the offering (%) 
12.98 19.13 167 17.41 28.26 78 
The return on equity for the most recent year prior 
to or in the year of the offering (%) 
26.85 37.81 167 29.27 22.96 78 
The proportion of IPOs subscribed by foreigners 
(%) 
10.13 13.70 167 3.63*** 8.60 78 
The proportion of IPOs subscribed by institutions 
(%) 
20.28 19.05 167 7.23*** 14.33 78 
Notes: 
***, **, * Significant difference between the mean of the pre-period sample and the post-period sample at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels respectively. 
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Table 3D Regression results with the IPO underpricing and performance of IPOs in the long-run return as the dependent variables and regression analysis of the impact of 
the Thai military coup in 2006 
 
The sample consists of IPOs made during the post-period dummy or POST is 1(0) if the issues were offered during Dec 19, 2006 - Dec 31, 2012 (otherwise). DEBT (INV): a dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO reported use of 
proceed for repaying debt (investment) equal to 1 and is equal to 0 otherwise; MAIR: the market-adjusted initial return or the IPO underpricing; lnSIZE: the logarithm of the offer size of IPO firms; lnAGE: the natural logarithm of 
the age of the firm in years from the establishment date to the year of IPO; LAG: the time-lag between IPO date and the first trading date; GOV: the proportion of shares owned by the government; EPS: change in the earnings per 
share from the IPO issue date to the date just prior to the listing date; ROA: the return on assets for the most recent year prior to or in the year of the offering; ROE: the return on equity for the most recent year prior to or in the 
year of the offering; DE: debt/equity ratio for the most recent year prior to or in the year of the offering; BULL: a dummy which is coded as 1 when a firm issued IPO stock in a bull market measured by the change in the SET 
index in a 3-month period before IPO issues and 0 otherwise; PFS: the percentage of foreigners subscribing for the issues; INS: the percentage of institutions subscribing for the issues. Statistical significance is corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. The robust standard errors are shown in the brackets.  
 
Explanatory variables IPO underpricing  Long-run performance of IPO 
 (23) OLS (24) OLS  (25) OLS (26) OLS 
 Coefficient Robust S.E. Coefficient Robust S.E.  Coefficient Robust S.E. Coefficient Robust S.E. 
Constant 1.270 (0.570)** 1.216 (0.562)** 
 
2.623 (1.603)* 3.232 (1.655)** 
POST  0.186 (0.072)** 0.184 0.072)** 
 
0.338 (0.208)* 0.358 (0.215)* 
INV (1 if IPO stated use of proceed for 
investment)  -0.064 (0.057)   
 
0.512 (0.135)   
DEBT (1 if IPO stated use of proceed for debt 
repayment)   0.069 (0.059) 
 
  -0.357 (0.137)** 
MAIR     
 
-0.511 (0.201)** -0.548 (0.202)*** 
lnSIZE -0.071 (0.029)** -0.071 (0.029)** 
 
-0.115 (0.072) -0.123 (0.073) 
lnAGE 0.040 (0.040) 0.040 (0.040)  0.070 (0.084) 0.069 (0.084) 
LAG -0.001 (0.004) -0.001 (0.004)  -0.016 (0.007)* -0.016 (0.008)** 
EPS 0.003 (0.006) 0.003 (0.006)  0.007 (0.009) 0.007 (0.008) 
ROA 0.159 (0.189) 0.161 (0.187)  -0.673 (0.429) -0.662 (0.448) 
ROE  0.128 (0.131) 0.130 (0.131)  0.262 (0.210) 0.260 (0.218) 
DE -0.009 (0.007) -0.009 (0.006)  0.009 (0.025) 0.000 (0.021) 
PFS 0.038 (0.277) 0.034 (0.277)  0.130 (0.458) 0.131 (0.455) 
INS -0.183 (0.186) -0.185 (0.186)  0.552 (0.448) 0.555 (0.453) 
GOV 0.194 (0.185) 0.207 (0.191)  1.494 (0.767)* 1.451 (0.801)* 
BULL  0.124 (0.057)** 0.123 (0.057)**  -0.188 (0.156) -0.158 (0.156) 
Year dummies No No  No No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 237 237  192 192 
Adjusted R2  0.108 0.109  0.200 0.169 
F-statistics 2.43** 2.44**  3.27*** 2.84*** 
MAX VIF 5.81 5.82  5.83 5.82 
 Note: 
     *
 Statistically significant at the 0.01 level,
  **
 Statistically significant at the 0.05 level and 
***
 Statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  
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Chapter 4 
IPOs’ Signalling Effects for Speculative Stock Detection 
4.1 Introduction 
The manipulation of securities’ prices has been a major concern in recent decades. The 
fact that stock markets can be manipulated is an important issue for both trading 
regulation and market efficiency. In general, securities’ regulators prohibit market 
manipulation because it distorts prices, hampers price discovery and creates dead-weight 
losses (Huang and Cheng, 2013).  According to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), Thailand, manipulation of the securities’ price can detrimentally damage investor 
and public confidence in the capital market. Such stock price manipulation may lead to a 
number of speculative stocks being traded on the global stock exchange.   
Yet there is a considerable amount of speculative stocks being traded in the various stock 
markets. Although they may vary slightly in characteristics and criteria from country to 
country, a general definition of speculative stocks is those with a high risk relative to any 
potential positive returns. A speculative stock may offer the possibility of substantial 
returns to compensate for its higher risk profile. Speculative stocks are favoured by 
speculators and investors because of their high-reward, high-risk characteristics. Recent 
studies in behavioural finance indicate that certain investors, especially some retail 
investors, are drawn toward stocks with speculative features such as high skewness and 
high volatility (Kumar, 2009; Dorn and Huberman, 2010). Speculative stocks are often 
purchased by risk-seekers or investors who ignore detailed analysis and believe the stock 
will appreciate in value. For example, ‘a penny stock45’ in the U.S. market is one of best-
known speculative stocks. For the UK, the term ‘a penny share’ refers to stock in a 
company with a small market capitalization (small-cap), or less than £100 million and/or 
with a stock price of less than £1.00. Such companies have a small amount of tangible 
assets and a short performing history. As a result, the most favourable place for trading 
                                                        
45 A penny stock is defined as a stock that is traded for less than $5.00 per share. Penny stocks are high-risk and low-
priced and are usually issued by new or growing companies with limited cash or resources. They are called ‘penny 
stocks’ because originally in the past their price was less than a dollar per share; the SEC later modified the penny stock 
definition to include all shares trading below $5.00. However, at the present time penny stocks are often traded for 
under $1.00 per share, although they may be priced at up to $5.00 per share. 
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penny shares is the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)
46
. Penny stock IPOs appear to 
be particularly well suited for investigating issues involving market manipulation and 
informational asymmetries (Bradley et al., 2006). Other features of speculative stocks
47
 
are that they have low prices, small capitalizations and less liquidity. Such characteristics 
may assist stock manipulators to pump and dump these particular share prices more 
easily.  
An important question is to identify the determinants of speculative stocks and understand 
why some stocks are more speculative than others. One of the potential reasons is the 
difficulty and subjectivity of defining their intrinsic values (Baker and Wurgler, 2006). 
For example, in the case of a young firm, currently unprofitable but with a potentially 
extremely profitable growth, the combination of its no-earnings history and a highly 
uncertain future allow investors to defend valuations ranging from much too low to much 
too high, as befits their prevailing sentiment. Seemingly, IPO stocks have some features 
that are more likely to be speculated rather than others due to a lack of public information 
such as historical price data and company news. Hong et al. (2006) also suggest that most 
of the earlier speculative manias were also most prominent for IPOs. Therefore, IPOs 
should transmit some signals identifying speculative stocks in the secondary market.      
The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) is unique in that, unlike other exchanges, it is 
comparatively new. Moreover, the SET has its own particular rules and regulations. 
Interestingly, investors in the Thai stock market do not pay taxes when making profits 
from trading securities (Capital Gains Tax: CGT)
48
. On the other hand, they pay about 
10% tax if they receive dividends. As a result, most of the individual investors in the Thai 
stock market prefer to purchase and speculate in common stocks rather than invest in 
them for a long horizon period to receive dividends. In Thailand there is also only a mild 
                                                        
46 AIM was launched in 1995 by the LSE and it is also the London Stock Exchange’s international market for smaller 
growing companies as well as for young and recovering companies. The objective of AIM is to offer small firms, from 
any country and any industry sector, the opportunity to raise capital in the market.  
47 Sindell (2005) indicates that it is not difficult to identify speculative stocks because they frequently have a 
price/earnings (P/E) ratio twice as high as that of other stocks. 
48 Capital gains tax (CGT) is a tax on capital gains. In general, most of capital gains come from sales of common stocks, 
bonds, precious metals and property. Several countries impose capital gains tax but have different rates of taxation for 
individuals and corporations. For example, there is a 25% CGT in Austria. In Brazil, the CGTs are normally 15%, 
except for day-trading (Net-settlement) when it is 20%. Canadian CGT is currently up to 50% calculated by capital 
gains (profit) × 50% × marginal tax rate. The CGTs in Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Poland and Romania are 
20%, 10%, 28%, 6%, 19% and 16% respectively. However, there are some countries such as Ecuador, Iran, Jamaica, 
Kenya, India (for long-term capital gain from common stocks), New Zealand, Singapore, and Thailand that do not 
impose CGT.   
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penalty and there are problems of law enforcement in cases of stock price manipulation
49
. 
In addition to this, there is no Casino in Thailand because gambling is illegal.  
Consequently, the Thai stock market is in fact one of the best targets for various 
manipulators (stock-price fixers) and speculators leading to many speculative stocks 
being traded on the SET.  
In recent decades, the SET has also been suffering from a number of speculative stocks. 
As a result, many investors have lost considerable sums of money by rashly dabbling in 
speculative stocks. In 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission, Thailand, 
introduced a new regulation, namely, the ‘Turnover List’ to signal to all investors the 
risks associated with trading in such securities. The SEC also intervened in the trading of 
Turnover List stocks by controlling the trading volume. Turnover List stock (TOL) is the 
common stock that has a high speculation but a poor performance. It is mostly common 
stock from a low-quality company, whereas blue-chip stocks, for example, have never 
been on the TOL. The SET and SEC clearly see the TOL as a means of forestalling 
speculative gains by Thai investors. 
In this chapter, the author examines the determinants of speculative stocks listed on the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) and the Market for Alternative Investment (MAI) 
between 2004 and 2012. Using IPO signalling, market-feedback and price manipulation 
models, this study investigates the nature and extent of the initial returns of IPOs and 
after-market returns to explain the probability of stocks appearing on the Turnover List. 
To carry out this investigation, the author constructs a cross-section of IPOs listed on the 
SET and MAI, and TOL within one year of the IPO data, both collected from the SEC 
database. The analysis covers 187 IPOs for the period between 2004 and 2012. 
Furthermore, this study considers both IPOs and existing Thai stocks and examines the 
role of both abnormal returns and trading volume in the transmission of probability for 
appearing on the TOL. The author constructs a unique panel dataset, consisting of 429 
Thai stocks, excluding financial companies, real estate investment trusts and closed-end 
investment funds, for the same period. In addition, this study controls for the 
heterogeneous characteristics of a firm’s balance-sheet that relate to the firm’s size, age, 
trading volume, and ownership structure. 
                                                        
49 Under the Securities and Exchange Commission (Thailand) Acts, ‘Stock manipulation’ is considered as criminal 
action. Anyone who commits such crime shall be imprisoned not more than two years or be fined from 500,000 Baht to 
double the benefit earned due to a deceptive practice causing damages to investors. 
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The organization of this chapter is as follows: Sections 4.2 and 4.3 introduce a Turnover 
List framework and related literature respectively; Section 4.4 presents econometric 
methodology and research models; Section 4.5 discusses the data and summary statistics; 
Section 4.6 reports the empirical findings and robustness checks; Section 4.7 concludes 
the chapter.  
4.2 Turnover List Framework  
The Turnover List (TOL) is an instrument identifying speculative stock features to warn 
investors who are trading shares on the SET. It is similar to other exchanges that have 
various implements to signal to their investors about some kinds of inferior stock. For 
example, there is a “Special Treatment (ST)50’ sign for stocks in danger of being delisted 
in the Chinese stock market.  In Malaysia, “A practice note (PN17)51” is a tool to preserve 
individual investors. PN17 stands for Practice Note 17/2005 and is promulgated by the 
Malaysian Stock Exchange. The PN17 is designated to a listed company that has financial 
problems or fails to meet minimum capital or equity (less than 25% of the paid-up 
capital).  In order to maintain listed company status, PN17 companies are compelled to 
submit a proposal to the Approving Authority to restructure and revive their companies.  
4.2.1 Turnover List Identifications  
According to the SEC Thailand database, the Turnover List regulations were established 
in 2004 and applied particularly to the Thai stock market. The purpose of the Turnover 
List is to disclose the list of securities that have a high turnover ratio and might lead to 
abnormal trading and settlement risk. The Turnover List is intended to warn both 
investors and brokers against the risks associated with trading in such securities. 
Accordingly the common stocks on the Turnover List, published by the SEC (Thailand), 
are speculative stocks. These are identified as follows: 
                                                        
50 The summaries of ST criteria are as follows: 1. A listed company has losses (negative net earnings) for 2 consecutive 
years; 2. Shareholder equity is lower than registered capital in the last fiscal year; 3. Firm auditors issue negative 
opinions. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange has similar ST criteria. 
51 A listed company is classified as a PN17 company are as follows: 1.The shareholders equity of the listed issuer on a 
consolidated basis is 25% or less of the issued and paid-up capital (excluding treasury shares) of the listed issuer and 
such shareholders equity is less than RM40 million; 2. Receivers or managers have been appointed over the asset of the 
listed issuer, its subsidiary or associated company which asset accounts for at least 50% of the total assets employed of 
the listed issuer on a consolidated basis; 3. The auditors have a negative opinion in audited financial statements; 4. The 
listed company or its subsidiary defaults on debt; and 5. The listed company has been suspended.    
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%𝟏𝐖 − 𝐓𝐮𝐫𝐧𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫 =  [
𝑫𝑨𝑻 ×𝟓
%𝑭𝑭 ×𝑫𝑨𝑴𝑪
] × 𝟏𝟎𝟎       (4.1)                                       
where, 1 % W-Turnover is the turnover in a one-week period and %FF is the percentage 
of the free-float. The daily average market capitalisation during the week is DAMC, and 
DAT is obtained from the average daily trading value during the week. 
 %𝑭𝑭 =  [
𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑨𝑳−𝑵𝑼𝑴𝑺𝑺
𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑨𝑳
] × 𝟏𝟎𝟎                                                 (4.2)              
and 
𝑫𝑨𝑴𝑪 =  [
∑ 𝑫𝑴𝑪𝒕
𝟓
𝒕=𝟏
𝑵𝑼𝑴𝑫𝑨𝒀
]                                                           (4.3)                                                                                                    
where, TOTAL denotes the total number of common shares in each company; NUMSS is 
the number of shares held by strategic shareholders; DMC is the daily market 
capitalisation and the trading day during the week; NUMDAY is the number of the trading 
day during the period of a week excluding any day on which a suspend sign (SP) is 
imposed for the whole day. In each week the Thai stocks are identified using Equation 
(4.1) at one time, when any common stocks are in line with the Turnover List criteria 
shown in Table 4.1. It will thus be declared to be a Turnover List stock (TOL) by the SEC 
(Thailand). Currently, there is a total of 579 listed-companies on the Thai stock market. 
However, the stocks of 218 firms (37.65%) have been placed on the Turnover List.  The 
researcher can also confirm that blue chip stocks have never been on the Turnover List.  
Table 4.1 The criteria of the Turnover List for common stocks in SET and MAI 
Common stocks in SET 
 Criteria 
Stocks in Turnover list - Weekly turnover ratio (1W-Turnover) ≥ 30% and 
- Average daily trading value in 1 week ≥ 100% million Baht 
- No more than the first 50 stocks 
 
Stocks which are obliged to be reported to the 
SEC 
 
- Stocks in the Turnover List with a P/E ratio over 100 times 
or a net loss or in the REHABCO sector 
Common stocks in MAI 
 Criteria 
Stocks in the Turnover List - Weekly turnover ratio (1W-Turnover) ≥ 30% and 
- Average daily trading value in 1 week ≥ 20% million Baht 
- No more than the first 5 stocks 
Note:  
Newly listed securities (IPO) with trading of less than 4 weeks are excluded from the analysis. 
There is now no limit for a number of shares to be listed on Turnover List. 
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4.2.2 Turnover List Announcement and Enforcement  
In general, the Turnover List is announced every Friday by the SEC (Thailand). The data 
obtained to identify the Turnover list span a period of five trading days and are seen in 
Figure 4.1. Importantly, under the SEC Turnover List regulations, investors who wish to 
trade in any high trading stock on the SEC Turnover List and SET criteria have to open a 
Cash Balance Account instead of using a Net settlement and Margin trading
52
 and they 
are also obliged to deposit the full amount of cash (100%) before their orders are 
executed.  
 
Figure 4.1 The time line indicates the data used in the Turnover List calculation and announcement 
The SET indicates that securities companies (brokers) must advise their customers when 
trading TOL stocks. The TOL regulation comes into effect the day following the TOL 
announcement and for at least the following 3 weeks. In cases when the stock is on the 
TOL, brokers will not allow it to be traded by net-settlement and margin trading until the 
stock is released from the Turnover List.  
 
Figure 4.2 The proportion of Turnover List and Non-Turnover List stocks on the Thai stock market 
(during the period 2004-2014) 
                                                        
52 According to Fred Tomczyk, CEO of online brokerage firm TD Ameritrade (http://money.cnn.com/news/), defined 
margin trading as “buying on margin” or borrowing money to purchase stock. He also noted that buying on margin is a 
game of high risk and high reward, as gains as well as losses are amplified.   
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The proportions of TOL and non-TOL stocks on the SET between 2004 and 2014 with 
the stock market sentiment are reported in Figure 4.2. It can be seen that the percentage of 
TOL stocks dramatically increased from 8% in 2009 to 30% in 2014. This indicates that 
the stock market movement or the bull-market condition may affect the risk of being put 
on the Turnover List.    
4.3 Related Literature 
In this chapter, the author aims to understand whether IPO underpricing and after-market 
returns affect the likelihood of a stock being classified as speculative at a later stage. This 
study focuses on asymmetric information models. In particular, the researcher considers 
three main theoretical models to explain speculative stock: IPO signalling, market-
feedback and price manipulation models.   
4.3.1 IPO Signalling Model 
One of the relevant features of IPOs is their tendency to be underpriced. There is an ever-
increasing literature explaining this phenomenon (Ritter and Welch, 2002). A well-known 
strand of theoretical literature focused on explaining IPO underpricing using signalling 
models (e.g., Ibbotson, 1975; Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; 
Welch, 1989). To be more specific, signalling models are derived from the concept of 
asymmetric information
53
 and assume that the issuing firm has an informational 
advantage, compared to the underwriters or investors. For example, issuers have private 
information about the present value and the risk of its future cash flows, knowledge that is 
not available to the investors. Thus, high-quality firms are willing to bear the cost of such 
signalling (i.e. using underpricing as a signal of the firm’s quality) to differentiate 
themselves to investors from low-quality firms.  Here Allen and Faulhaber (1989), 
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989) presumed that underpricing allows “good” 
firms to distinguish themselves from “bad” ones and to improve their external financing 
in the future. If this strategy is successful, then high-quality firms will be able to return to 
the market by releasing future equity issues after their IPOs. In common with many other 
                                                        
53 ‘The ‘winner’s curse model’ by Rock (1986) is well-known as an asymmetric information model. Again, the 
assumption is that there are two types of investors, namely, informed and uninformed investors. ‘Informed investors’ 
such as underwriters and issuing firms are better informed about the true value of the stocks on offer than general and 
individual investors. Informed investors invest only in attractively priced IPOs while uninformed investors invest 
randomly. 
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signalling models, high-quality companies demonstrate that they are high-quality by 
throwing money around. One way to do this is to “leave money on the table in the IPO” 
(Ritter and Welch, 2002). According to Su and Fleisher (1999, p. 181) “The best a low-
value issuer can do is to ‘take the money and run’ when its stock is initially offered”. A 
high-quality company will find it advantageous to signal its IPO through underpricing 
while a low-quality company will not find such underpricing worthwhile
54
.  
There are several empirical works that have investigated and contributed to the signalling 
models of IPOs.  For example, Jegadeesh et al. 1993, Su and Fleisher (1999) and 
Kennedy et al. (2006) found a positive relationship between underpricing and the 
likelihood of seasoned equity offerings (SEO). In contrast, Yu and Tse (2006) found no 
evidence to support the signalling hypothesis. Michaely and Shaw (1994) showed that 
companies with less IPO underpricing generated better earnings and paid higher 
dividends.  
More recently, a number of authors have studied whether IPO underpricing affects the 
probability of IPO survival and voluntary delisting from the stock market. Kooli and 
Meknassi (2007), for example, examined the survival profile of IPO issuers listed during 
1985-2005 in the U.S. They reported that large IPOs have a lower likelihood of failing 
when compared to small IPOs, and IPO underpricing increases the probability of failure. 
However, Espenlaub et al. (2012) and Pour and Lasfer (2013) focused on the AIM IPOs 
in the U.K. market and found no relationship between IPO underpricing and IPO survival. 
Most of the prior findings suggest that IPO underpricing is explainable as a means of 
bribing bureaucrats and can be understood in terms of establishing equilibrium when 
there is asymmetric information: in such a situation underpricing is a useful strategy for 
companies to signal their value to investors. In another study, Ellul and Pagano (2006)
55
 
suggested that the IPO underpricing is generally explained by asymmetric information 
and risk. The less liquid the aftermarket is expected to be, and the less predictable its 
liquidity, the larger will be the IPO underpricing.  It can be seen from a number of IPO 
studies that IPO underpricing has been employed to verify the quality of firms in various 
                                                        
54 Several empirical researchers have shown there to be a positive relationship between the IPO underpricing and the 
likelihood of seasoned equity offerings (SEO). For example, Ljungqvist (2004) suggested the possibility of 
distinguishing between good and bad firms, claiming that a company’s true type is revealed to investors before the post-
IPO financing stage. This exposes bad issuers to the risk that any cheating on their part will be detected before they can 
reap the benefit from aping high-quality issuers’ signals. 
55 Ellul and Pagano (2006) studied 337 British IPOs going public between 1998 and 2000 using various measures of 
liquidity. They find that expected after-market liquidity and liquidity risk are important determinants of IPO 
underpricing. 
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ways (Jegadeesh et al., 1993; Su and Fleisher, 1999; Kennedy et al., 2006; Kooli and 
Meknassi, 2007; Espenlaub et al., 2012; Pour and Lasfer, 2013 and among others).  
In short, signalling theory indicates a clear relationship between IPO underpricing and the 
probability of being TOL stocks. However, the researcher does not have a strong view on 
the sign of the IPO underpricing coefficients, as it may be a signal of the quality of firms 
or of higher ex-ante uncertainty. For example, concerning the quality of firms, in such 
circumstances, one may expect that firms with lower IPO underpricing are more likely to 
appear on the TOL (e.g., Jegadeesh et al. 1993; Su and Fleisher, 1999; Kennedy et al., 
2006). On the other hand, higher IPO underpricing may signal higher ex-ante uncertainty 
at the time of the offering that may lead to a higher probability of failure in the 
aftermarket (Beatty and Ritter, 1996; Kooli, 2007).  
4.3.2 Market-Feedback Hypothesis 
Next, the researcher considers the market-feedback hypothesis where IPO prices are a 
weighted average of the perceived present values of high-value and low-value issuers.  In 
contrast to the signalling models, the market-feedback hypothesis assumes that the market 
is better informed than the issuer and then that a high return in the IPO period implies that 
the issuer has underestimated the marginal return on the project. Under the market-
feedback hypothesis, the IPO price per se is not informative but the initial return on IPOs 
provides a measure of the extent to which the market is able to discriminate high-value 
companies from low-value ones (Jegadeesh et al., 1993). Moreover, Bommel and 
Vermaelen (2003) tested the market-feedback hypothesis which states that during the IPO 
process valuable information is collected and channelled to the company’s managers. 
They compared the variances of the indicative underpricing with those of the final 
underpricing.  The decrease in the average pricing error between the filing date and the 
pricing meeting shows the merit of the ‘book-building exercise’ and suggested that 
important information is aggregated in the waiting-period. In short, for the market 
feedback model (Jegadeesh et al., 1993; Bommel, 2002; Bommel and Vermaelen, 2003), 
investors are better informed about the firm’s value than the managers themselves. The 
owner-managers select the amount of IPO, setting the offer price to maximize 
information production by informed investors. As a consequence, the intrinsic value of 
the company is exposed to managers by the post-IPO price (Kennedy et al., 2006). In 
addition to the IPO signaling models, several researchers test the market-feedback 
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hypotheses simultaneously. For instance, Jegadeesh et al. (1993), Su and Fleisher (1999), 
Huyghebaert and Hulle (2006), Kennedy et al. (2006) and Yu and Tse (2006) find that the 
abnormal returns after going public are significantly positively related to the likelihood of 
subsequent SEOs. In another study, Pour and Lasfer (2013) report that firms that have 
lower stock returns in the post-IPO period are more likely to delist but the magnitude of 
underpricing is not significant. These results imply that the initial return of IPOs does not 
play a unique role in distinguishing a company’s quality.     
Consequently, the author expects to find a higher probability of a firm appearing on the 
Turnover List if the market discovers their true quality or when information is revealed 
when after-market trading starts and price differentiation occurs. Based on the alternative 
“market-feedback” hypothesis, this study also employs the aftermarket abnormal return as 
a potential explanation of Turnover List participation and compares TOL prediction to the 
IPO signalling hypotheses.  
4.3.3 The Asymmetric Information and Price Manipulation Hypothesis   
Firms that have an IPO period of time (from the filing date to the beginning of the trading 
period in the secondary market) have large information asymmetry due to the lack of 
public information such as historical price data and company news. Uninformed investors 
may therefore base their trading activities on publicly observable information such as past 
stock and market returns (Chiou et al., 2007). As a result, they aim to seek company 
information, especially in the initial IPO trading period. On this subject, Aggarwal and 
Wu (2006) suggested that “potentially informed investors” such as corporate insiders, 
brokers, underwriters, large shareholders and market makers are likely to be 
manipulators. They also showed that returns from manipulation are higher when there are 
more information-seekers in the market. During the IPO period a market-maker is able to 
manipulate the share price more easily because both market-maker and underwriter use 
their privileged positions to restrict supply while using their brokerage to create demand 
from individual investors. A well-known example of IPO price manipulation is the case 
of the ‘Paravant Computer Systems Company56’. Some relevant studies show that most of 
                                                        
56 Aggarwal and Wu (2006) gave an example of straightforward manipulation of IPO pricing. In June1996, Paravant 
Computer Systems, Inc. was listed on the NASDAQ market and issued their IPO assisted by the underwriter “Duke & 
Company”. The offered price was $5.00 per share. On June 3, 1996, the IPO increased to $9.875 per share on the first 
trading day. The SEC alleged that Duke (a market-maker for Paravant securities) created a significant demand for 
common stock. Interestingly, the CEO of Duke (Victor M. Wang) was associated with a large allocated proportion of 
Paravant IPOs. Duke also had a larger supply of these IPOs in its inventory. Prior to this IPO, several representatives 
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the earlier speculative manias were most prominent for new issues with a limited asset 
float
57
 (Malkiel, 2003 and Hong et al., 2006). In addition, the findings of Hong et al. 
(2006) suggest that IPO underpricing attracts a larger number of market participants to 
the shares. More investors mean better risk-sharing, which leads to a larger bubble. 
Therefore, the author conjectures that IPOs are more likely to become Turnover List 
stocks than non-IPOs. 
Most of the previous empirical studies on the IPO signaling theories and the market-
feedback model have paid attention to the fact that the underpricing and the after-market 
returns can signal ‘good’ or ‘bad’ quality companies. For example, a strand of previous 
studies on IPOs has claimed that IPO underpricing is being employed to verify the quality 
of firms. To his knowledge, the researcher is the first to analyze this unusual form of 
speculative stock on the so-called ‘Turnover List’ (TOL) in the Thai SEC setting. The 
questions of what exactly is a signalling of TOL stocks or how investors can avoid 
investment in bad or speculative stocks have important implications for a firm’s 
stakeholders, especially for retail, foreign and institutional investors. As a consequence, 
this study suggests IPO signalling as a means of detecting speculative stocks. Investors 
are therefore interested in the likelihood of their stocks being TOL ones.  
4.4 Econometric Methodology and Research Models 
In what follows, this study first presents a logit model, considering a set of potential 
determinants of a Thai IPO becoming a Turnover List stock. Next, the author examines 
the relationship between the stock price reactions to the announcement of the first TOL. 
Finally, this study extends the sample to include all listed Thai companies and tests with a 
panel logistic regression model whether a firm’s characteristics influence the probability 
of its stock being speculated. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
from Duke & Co. offered customers the chance to buy Paravant common stocks once aftermarket trading had 
commenced to ensure demand for this stock. As a result, the artificially small supply of common stock created demand 
and, once after-market trading commenced, the price of Paravent stock rose. On June 4, 1996, the stock price had 
increased to between $10.75 and $13.375 per share. Finally, the manipulation ceased on June 21, 1996, by which time 
Duke had generated over $10 million in illegal profits.      
57 Several firms were recent IPOs, and generally their shares were locked up shares, which held by insiders, managers 
and other pre-IPO equity shareholders, and are tradable for at least 6 months after the IPO date.  
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4.4.1 The Probability of Turnover List and IPO Underpricing 
This study investigates whether the probability of a Thai IPO becoming a Turnover List 
stock is related to the signalling model of IPOs and to the market-feedback hypothesis, by 
estimating the following logit model: 
ln[
𝑃𝑖
𝑇𝑂𝐿
(1−𝑃𝑖
𝑇𝑂𝐿)
] =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖 +
                             𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐹𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
15
𝑗=8 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
22
𝑘=16 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 +  Ɛ𝑖   (4.4) 
where Pit is the probability that the Turnover List (TOL) variable is equal to 1. MAIR is 
the market-adjusted initial return (MAIR) or the IPO underpricing. MAIRi is calculated by 
[(Pi,1-Pi,0)/Pi,0] - Ri,m or the percentage change between the offer price and the IPO closing 
price on the first trading day. Pi,1 is the closing price on the first day of trading, Pi,0 is the 
IPO offering price, and Ri,m is the stock market (either the SET or the MAI depending on 
which is the listed exchange) index return from the IPO date to the first trading date. 
Under the IPO signalling model, the researcher expects that there is a negative 
relationship between the IPO underpricing and the likelihood of being on the TOL. BHAR 
represents 6-month post-abnormal returns for the IPOs. To test the market feedback 
hypothesis, the author uses the abnormal returns over the period from trading day 1 to 
trading month 6 following the IPO date because it corresponds to the average silent 
(locked-up) period for strategic shareholders in the Thai stock market. The author expects 
that they will sell their IPOs or reduce their share proportion immediately after the silent 
period, particularly in cases of bad issuers (low-value companies) going to the public 
because they know the true value of their companies. This study controls for potential 
size and age differences in TOL activity. Thus, the author include the natural logarithm of 
offer size of IPO firms (lnSIZE) and the natural logarithm of the age of the firm in years 
from the establishment date to the year of IPO (lnAGE) in the regression models. 
Moreover, the proportion owned by the government (GOV) is employed in the model for 
an additional signal. This study also considers interesting variables namely, the IPO 
subscription rates that have not been studied closely in previous IPO empirical works. 
These explanatory variables are PFS (the percentage of foreigners subscribing for the 
IPOs) and INS (the percentage of institutional investors subscribing for the IPOs). Other 
variables include YEAR and INDUSTRY for controlling each year’s conditions and 
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industry effects. i is the regression error term. Alternatively, as noted in equation 4, this 
model can be written in the following non-linear-in-the-parameters form: 
𝑃𝑖 =
𝑒∝+𝑥
′
𝑖𝛽+𝑈𝑖
1+∝+𝑥′𝑖𝛽+𝑈𝑖
 ,                                                         (4.5)                                                                       
where, Pi is the probability that the i
th
 firm becomes a TOL item and xi is the column 
vector of explanatory variables.  
Again, the three independent variables of primary interest are the IPO underpricing 
(MAIR), the abnormal-returns in 6-month periods after going public (BHAR) and the 
proportion of IPOs owned by the Thai government (GOV).  Moreover, in logit models the 
author can examine the effect of a one-unit change in an explanatory variable that TOL = 
1 by considering the derivative, which is generally called the marginal effect
58
:  
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑥
= 𝛷(𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑥)𝛽2                                         (4.6)       
4.4.2 Market Anticipation of Turnover List 
The relationship between the stock price reaction to the announcement of the first 
Turnover List and IPO underpricing and the aftermarket abnormal return was examined. 
The researcher expected in accordance with the signalling hypotheses the market to be 
more surprised by the TOL announcement for IPOs with lower underpricing (low-quality 
firms), and the author then expected the price decline, normally associated with 
speculative stock announcements, to be less severe for high-quality firms. To test these 
implications of the IPO signalling model and of the market-feedback hypothesis in this 
study, the researcher regressed the abnormal 5-day returns due to the TOL announcement 
against the independent variables used in the previous regression. In general, one strategy 
is to ignore the companies which have ever been on the Turnover List, omit them from 
the sample, and then use the least squares to estimate a stock price reaction equation for 
                                                        
58 For logit models, this interpretation would be incorrect because the form of the function is not 𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 , 
for example, but rather 𝑃𝑖 = 𝐹(𝑥2𝑖), where F represents the non-linear logistic function. To obtain the required 
relationship between change in 𝑥2𝑖 and 𝑃𝑖, I would need to differentiate F with respect to 𝑥2𝑖 and it turns out that this 
derivative is 𝛽2𝐹(𝑥2𝑖). Then in fact, a 1-unit increase in 𝑥2𝑖 will cause a 𝛽2𝐹(𝑥2𝑖) increase in probability. In general, 
these impacts of incremental changes, being explanatory variables are evaluated by setting each of them to their mean 
values. 
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those that are speculative stocks.  However, the author would face a ‘sample selection 
problem’ if he considered or collected data on only firms that are on the Turnover List. 
The estimator is probably inconsistent as a result of truncation bias.
59
 Eckbo et al. (1990) 
suggest deriving consistent estimators using a latent variable model. Michaely and Shaw 
(1994) and Yu and Tse (2006) also applied this method to detect the dividend 
announcement and seasoned equity announcement effects. This study thus employed the 
‘Heckit’ selection bias model60 to detect the TOL announcement effect. In the context of 
the problem of estimating the TOL equation for IPOs, a probit model is first estimated 
explaining why an IPO is on the Turnover List or not. Then, a least squares regression is 
estimated in the second stage relating the stock price response to the IPO underpricing, 
the aftermarket abnormal returns and a variable called the “Inverse Mills Ratio” or IMR. 
Firstly, a probit regression is estimated as follows: 
𝑇𝑂𝐿𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖𝛿 + Ɛ𝑖                                                (4.7)                                                             
where the dependent variable TOL takes value 1 if TOL is observed and 0 otherwise and 
xi is the vector of explanatory variables that is the same as that used in the previous logit 
model (4). Then, this study calculated the Mill’s ratio (IMR) as follows: 
?̃?𝑖 =
𝜙(?̃?1+ ?̃?2𝑥𝑖)
𝛷(?̃?1+ ?̃?2𝑥𝑖)
                                        (4.8)  
where, ϕ(.) denotes the standard normal probability density function, and Φ(.) denotes the 
cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable. The parameters 
δ1 and δ2 can be estimated by using the probit model (7), based on the observed binary 
outcome TOLi. Finally, the author inserted the IMR into the regression equation as an 
extra explanatory variable, yielding the estimating equation: 
                                                        
59 The sample consists of N observations; however, the variable of interest is observed only for n < N of these. The 
selection equation is shown in terms of a latent variable zi
* that depends on one or more independent variables wi and is 
given by  𝑧𝑖
∗ = 𝛿1 + 𝛿2𝑤𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖      𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁. For simplicity I will include only one explanatory variable in the 
equation. The latent variable is not observed, but the author does observe the binary variable. zi = 1; zi
* > 0 or 0; 
otherwise. The second equation is the linear model of interest. It is 𝑦𝑖 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖   𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛. A selection 
problem arises when yi is observed only when zi = 1, and if the errors of the two equations are correlated. As a result, the 
least squares estimators of β1 and β2 are biased and inconsistent. 
60 James Heckman is well-known as the Noble Prize-winning econometrician and also develops a solution to the 
selection bias problem namely ‘Heckit’. This simple procedure uses two estimation steps: from the first stage, I create a 
variable “Inverse Mills Ratio” or IMR by probit estimation and in the second stage I use least squares regression to find 
the relationship between dependent and explanatory variables including an IMR variable. 
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𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖 =  𝜉1 + 𝜉2𝑥𝑖 + 𝜉𝜆?̃?𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖    𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛                          (4.9) 
where, REACT, over the event days -1 through +4, where day 0 is the TOL announcement 
date. REACT equals to [(Pi,4-Pi,-1)/Pi,4] – [(Ii,4-Ii,-1)/Ii,4], where day 0 is the TOL 
announcement date, Pi,4 is the fourth day closing price of the stock and Ii,4 is the fourth 
day closing price of the corresponding market index after the TOL announcement. Pi,-1 
and Ii,-1 are the stock price and index price 1 day before the TOL announcement, 
respectively.  xi is a column vector of explanatory variables which are the same in the 
equations (4) and (5). ?̃?𝑖  and 𝜈𝑖 are IMR and error term respectively.  
4.4.3 IPOs vs Non-IPOs for being Turnover List stocks 
According to asymmetric information theories, this study conjectures that an IPO 
company is more likely to be a TOL stock within a year of going public rather than non-
IPO companies, thus the author extended the sample from the IPO cross-sectional data to 
a panel dataset consisting of 429 Thai companies, excluding financial companies, real 
estate investment trusts and closed-end investment funds, for the period from 2004 to 
2014. The panel data used fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) logistic methods
61
 
were therefore employed in this study. Moreover, the researcher examined whether a 
firm’s characteristics would influence the probability of   its stock being speculated.  This 
study considered existing common stocks that are now trading on the Thai stock market. 
Instead of logit models, this study now worked with a panel logistic regression model. 
The model is as follows: 
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑂𝐿
1−𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑂𝐿) = 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛽𝛸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖, 𝑡 = 1,2, 3, … , 𝑇             (4.10) 
where Pit is the probability that the Turnover List (TOL) variable is equal to 1. Χit is a 
vector of the time-varying predictors, Zi is a vector of the time-invariant predictors, and αi 
represents the combined effects of all the unobserved variables that are constant over 
time. The author should treat αi as a set of fixed constants, one for each individual. 
However, this is equivalent to assuming that αi is random with unrestricted associations 
                                                        
61 The crucial difference is that a fixed effects model treats unobserved differences between individuals as a set of fixed 
parameters that can either be directly estimated out of the estimating equations but unobserved differences are treated as 
random variables with a specified probability distribution in a random effects model (Allison, 2009). 
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between αi and Χit. A column vector of explanatory variables is made up of the following: 
lnMV is the natural logarithm of market capitalization calculated by the market share 
price times the number of shares outstanding; LIQ is the liquidity ratio (current 
assets/current liabilities); PE is the Price-Earnings ratio (market price per share/ earnings 
per share); LEV is the financial leverage ratio (debt/equity); EPS is the earnings per share; 
GROWTH is sales growth (percentage change between year t and year t-1); BHAR is the 
1-year buy-and-hold abnormal return of company i from Jan to Dec in each fiscal year
62
; 
VOL is the yearly standardized trading volume
63
; DIV is a dummy variable, which is 1 if 
the firm distributes dividends and 0 otherwise; IPO is a dummy variable, which is 1 if the 
firm issues the IPO at year t and 0 otherwise.  
4.5 Data and Summary Statistics 
4.5.1 Data Construction 
The present study obtained data on IPOs and Turnover List (TOL) for the Thai markets 
from the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) and Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), Thailand database. This study obtained the official prospectus filing form (Form 
69-1) from the IPO filing database at the SEC (Thailand) and hand-collected data at the 
time of IPO, including  the number of IPOs issued, the IPO size, the age of the listed 
company, and the proportion of IPOs owned by the government. For the subscription 
rates, the author obtained data from the computer database at the SEC library (Bangkok, 
Thailand). The IPO sample totals 187 IPOs, covering the period 2004 to 2012 and the 
TOL within one year of the IPO date. This period was selected because the Turnover List 
regulations were first established in 2004. The author only includes the first TOL for the 
firms in the IPO sample. The stock prices, the SET and the MAI indices were obtained 
                                                        
62 Buy and hold abnormal return is calculated as below. 
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where, The market-adjusted abnormal returns of company i in event month t (ARi,t) are calculated for each event month 
t as follows: ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t. Thus, Ri,t = (Pi,t-Pi,t-1)/Pi,t-1 where Pi,t is the last traded price of the company in event 
month t and Pi,t-1 is the last traded price of the company in event month t-1. Rm,t is the return on the market index (SET 
or MAI indices) in event month t and is calculated as Rm,t = (Pm,t-Pm,t-1)/ Pm,t-1 where Pm,t is the last closed stock market 
index in event month t and Pm,t-1 is the last closed market index in event month t-1. In cases of IPO companies, the 
author calculated the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) from the closing price on the first trading day to the end 
of the fiscal year.  
63 The researcher followed the study of You et al. (2012) to calculate the standardized monthly trading volume as: 
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 =
𝑉𝑖𝑡−?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝑡𝑑(𝑉𝑖)
 where, for each stock i, Vit is the trading volume at time t, ?̂?𝑖 is the mean trading volume, and Std(Vi) is 
the standard deviation of trading volume. The average standardized trading volume for the fiscal year is calculated 
as[
∑ 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡
12
𝑖=1
12
]. 
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from the Thomson Reuter database. Table 4.2 shows details of the sample by year and 
exchange of listing. Approximately 60% (40%) of IPO listings are on the SET (MAI). 
Most of the firms in the sample issued their IPOs in 2004 (49 IPOs (26.2%)) and 2005 (45 
IPOs (24.1%)). Interestingly, the IPO firms for the entire sample mostly came from the 
service and property & construction sectors. Similarly, the majority of IPOs in the MAI 
sample were in the property & construction industry (29.8%). For SET IPOs, this study 
finds that 27.5% of the sample is dominated by the service sector, 16.8% by the industry 
and property & construction sectors, 11.5% by the financial sector, and 10.6% by the 
technology sector. For MAI IPOs, these findings show that 16.2% is dominated by the 
industrial sector, 13.5% by the services and technology sectors, and 10.8% by the 
resources industry. A possible reason that could explain the number of ’Property & 
Construction’ IPOs in the sample is that after the Asian financial crisis a major 
government reform was implemented (between 1997 and 1999) in Thailand. The Thai 
government intended to stimulate economic growth and employment, and so it launched a 
number of large-scale infrastructure projects, including the sky train (BTS) and the 
underground train (MRT). Therefore, the construction companies could benefit and earn 
substantial profits. As a result, several fledgling construction companies went public at 
this time. 
Table 4.2 Sample size of Thai IPOs 
Panel A: sample size disaggregated by exchange and by IPO offering year 
Year Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) 
Market for Alternative 
Investment (MAI) 
Total 
Number % Number % Number % 
2004 37 32.7 12 16.2 49 26.2 
2005 31 27.4 14 18.9 45 24.1 
2006 10 8.9 5 6.8 15 8.0 
2007 6 5.3 6 8.1 12 6.4 
2008 8 7.1 3 4.0 11 5.9 
2009 5 4.4 11 14.9 16 8.6 
2010 4 3.5 7 9.5 11 5.9 
2011 3 2.7 7 9.5 10 5.3 
2012 9 8.0 9 12.1 18 9.6 
Total 113 100 74 100 187 100 
Panel B: sample size disaggregated by exchange and by industry group 
Industry Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) 
Market for Alternative 
Investment (MAI) 
Total 
Number % Number % Number % 
Agro & Food  6 5.3 2 2.7 8 4.3 
Consumer Products 7 6.2 4 5.4 11 5.9 
Financial 13 11.5 6 8.1 19 10.1 
Industrial 19 16.8 12 16.2 31 16.6 
Resources 6 5.3 8 10.8 14 7.5 
Services 31 27.5 10 13.5 41 21.9 
Technology 12 10.6 10 13.5 22 11.8 
Property & Construction 19 16.8 22 29.8 41 21.9 
Total 113 100 74 100 187 100 
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4.5.2 Summary statistics 
Table 4.3 presents the proportions of Turnover List and non-Turnover List for the sample 
of IPO firms that the author uses for this empirical study. It can be seen that 64 IPOs 
(34.2%) from the entire sample were on the Turnover List (TOL) within one year 
following their IPOs. When this study considers the proportion of TOL:Non-TOL by 
listed exchange separately, it shows a higher proportion on the TOL of stocks in the SET 
IPOs (46.9%). However, there are 11 IPOs (14.9%) that were TOL stocks for the MAI 
sample. This implies that Thai speculative stocks are likely to come from large-sized 
companies. Interestingly, a high density of TOL occurred between 2011 and 2012 
because of a bull-market period and high trading volume. In addition to this, it can be 
seen in Table 4.3 that, Panel B shows that the TOL stocks were mostly from the service 
sector. There are no TOL stocks from the Agro & Food and financial sectors for the MAI 
sample.      
Table 4.3 The proportion of Turnover List stock (TOL) and Non-Turnover List stock (Non-TOL) for 
Thai IPOs issued during the 2004-2012 period 
Panel A: sample size disaggregated by exchange and by IPO offering year  
Year  The entire sample  The Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) 
 Market for Alternative 
Investment (MAI) 
  TOL % Non 
TOL 
%  TOL % Non
TOL 
%  TOL % Non 
TOL 
% 
2004  15 30.6 34 69.4  14 37.8 23 62.2  1 8.3 11 91.7 
2005  15 33.3 30 66.7  15 48.4 16 51.6  0 0.0 14 100 
2006  5 33.3 10 66.7  5 50.0 5 50.0  0 0.0 5 100 
2007  3 25.0 9 75.0  2 33.3 4 66.7  1 16.7 5 83.3 
2008  1 9.1 10 90.9  1 12.5 7 87.5  0 0.0 3 100 
2009  2 12.5 14 87.5  1 20.0 4 80.0  1 9.1 10 90.9 
2010  4 36.4 7 63.6  3 75.0 1 25.0  1 14.3 6 85.7 
2011  4 40.0 6 60.0  3 100 0 0.0  1 14.3 6 85.7 
2012  15 83.3 3 16.7  9 100 0 0.0  6 66.7 3 33.3 
Total 64 34.2 123 65.8  53 46.9 60 53.1  11 14.9 63 85.1 
Panel B: sample size disaggregated by exchange and by industry group 
Industry The entire sample  The Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) 
 Market for Alternative 
Investment (MAI) 
 TOL % Non 
TOL 
%  TOL % Non 
TOL 
%  TOL % Non 
TOL 
% 
Agro & Food 3 37.5 5 62.5  3 50.0 3 50.0  0 0.0 2 100 
Consumer Products 4 36.4 7 63.6  3 42.9 4 57.1  1 25.0 3 75.0 
Financial 6 31.6 13 68.4  6 46.2 7 53.8  0 0.0 6 100 
Industrial  7 22.6 24 77.4  6 31.6 13 68.4  1 9.3 11 91.7 
Resources 3 21.4 11 78.6  2 33.3 4 66.7  1 12.5 7 87.5 
Service 22 53.7 19 46.3  19 61.3 12 38.7  3 30.0 7 70.0 
Technology 6 27.3 16 72.7  5 41.7 7 58.3  1 10.0 9 90.0 
Property & Construction 13 31.7 28 68.3  9 47.4 10 52.6  4 18.2 18 81.8 
Total 64 34.2 123 65.8  53 46.9 60 53.1  11 14.9 63 85.1 
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Table 4.4 shows a comparison of variables, which is taken into consideration when 
investigating the relationship between the Turnover List and IPO underpricing. The 
market-adjusted initial returns (𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑅) are evident across both stock markets. The 
average of IPO underpricing for Thai IPOs going to the public between 2004 and 2012 is 
22.67%. The researcher also finds that the average market-adjusted initial return in the 
MAI IPOs (34.46%) was larger than those associated with the SET IPOs (14.95%) and 
showed a statistically significant difference at 0.01 level. The averages of six-month 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑠 in the entire SET and MAI samples are 2.31%, 2.18% and 2.50% respectively. 
However, there is no significance in the difference in mean of BHAR between the SET 
and MAI samples. The issue size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) is measured by the number of shares offered at 
the IPO times the IPO offer price. The mean of 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 for the Thai IPOs is about 1,152 
million Baht. It worth noting that the average issue size in the SET is significantly larger 
than that in the MAI. For 𝐴𝐺𝐸i which is the age of a firm in years from the establishment 
date to the date of the IPO, the author found that the results associated with SET and MAI 
have the same pattern; there is also an insignificant difference for 𝐴𝐺𝐸 between SET- and 
MAI-market firms. The subscription details for IPOs for foreign 𝑃𝐹𝑆 and institutional 
𝐼𝑁𝑆 investors are also reported in Table 4.4. The average foreign and institutional 
investors’ subscriptions for SET IPOs are 10.9% and 21.21%, but only 4.6% and 8.47% 
in the MAI market respectively.  
To examine the excess return around the date when the firm was announced on the TOL, 
the author estimated the excess return and obtained 5-day (-1, 4) abnormal returns using 
standard event study methodology. The author used the SET and MAI equal-weighted 
index returns as the market index in the event study. The average IPO react prices for the 
TOL announcement in the entire and in the SET samples show positive returns of 2.72% 
and 4.4% respectively, but -4.6% in the MAI.  Notably, there is a statistically significant 
difference in the mean of 5-day abnormal returns between the SET and the MAI IPOs. In 
addition, this study employs a non-parametric test, namely, the two-sample Wilcoxon 
rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) to test median differences. As can be seen in Table 4.4, the 
median difference findings are consistent with the mean different t-test, suggesting 
significant differences for 𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑅, 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸, 𝐺𝑂𝑉, 𝑃𝐹𝑆, 𝐼𝑁𝑆 and 𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐶𝑇 between SET- and 
MAI-market companies.   
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4.6 The Empirical Results 
4.6.1 Relationship between IPO underpricing and Probability of Turnover List Risk 
Table 4.5 shows the results of the logit regression estimations.
64
 This study first considers 
the relationship between IPO underpricing and the probability of these being speculative 
stocks. For the entire sample, the results can be seen in Models (1) to (4). On average, 
there is a positive and significant relationship between the MAIR and the probability of 
being on the TOL.  The marginal effects are reported in brackets below the standard 
errors (SE) where they indicate that the effect is economically important. The slope 
coefficient on the variable MAIR is 1.434. The marginal effect indicates that a 1% 
increase in underpricing will lead to the increased likelihood of IPOs being speculative 
stocks by 41.7%. Contrary to his expectation, the author finds a positive and significant 
coefficient for the initial returns, contrary to the expectation. In contrary to the IPO 
signaling expectation and to the IPO signalling model, this study finds a positive and 
significant coefficient for the initial returns (e.g., Jegadeesh et al., 1993; Su and Fleisher, 
1999; Kennedy et al., 2006). A possible explanation for this finding is that for the first 
trading day of IPOs, there was no ceiling price in the past in the Thai stock market. 
However, in 2012 the SET adjusted the ceiling price to 300% from the offering price. 
This implies that if stock price-fixers would like to pump up the stock price, it is a good 
opportunity to do this on the first trading day. As a consequence, the magnitude of 
underpricing has a positive effect on the Turnover List risk. 
                                                        
64 For the sake of brevity, the author does not report the estimates of the coefficients of year and industry dummy 
variables. 
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Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics of the SET and the MAI IPOs 
The descriptive statistics are for the187 Thai IPOs issued during 2004-2012. The SET sample refers to IPOs from the Stock Exchange of Thailand. The MAI sample denotes IPOs from the Market for Alternative 
Investment. MAIR is the market-adjusted initial return (MAIR) or the IPO underpricing calculated by [(Pi,1-Pi,0)/Pi,0] – Ri,m or percentage change between offer price and IPO closing price on the first trading day. Pi,1 
is the closing price on the first day of trading, Pi,0 is the IPO offering price, and Ri,m is the stock market index return from the IPO date to the first trading date. BHAR represents 100-day post abnormal returns for 
the IPOs calculated as 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑖=1 ) − ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
𝑇
𝑖=1 ). SIZE is the number of shares offered at the IPO times the IPO offer price, and AGE is the age of a firm in years from the establishment date to 
the date of the IPO. GOVi which is the proportion owned by the government is considered in the model as an explanatory variable. The percentage of foreign and institution investors subscribing for the IPOs are 
PFS and INS respectively. TIMETOL is the number of days between an IPO and its first Turnover List (TOL). REACT is the abnormal TOL 5-day announcement price reaction (over the event days -1 through +4) 
calculated by [(Pi,4-Pi,-1)/Pi,4] – [(Ii,4-Ii,-1)/Ii,4], where day 0 is the TOL announcement date, Pi,4 is the fourth day closing price of the stock and Ii,4 is the fourth day closing price of the corresponding market index 
after the TOL announcement. Pi,-1 and Ii,-1 are the stock price and the index price 1 day before the TOL announcement, respectively. The significance of the difference in the mean (median) of variables between 
SET and MAI sample measures is computed using the independent-sample t-test (the non-parametric test namely two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test). 
 
Variables  The entire IPOs   The SET IPOs  The MAI IPOs  Different  
 N Mean Median SD  N Mean Median SD  N Mean Median SD  t-stats  z-stats 
MAIR (%)  187 22.67 17.06 43.39  113 14.95 4.15 36.02  74 34.46 13.92 50.74  -2.868***  -2.476** 
BHAR (%)  187 2.31 -5.18 38.07  113 2.18 -5.10 40.64  74 2.50 -4.17 34.04  -0.057  -0.483 
SIZE (million Baht)  187 1,152.41 251.25 3,642.36  113 1,798.07 471.25 4,574.33  74 166.44 100.85 262.61  3.782***  8.892*** 
AGE (year)  187 15.79 13.00 12.24  113 15.91 13.00 13.97  74 15.59 14.50 9.08  0.173  0.879 
GOV (%)  187 2.00 0.00 10.9  113 3.00 2.15 13.9  74 0.00 0.00 0.40  2.016**  2.753*** 
PFS (%)  187 8.41 2.0 13.71  113 10.90 2.93 14.80  74 4.60 1.00 10.89  3.346***  3.332*** 
INS (%)  187 16.27 0.00 19.52  113 21.21 10.53 21.53  74 8.74 0.56 12.83  4.956***  4.066*** 
REACT (%)  64 2.72 -2.00 12.08  52 4.40 14.00 12.22  12 -4.6 12.00 8.40  2.433**  2.232** 
Note: 
    *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
  **Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
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These findings are consistent with Li et al. (2005)
65
, Zheng et al. (2005) and Ellul and 
Pagano (2006), who argue that IPO underpricing fosters higher post-IPO trading volume 
and turnover in both the short-run and the long-run. The underpricing is likely to lead to 
IPO oversubscription which in turn increases aftermarket liquidity. This finding also 
confirms Beatty and Ritter’s (1986) theory that more underpricing is a sign of high ex-
ante uncertainty that may result in a higher TOL risk.  
For the after-market return variable BHAR, it is positively related to the likelihood of 
TOL and is statistically significant. The slope coefficient on the aftermarket return 
variable BHAR is 0.793. These point estimates suggest a stronger relation between the 
IPO underpricing appreciation and the probability of being on the Turnover List than 
between the after-market abnormal return and the latter. This indicates that the after-
market returns of IPOs are a good predictor for the detection of speculative stocks 
(Turnover List) as well as the IPO underpricing. In addition, the positive coefficient of 
BHAR suggests that the higher the abnormal after-market return, the more likely the listed 
firms are to be speculative stocks. It was found that the offering size has a positive effect 
on TOL risk. This is consistent with the finding in Section 3.2 that TOL stocks come from 
the main stock market. This is in contrast with the UK stock market and other markets 
where speculative stocks are likely to be traded in the mid-cap FTSE 250, AIM and 
small-cap stock markets. 
This study also included a proportion of IPOs owned by the government (GOV) in the 
logit Models (3) and (4). For these a slightly different regression result was found. 
Interestingly, the author found that the GOV variable was negatively related to the 
probability of TOL participation. The government mostly invests in high-quality 
companies or holds only blue-chip stocks
66. Under Rock’s assumption (1986)67, we can 
also assume that the Thai government (an informed investor) has better information than 
uninformed investors because they can perceive which companies will generate huge 
                                                        
65 Li et al. (2005) studied 1,673 IPOs of common stocks listed on NASDAQ between 1993 and 2000. They found that 
initial return (underpricing) is positively related to turnover ratio which is the daily trading volume divided by the 
number of shares offered and measures the speed of transaction. 
66 Blue-chip stocks, for example, are good fundamental stocks or the shares of a company in which there is financial 
strength, a record of profit growth and a good reputation. 
67 ‘The ‘winner’s curse model’ by Rock (1986) is probably well known as an asymmetric information model. The 
assumption is that informed investors such as underwriters and issuing firms are better informed about the intrinsic 
value of the stocks on offer than general and individual investors. Informed investors invest only in attractively priced 
IPOs while uninformed investors invest randomly. He suggested that shares must on average be underpriced in order to 
attract less informed investors to preempt the new IPO. ‘The uninformed compete with the informed, and the issuer 
must ultimately compensate them for their disadvantage” (Rock, 1986, p. 207). 
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profits from any proposed mega-projects in the future. This supports the Sun et al. (2002) 
study that apart from political and financial support, the states have other impacts on 
performance of listed companies such as positive signaling, effective monitoring and 
providing business connections. Seemingly, the government avoids investment in poor 
quality companies. The findings suggest that the government plays an interesting role for 
individual investors making investment decisions and speculative stock avoidance 
concerning the Thai stock market. However, Table 4.5 shows the logit estimates with 
unexplained lnAGE, PFS and INS as the explanatory variables in place of the age of 
firms, and the proportion of foreign and institutional investors subscribing for IPOs.     
As a robustness check, on separating the entire sample into SET and MAI groups, the 
researcher gained significant insights into the determinations of TOL participants 
following IPOs. Using the same vector of explanatory variables as that used in the 
previous logit regression for the entire sample, the author obtained a coefficient for MAIR 
of 1.836 for the SET IPOs, while for the firms this study obtained a coefficient of 1.647 
(See Models 5 and 9). The marginal effects indicate that a 1% increase in underpricing 
their IPOs increases the likelihood of their being speculative stocks by 73.18% and 6.19% 
for SET and MAI IPOs respectively. The author found that a 6-month abnormal return 
after going public also positively affects the likelihood of TOL participation for the entire 
sample and for the SET sample and is statistically significant. Nevertheless, for MAI 
IPOs, there is no evidence of a relationship between the aftermarket abnormal return 
(BHAR) and the probability of their being speculative stocks. Again, as is apparent from 
the coefficients and marginal effects, the strong positive relationship between the 
likelihood of TOL participation and the level of 6-month abnormal return shown by the 
IPOs from the SET sample does not exist for the group of MAI IPOs. In addition to this, 
the researcher found from the logit estimates that lnAGE, PFS and INS still have 
insignificant effects on the likelihood of being listed on TOL or being speculative stocks.  
In addition, this study examines the market reaction to the firms being announced on 
TOL. To be more specific, this study replaces the TOL dependent variable with 5-day (-1, 
4) abnormal return of firms being announced on TOL (REACT) and uses the same set of 
independent variables as the previous regressions with an additional Mill’s ratio (IMR). 
The estimation results are reported in Table 4.6. In all cases, the slope coefficients for 
MAIR and BHAR are insignificant. These results are somewhat surprising, given the 
earlier findings. One possible explanation for the insignificant relationship between IPO 
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underpricing and the aftermarket return and the abnormal return on the TOL 
announcement dates is that the market expectations do not reflect the statistical relation 
between the initial and aftermarket returns of IPOs and Turnover List participation that 
the author documented. More interestingly, the author found that the estimate of the slope 
coefficient on the variable PFS is reliably negative. This indicates that the stock market 
reacts more unfavourably to speculative stock announcements by firms with a large 
proportion of foreign investors holding their IPOs, which in turn implies that the Thai 
stock market attaches a higher probability to such announcements by these companies. In 
addition to this, the Mill’s ratio is not statistically significant. This implies that this study 
has no selection bias problem.  To verify this finding, the author also used bootstrapped 
linear regression and bootstrapped quantile regression. These results support the OLS 
regression that proportion of IPOs subscribed by foreigners is a crucial factor affecting 
the stock price reaction in the period of the TOL announcement. 
A possible reason supporting foreign investor reaction to a Turnover List announcement 
is the home-biased literature that assumes that investors do not hold a world market 
portfolio. Foreign investors who invest outside their home country can change their 
positions quickly when they face such obstacles in their investments. Kang and Stulz 
(1997) suggest that there are two main barriers are political risk
68
 differences between 
domestic and foreign investors and information asymmetries. Markets for TOL stocks 
show less liquidity due to margin restriction and the controlling of trading volume by the 
SEC, Thailand, so that foreign investors may find it expensive to sell the stocks to avoid 
political risk. The possibility of unexpected surges in Turnover List risk would prompt 
foreign investors to sell TOL stocks and invest more in securities that have a liquid 
the remaining variables, including the offering market. However, the author finds that 
size, age of firm, proportion of IPOs owned the government and subscribed by institution 
investors, do not in fact affect the price reaction.  These variables are included to control 
for possible differences in the extent to which the market microstructure is surprised by 
the TOL announcements that are unrelated to the stock returns around the time of their 
IPOs.  
 
                                                        
68 Political risk differences arise if non-resident investors feel that they might have trouble repatriating their holdings or 
that their holdings might be expropriated altogether, so that their expected return on foreign shares is lower than the 
expected return for resident. 
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Table 4.5 Logit regression estimates of the probability of TOL 
The logit regression estimates of the relation between the initial returns of IPOs and the probability of a Turnover List (TOL) for the SET and MAI IPOs in the 2004-2012 period. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable taking the value 1 if a firm is announced in the TOL by the SEC (Thailand) within 1 year after its IPOs, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are MAIR, which is the market-adjusted initial 
return or the IPO underpricing calculated by [(Pi,1-Pi,0)/Pi,0] – Ri,m or the percentage change between the offer price and the IPO closing price on the first trading day. Pi,1 is the closing price on the first day of 
trading, Pi,0 is the IPO offering price, and Ri,m is the stock market index return from the IPO date to the first trading date. BHAR represents 3-month post abnormal returns for the IPOs calculated as 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑖=1 ) − ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
𝑇
𝑖=1 ). lnSIZE is the natural logarithm of the number of shares offered at the IPO times the IPO offer price, and lnAGE is the natural logarithm of the age of a firm in years from the 
establishment date to the date of the IPO. GOV which is the proportion owned by the government is considered in the model as an explanatory variable. The percentage of foreign and institution investors 
subscribing for the IPOs are PFS and INS respectively. Standard Errors are reported in parentheses, and marginal effects are reported within brackets. ?̂? is calculated by?̂? =
1
1+𝑒−(∝+?̅?
′
𝑖?̂?)
 , where ?̅?′is means of 
explanatory variables. Thus, the marginal effect is in fact calculated by ?̂?(?̂?𝑖).  
 
Variables The Entire IPOs   The SET IPOs  The MAI IPOs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Constant -0.866*** -0.687*** -16.046*** -16.551***  -0.375* -0.146 -5.659 -10.192*  -2.546*** -1.743*** -35.951*** -21.857** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (1.952) (2.351)  (0.132) (0.121) (2.530) (3.119)  (0.048) (0.334) (6.124) (1.156) 
MAIR 0.869**  1.434*** 0.947*  1.836**  2.116*** 2.106**  1.647***  1.889** 1.674** 
 (0.217)  (0.248) (0.316)  (0.426)  (0.457) (0.503)  (0.078)  (0.402) (0.111) 
 [0.327]  [0.417] [0.248]  [0.732]  [0.837] [0.774]  [0.062]  [0.192] [0.035] 
BHAR  0.856** 0.793* 1.037*   1.412*** 1.477** 2.234***   -0.554 -1.238 -2.971 
  (0.249) (0.269) (0.310)   (0.318) (0.339) (0.416)   (0.387) (0.731) (0.037) 
  [0.274] 0.231 [0.272]   [0.559] [0.584] [0.821]   [-0.047] [-0.126] [-0.062] 
lnSIZE   0.805*** 0.855***    0.306 0.559**    1.681** 0.946 
   (0.101) (0.121)    (0.129) (0.157)    (0.320) (0.062) 
   0.234 [0.224]    [0.121] [0.206]    [0.171] [0.020] 
lnAGE   -0.280 -0.299    -0.372 -0.215    0.665 -0.077 
   (0.138) (0.153)    (0.163) (0.185)    (0.360) (0.060) 
   [-0.081] [-0.078]    [-0.147] [-0.079]    [0.068] [-0.002] 
GOV   -2.721* -3.230*    -1.692 -2.658      
   (1.074) (1.123)    (1.078) (1.165)      
   [-0.792] [-0.846]    [-0.669] [-0.977]      
PFS   0.796 0.340    1.726 0.491    6.929 6.051 
   (1.188) (1.233)    (1.384) (1.488)    (2.977) (0.304) 
   [0.232] [0.089]    [0.683] [0.181]    [0.705] [0.126] 
INS   -0.965 -0.851    0.931 -0.775    -7.558 -2.663 
   (0.813) (0.880)    (0.906) (0.976)    (3.960) (0.295) 
   [-0.281] [-0.223]    [0.342] [-0.285]    [-0.769] [-0.055] 
Year dummy No No No Yes  No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Ind. dummy No No No Yes  No No No Yes  No No No No 
?̂? 0.376 0.319 0.291 0.262  0.399 0.396 0.395 0.368  0.038 0.085 0.102 0.021 
n 187 187 187 187  113 113 113 113  74 74 74 74 
McFadden R2 0.025 0.019 0.170 0.267  0.055 0.051 0.140 0.243  0.122 0.005 0.339 0.422 
Note: 
    *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
  **Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 4.6 OLS estimates including “Inverse Mills Ratio” analysis (Heckman) and bootstrapped linear 
regression (BSREG) and bootstrapped quantile regression (BSQREG) analyses of the TOL 
announcement effect 
 
The dependent variable is the abnormal return TOL 6-day announcement price reaction (REACT) (over the event days -1 through +4) 
calculated by [(Pi,4-Pi,-1)/Pi,4] – [(Ii,4-Ii,-1)/Ii,4], where day 0 is the TOL announcement date, Pi,4 is the fourth day closing price of the 
stock and Ii,4 is the fourth day closing price of the corresponding market index after the TOL announcement. Pi,-1 and Ii,-1 are the stock 
price and index price 1 day before the TOL announcement, respectively. The independent variables are MAIR, which is the market-
adjusted initial return or the IPO underpricing calculated by [(Pi,1-Pi,0)/Pi,0] – Ri,m or percentage change between the offer price and the 
IPO closing price on the first trading day. Pi,1 is the closing price on the first day of trading, Pi,0 is the IPO offering price, and Ri,m is the 
stock market index return from the IPO date to the first trading date. BHAR represents 3-month post abnormal returns for the IPOs 
calculated as 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
T
i=1 ) − ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
T
i=1 ). lnSIZE is the natural logarithm of the number of shares offered at the IPO 
times the IPO offer price, and lnAGE is the natural logarithm of the age of a firm in years from the establishment date to the date of the 
IPO. GOV, which is the proportion owned by the government is considered in the model as an explanatory variable. The percentage of 
foreign and institution investors subscribing for the IPOs are PFS and INS respectively. Standard Errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Variables Heckman  BSREG  BSQREG 
 (13) (14)  (15)  (16) 
Constant -0.756* -1.137  -0.756  -0.689 
 (0.446) (0.752)  (0.761)  (0.957) 
MAIR -0.045 -0.028  -0.045  -0.062 
 (0.061) (0.068)  (0.080)  (0.108) 
BHAR 0.013 0.032  0.013  -0.015 
 (0.038) (0.055)  (0.059)  (0.078) 
lnSIZE 0.044* 0.061  0.044  0.395 
 (0.022) (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.043) 
lnAGE -0.018 -0.023  -0.018  -0.244 
 (0.023) (0.024)  (0.032)  (0.035) 
GOV 0.079 0.018  0.080  0.162 
 (0.396) (0.130)  (8.997)  (8.128) 
PFS -0.469** -0.448**  -0.470*  -0.588* 
 (0.093) (0.192)  (0.239)  (0.321) 
INS 0.131 0.103  0.132  0.166 
 (0.179) (0.147)  (0.178)  (0.244) 
Inverse Mills Ratio    0.061  -0.040  0.019 
  (0.106)  (0.137)  (0.165) 
Year dummy Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Ind. Dummy Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
n 64 64  64  64 
Adj. R2 0.145 0.116  0.145   
Pseudo R2      0.326 
Note: 
    *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
  **Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
4.6.2 Do IPOs appreciate being speculated? (IPO VS non-IPO) 
So far, the author has only considered the probability of an IPO firm being classified as 
speculative stock on TOL. However, the proportion of IPOs appearing on the TOL is only 
about 17%. Yet most of the earlier speculative manias were focused on the IPOs. (Hong 
et al., 2006). In this section, the author extends the sample to account for both IPOs and 
existing Thai common stocks.   
Table 4.7 reports the results from applying panel logit regression methods to the Turnover 
List. However, the author uses both a fixed effects (FE) model with robust standard errors 
and include year dummies to control for changes in unobservable annual shocks that 
model with robust standard errors and include year dummies to control for changes in 
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observable annual shocks that may affect the probability of appearing on the TOL
69
. This 
study employs a Hausman-test to determine whether RE coefficients are identical to the 
FE coefficients, and suggests that an FE model is more superior for the dataset. It should 
be noted that no constant is reported for a conditional maximum likelihood method 
because the constant is conditioned out of the likelihood function.  
As can be seen in Models (17) and (19), the abnormal return and the standardized trading 
volume are significantly associated with an increased risk of being put on the Turnover 
List. To consider the coefficient of 0.096 for 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅, by exponentiating, the author gets an 
odds ratio of 1.10. This means that each additional percent of the cumulative abnormal 
return is associated with a 10% increase in odds for being put on the Turnover List. This 
is in line with the expectation and also supports the findings of the IPO sample in Section 
6.1 that the return is positively related to the likelihood of being speculative stock. 
Unsurprisingly, the turnover of shares traded is positive and statistically significant. The 
trading volume is one of the major factors for Turnover List calculation by SEC, 
Thailand. Therefore, a higher turnover of stocks traded results in a higher probability of 
there being TOL stocks. Furthermore, the author included an IPO dummy variable in 
model (18) and found that the coefficient of 1.965 is strongly significant for an IPO. This 
means that when companies go public, their odds of being on the TOL within their IPO 
years are multiplied by about 5.4. This is in line with the studies of Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) and Hong et al. (2006) that IPOs have some features, such as young companies 
and a lack of public information, that mean they are more likely to be speculated rather 
than others.  Thus, this study supports the asymmetric information and price manipulation 
hypothesis that when compared with non-IPOs, IPOs are more likely to become TOL 
stocks. This implies that price-makers prefer to manipulate the new issues rather than 
existing stocks due to large asymmetric information and more information-seekers. This 
is in line with Tinic (1988) and Mok and Hui (1998)’s proposed speculative bubble 
hypothesis, suggesting that the temporary price divergence of an IPO above its true value 
in the aftermarket is attributed to the speculation of those investors who could not get an 
allocation of the oversubscribed new issues and possibly also due to ‘price manipulation’.  
 
                                                        
69 The author employed a Hausman test to test the null hypothesis that random effect coefficients are identical to the FE 
coefficients. I reject the null hypothesis, and suggest FE model is more appropriate for our dataset. 
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Table 4.7 Conditional likelihood of the panel logit regression models and tests of equality for 
deviation and mean coefficients 
 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a firm is announced in the TOL within each fiscal year, and 0 
otherwise. The independent variables are BHAR, which is the 1-year buy-and-hold abnormal return of company i from Jan to Dec in 
each fiscal year. lnMV is the natural logarithm of market capitalization calculated by the market share price times the number of shares 
outstanding; VOL is the yearly standardized trading volume; LIQ is the liquidity ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PE is Price-
Earnings ratio (market price per share/ earnings per share); LEV is financial leverage ratio (debt/equity); EPS is earnings per share; 
GROWTH is sales growth (percentage change between year t and year t-1);  and DIV is a dummy variable, which is 1 if the firm 
distributes dividends and 0 otherwise; IPO is a dummy variable, which is 1 if the firm issues the IPO at year t and 0 otherwise. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and odd ratios are reported within brackets. 
  
Variable  Conditional likelihood  
(Fix Effects) 
 Equality for Deviation 
and Mean Coefficients 
  (17) (18) (19)  χ
2 (p-value) 
BHAR  0.096** 0.080* 0.027  2.32 
  (.0461) (0.039) (0.036)  (0.127) 
  [1.100] [1.083] [1.027]   
lnMV  0.052 0.028 0.394**  15.43*** 
  (0.119) (0.123) (0.187)  (0.000) 
  [1.053] [1.029] [1.483]   
VOL  0.180*** 0.163*** 0.105**  21.71*** 
  (0.059) (0.058) (0.086)  (0.000) 
  [1.197] [1.177] [1.111]   
LIQ    0.014  0.83 
    (0.038)  (0.364) 
    [1.014]   
PE    0.000  0.75 
    (0.001)  (0.387) 
    [1.000]   
LEV    -0.004  1.31 
    (0.001)  (0.253) 
    [0.996]   
EPS    0.056  0.43 
    (0.071)  (0.512) 
    [1.057]   
GROWTH    0.124  1.95 
    (0.210)  (0.162) 
    [1.132]   
DIV   -0.315** -0.477**  2.04 
   (0.123) (0.215)  (1.537) 
   [0.730] [0.621]   
IPO   1.695*** 1.603***  0.63 
   (0.282) (0.381)  (0.429) 
   [5.447] [4.966]   
Combined test    
      (10 df) 
     44.85***  
(0.000) 
i.Yeara  Yes Yes Yes   
IND. Dummy  No No No   
n  1,833 1,833 982   
Wald test       
LR test  246.37*** 283.11*** 152.16***   
Hausman test  209.86*** 140.95*** 143.16***   
Note: 
    a The YEAR coefficients, which  are all comparisons with Year 2004, are not reported in this table.  
    *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
  **Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
 
In contrast, there is no relationship between financial variables and the risk of being on 
the TOL apart from the 𝐷𝐼𝑉 variable. Exponentiating the coefficient of -0.477 and -0.316 
for 𝐷𝐼𝑉 in (18) and (19), the author gets unreasonable ratios of 0.73 and 0.62. This 
implies that if a listed company changes from distributing a dividend to not distributing a 
dividend, the odds of its being on the Turnover List are multiplied by 0.73 and 0.62. 
Hence, the findings support the conclusion of Baker and Wurgler (2006) that the salient 
“no dividends” mark the stock as speculative.  
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4.6.3 The frequency of appearing on the TOL and stock market performances  
In this section, the author studies the impact of stock market performances on the 
frequency of a firm appearing on the TOL in each fiscal year instead of binary dummy 
variable. In consideration of the fact that a dependent variable is a tally of the number of 
appearances on the TOL in each fiscal year, an additional approach, namely, a Poisson 
regression model, has been adopted in this study.  The researcher extended the count data 
method to cover multiple periods per individual firm along with fixed effects to control 
for all time-invariant predictor variables. Thus, the author repeated the sample of 429 
firms with yearly counts of TOL appearances in each of the years from 2004 to 2014. The 
Poisson distribution is perhaps the simplest probability distribution that is appropriate for 
such count data. Let TOLit be the Turnover List count for firm i in time t. Each of these 
variables is assumed to have a Poisson distribution with an expected value of λit. That is, 
the probability that TOLit = r is given by 
Pr(𝑇𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟) =
𝜆𝑖𝑡
𝑟 𝑒−𝜆𝑖𝑡
𝑟!
, 𝑟 = 0, 1, 2,3, …                                (4.11) 
The Poisson distribution is derived from a stochastic process model under the assumption 
that events cannot occur simultaneously and events are independent
70
 (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 1998). Next, the author let λit be a log-linear function of the predictor variables as 
in the following: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜆𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛽𝛸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖                                                (4.12) 
Where, Χit is the vector of explanatory variables and is the same as that used in the 
previous panel logit model (4.10). Zi denotes the time-invariant predictors, and αi denotes 
the unobserved fixed effects. As before, treating αi as a set of fixed constants is equivalent 
to treating them as random variables that have unrestricted correlations with Χit. In 
general, there are two approaches to estimating the equation (4.12), namely, conditional 
ML and unconditional ML. In the first approach, the likelihood function is conditioned on 
the sum (over time) and all the counts for each firm, which eliminates the fixed effects 
(αi). The resulting conditional likelihood (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) is proportional to  
                                                        
70 The independence assumption means that the incidence of an event neither increases nor decreases the probability of 
future events. 
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∏ ∏ (
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜇𝑡+𝛽𝛸𝑖𝑡)
∑ exp 𝑠 (𝜇𝑠+𝛽𝛸𝑖𝑠)
)
𝑇𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑖                                           (4.13) 
 The author reports the Poisson regression with FE results in Table 4.8 Model (20)
71
.  The 
results show that all corresponding explanatory variables have a highly significant effect 
on the TOL count despite market capitalization and liquidity. Examining the parameter 
estimates and their associated statistics, itcan be seen in Model (20) that the cumulative 
abnormal return has a significant influence on the Turnover List count, with a coefficient 
of 0.062. To interpret this, it should be noted how the dependent variable is logged (see 
Equation 12). This indicates that if a firm is to increase the abnormal return by 1%, the 
difference in the logs of TOL counts would be expected to increase by a 0.062 unit while 
holding the other variables in the model as constant. For the 𝐷𝐼𝑉and 𝐼𝑃𝑂, the Poisson 
regression coefficient comparing dividend (IPO) and non-dividend (non-IPO) firms are 
estimated, assuming that other variables are constant. The difference in the logs of TOL 
counts is expected to be 0.858 (0.900) of a unit lower (higher) for dividend (IPO) firms 
compared to non-dividend (non-IPO) firms, while holding the other variables constant in 
the model. This is in line with the expectation that an IPO is more frequently on the 
Turnover List than a non-IPO. 
4.6.4 Further Robustness Tests 
In addition to the FE and RE panel logistic models, for robustness results we also 
considered a new alternative test, the ‘Hybrid method’ proposed by Allison (2009), which 
may have somewhat better properties than the Hausman test. We combined the FE and 
RE methods into a single model
72
.  We could then easily test the assumption within the 
hybrid model by directly testing for equality across the pairs of coefficients. The results 
are show in the last column in Table 4.7. In this case, the crucial test is the joint test 
revealing that all ten deviation coefficients are equal to the corresponding mean 
coefficients, thus indicating a need to reject this assumption and supporting the results of 
                                                        
71 The author revisits dichotomous outcomes in the beginning of section 4.6.1. Therefore, counts of Turnover List in 
each fiscal year are undertaken in this study as dependent variables. Many authors treat count variables as continuous 
measures and use OLS regression for their analysis. This may be inappropriate for several reasons. Count variables are 
necessarily discrete and cannot be negative value. Also, their distributions are highly skewed. A superior approach is a 
Poisson regression to estimate count data models. However, the estimation problems that plague logistic models turn 
out to be less serious for count data models. 
72 I detail a construction of the hybrid model and a further analysis in Appendix 4A (Page 159).  
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the Hausman-test as well as suggesting that a fixed effects approach is superior to a 
random effects one.    
Table 4.8 Poisson regression estimates for Turnover List count data, eleven time periods and 
unconditional and conditional estimates of a fixed effects negative binomial model 
 
The dependent variable is a Turnover List count for firm i in each fiscal year t. The independent variables are BHAR, which is the 1-
year cumulative average abnormal return of company i from Jan to Dec in each fiscal year; lnMV is the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization calculated by the market share price times the number of shares outstanding; VOL is the yearly standardized trading 
volume; LIQ is the liquidity ratio (current assets/current liabilities); PE is the Price-Earnings ratio (market price per share/ earnings per 
share); LEV is the financial leverage ratio (debt/equity); EPS is earnings per share; GROWTH is sales growth (percentage change 
between year t and year t-1);  and DIV is a dummy variable, which is 1 if the firm distributes dividends and 0 otherwise; IPO is a 
dummy variable, which is 1 if the firm issues its IPO at year t and 0 otherwise.  
 
Variable       Poisson Regression Model  Negative Binomial Model 
  Fixed Effects (20)   Conditional Estimates of 
Fixed Effects (21) 
 Unconditional Estimates of 
Fixed Effects (22) 
  Coefficient Bootstrapped 
S.E. 
  Coefficient Conventional 
S.E. 
 Coefficient Conventional 
S.E. 
Constant      -3.783*** 0.896  -3.98*** 0.719 
CAR  0.062* 0.034   0.028** 0.018  0.113 0.047 
lnMV  -0.022 0.140   0.075 0.083  0.009 0.069 
VOL  0.082*** 0.084   0.188*** 0.052  0.286*** 0.043 
LIQ  -0.010 0.079   0.002** 0.032  -0.035 0.017 
PE  0.001 0.001   0.001 0.000  0.001 0.001 
LEV  -0.012 0.007   0.000 0.004  -0.001 0.001 
EPS  0.165 0.144   0.065** 0.056  0.114 0.05 
GROWTH  0.524*** 0.169   0.251** 0.128  0.253** 0.155 
DIV  -0.858*** 0.319   -0.481*** 0.181  -0.479*** 0.162 
IPO  0.900*** 0.263   1.138*** 0.209  1.083*** 0.305 
i.Yeara  Yes Yes   Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
IND. 
Dummy 
 No    Yes   
Yes  
n  1,003    1,003   1,257  
Wald Test  289.81***    191.63***     
α         4.406***  
Pseudo R2           0.077  
Note: 
   a The YEAR coefficients, which  are all comparisons with Year 2004, are not reported in this table.  
    *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
  **Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
Again, the FE Poisson regression models are quite weak regarding the effects of 
overdispersion because FE allows for unobserved heterogeneity across individuals by 
way of the αi parameters. The heterogeneity is assumed to be time invariant, and there is 
probably unobserved heterogeneity that is specific to particular points in time, as a result 
of unobserved overdispersion. In addition to the bootstrapping S.E. method, we can 
correct for overdispersion by using the FE negative binomial model as a robustness 
check. The appeal of this negative binomial model is that the estimated regression 
coefficients may be more efficient (less sampling variability) and the standard errors and 
test statistics may be more accurate than those produced by such empirical, after-the-fact 
corrections as the bootstrap. We assume that the TOL counts are drawn from a negative 
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binomial distribution
73
 for each company for each year. There are several ways to 
construct a negative binomial regression model. The model below, proposed by Cameron 
and Trivedi (1998), is usually called the NB2 model, in which the probability mass 
function for yit is given by 
Pr (𝑇𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟) =
Γ(θ+r)
𝛤(𝜃)𝛤(𝑟+1)
(
𝜆𝑖𝑡
𝜆𝑖𝑡+𝜃
)
𝑟
(
𝜃
𝜆𝑖𝑡+𝜃
)
𝜃
          (4.14) 
where λit is the expected value of TOLit, θ is the overdispersion parameter, and Γ(•) is the 
gamma function. As θ →∞, this distribution converges to the Poisson distribution. The 
same as with the Poisson model, the expected value of TOLit is described by a log-linear 
regression as in Equation (12). The results of conditional and unconditional ML by 
estimating the negative binomial regression model
74
, including the individual firm 
dummy variables, are reported in the last column of Table 4.9
75
. The author omitted 163 
firms that had no TOLs in any of the 11 years. It can be seen that the coefficients for the 
negative binomial models (25) and (26) are very similar to those for the FE Poisson 
model (24). Moreover, the S.E. and test statistics for the negative binomial model are 
close to those for the Poisson model with bootstrapped S.E. The estimated parameter 
labelled Alpha is a measure of overdispersion. It is basically an estimate of 1/θ, where θ is 
the parameter in Equation (4.14). The alpha (α) value is greater than 0, which indicates 
that there is a significant amount of overdispersion. As a result, the author should reject 
the Poisson model with conventional S.E. in favour of the negative binomial model. 
However, the results from the negative binomial model are the same as those from 
Poisson regression with bootstrapping S.E.  
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the relationship between IPO underpricing and aftermarket 
abnormal returns and the subsequent classification of such stocks as speculative 
investments. The researcher found that 34.2% of the IPO firms in the sample were 
speculative stocks within one year following their IPOs. The author also found that firms 
                                                        
73 The negative binomial distribution is a generalization of the Poisson distribution that allows for overdispersion by 
way of an additional parameter. 
74 Hausman et al. (1984) proposed a fixed effects negative binomial regression model and they also derived a 
conditional ML estimator for the model. However, Allison and Waterman (2002) argued that this is not a true fixed 
effects regression model and the method does not control for all stable predictors.  
75 Coefficients for the dummy variables for firms are not reported. 
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from the SET that experienced relatively larger underpricing for their IPOs and higher 
aftermarket abnormal returns are subsequently more likely to be on the Turnover List, 
unlike the MAI IPOs. This indicates that the initial returns around the date of the IPO 
play a significant role in predicting future speculative stocks. Furthermore, this study 
shows that the proportion of IPOs owned by foreigners is negatively related to the 
abnormal returns of IPOs around the TOL announcements. This study therefore concludes 
that IPO underpricing and the aftermarket returns are significant indicators of stocks 
being placed on the Turnover List.  In addition, this study used the panel dataset including 
IPO and non-IPO firms and found here that the abnormal return and the standardized 
trading volume increased the risk of appearing on the Turnover List. The abnormal return, 
the trading volume, and the firm’s growth also have significant effects on the Turnover 
List count. The author also found that IPO and non-dividend companies have a higher 
risk of being on the Turnover List.   
The findings are particularly useful for SET and SEC, enabling the Thai authorities to 
monitor IPOs that have a high probability of becoming speculative stocks in the future 
and so be able to warn investors about the risks associated with trading in them. 
Regulators can also use the probability of Turnover List risk as one of the benchmarks to 
measure the success of the rules they impose on companies that plan on going public. In 
addition, understanding the determinants of speculative stocks is crucial for many 
stakeholders especially money-lenders (e.g., banks and building societies) and investors 
(individuals and portfolio managers), who are increasingly facing challenges in predicting 
and managing investment risks.  
Appendix 4A 
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Appendix 4A 
A Hybrid Method 
In Section4.6.3, I combined the fixed effects (FE) and the random effects (RE) approaches into a single 
model. This was accomplished by de-composing each time-varying predictor into a within-company 
component and a between-company component and then fitting a RE model with both components. The 
between-company component is the company-specific mean of each variable. The within-company 
component is the deviation from that company-specific mean. The author can now include time-constant 
variables in the model, compare FE and RE, and produce a wider class of models. 
The results from using a RE model for the Turnover List are shown in Table 4A. All the variable names 
beginning with M (D) refer to company-specific means (deviations from those means). The coefficients for 
the deviation variables are functionally equivalent to FE coefficients because they are estimated using only 
with-firm variation and then controlling for all stable predictors. The coefficients for the mean variables are 
not very interesting in themselves, but what is striking is how much larger (in magnitude) they are than the 
corresponding deviation coefficients.    
 
Table 4A Hybrid model for the Turnover List panel data 
Variable Coefficient Std. z P-value 
Constant -7.2689*** 0.9102 -7.9900 0.0000 
DCAR 0.0369 0.0400 0.9200 0.3570 
DlnSIZE 0.3453** 0.1700 2.0300 0.0420 
DLIQ 0.0145 0.0314 0.4600 0.6440 
DlnVOL 0.2069** 0.0858 2.4100 0.0160 
DPE 0.0007 0.0008 0.8300 0.4060 
DLEV 0.0012 0.0018 0.6300 0.5280 
DEPS 0.0298 0.0520 0.5700 0.5660 
DGROWTH 0.0992 0.1454 0.6800 0.4950 
DDIV -0.4418*** 0.1605 -2.7500 0.0060 
DIPO 1.7046*** 0.3461 4.9300 0.0000 
MCAR 0.3386 0.2578 1.3100 0.1890 
MlnSIZE -0.4188*** 0.0849 -4.9300 0.0000 
MlnVOL 0.7124*** 0.0725 9.8200 0.0000 
MLIQ -0.1011** 0.0538 -1.8800 0.0600 
MPE 0.0022 0.0021 1.0400 0.2980 
MLEV -0.0077* 0.0042 -1.8400 0.0650 
MEPS 0.0664 0.0695 0.9600 0.3400 
MGROWTH -0.0333 0.1671 -0.2000 0.8420 
MDIV -0.1455 0.1821 -0.8000 0.4240 
MDIPO 2.8983** 1.2844 2.2600 0.0240 
i.YEAR YES    
n 2,395    
Wald test 225.28***    
LR test 53.44***    
 Note:  
    *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
  **Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
5.1 Introduction to and Outline of Chapter 
This chapter presents the empirical findings of the thesis. It discusses the main limitations 
of the outcomes. This is then concluded with a discussion of potential further research 
areas that were unexplored in this thesis and of the implications of the findings 
5.2 Summary of the Main Findings         
This thesis has presented three empirical studies concerning the long-run performance of 
Thai IPOs, the intended uses-of-IPO-proceeds disclosure influencing IPO performance in 
the short- and long-run and IPOs’ signalling for the detection of speculative stocks. The 
main results of each are summarized in this section.                 
5.2.1 Long-Run Performance of Thai IPO Results 
In the first empirical chapter (Chapter 2), the author discussed the findings to answer the 
research questions: 
‘How do Thai IPO companies perform relative to several benchmarks in the long-
run?’ 
‘Do both event-time and calendar-time approaches produce the same results?’ 
The author applied a very broad variety of quantitative methods, ranging from 
classical event study measures (such as CARs, BHARs or WRs) to multi-factor models, 
which actually extend far beyond the commonly used Fama-French and Carhart models 
because the author also included, in particular, the liquidity factor. The Carhart and 
LCAPM model factors are not publicly available for Thailand, so the author created them 
for the purpose of this study, as well as for the analysis of the size-decile portfolio 
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abnormal return (SD). In addition, the author provided quantitative analysis by 
investigating the cases of individual IPO companies which, for example, were 
characterised by unusually high returns, through explaining the circumstances related to 
their business activity etc. (very few papers in this area even attempt to do that and 
engage in such detailed analysis of this kind) in order to provide better explanation and 
understanding of the results. The author additionally investigated performance relative 
not only to the entire market but also to the individual industry benchmarks. 
Overall, this study provides evidence that Thai IPO underperformed in the long-run after 
going public when measured by equally-weighted event-time CARs and BHARs and by 
calendar-time returns. These findings are mostly consistent with previous studies. In 
addition, the results show that the stock prices of large firms behaved differently from 
those of small and medium-sized companies. Large IPOs were characterized by poor 
long-run returns, whereas the IPOs of smaller companies performed better. However, the 
findings are different when market value-weighted event time is used. The value-
weighted returns of IPO stocks relative to the market over a three-year holding period 
show an over-performance. Furthermore, when the sample was segmented into separate 
industry sectors, the results suggest that investors who used a value-weighted portfolio of 
IPOs to measure the long-term performance obtained positive abnormal returns in the 
long-run from the IPOs belonging to the Resource and the Property & Construction 
sectors. Moreover, the IPOs from the Industrial and Technology sectors were 
characterised by poor performance  
The performance of Thai IPOs over a long horizon period varies according to the 
methodology and the portfolio weighting. The results from the first empirical work 
suggest that investors who measured their investment in the SET market IPO companies 
using the event-time approach with value-weighted CAR and BHAR would conclude that 
they could gain positive returns in the long-run. However, if they considered the equally-
weighted CAR and BHAR, the event-time returns related to CAPM, FF and SD models 
and the calendar-time approach, they would conclude that they cannot earn any abnormal 
returns irrespective of the alternative benchmarks and weighting methods used. In the 
same vein, after controlling for the size-effect, the findings show that Thai IPOs perform 
worse than the benchmarks in the long-run either using event-time approach or calendar-
time approach.  
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5.2.2 The Intended Use-of-IPO-Proceeds Results 
As the title of Chapter 3 indicates, the second empirical chapter explores the role of use-
of-proceeds information disclosure in understanding IPO underpricing and the long-term 
performance of IPO companies. Empirical evidence is gathered as the result of a 
construction of a use-of-proceeds disclosure index and also the author also developed his 
own classification of use-of-proceeds disclosures, with the aim of determining disclosure 
relating to the purpose of using IPO proceeds. In the same vein, the author classified the 
uses of IPO proceeds to be invested in new projects and used to make debt repayments. In 
the second empirical chapter, the author posed the following two research questions: 
‘Do the levels of use-of-proceeds information disclosures affect IPO underpricing 
and long-run performance?’ 
‘Which important factors can determine the performance of IPOs?’ 
Overall, the results suggest that increasing levels of use-of-proceeds disclosures can 
reduce ex-ante uncertainty and IPO under-pricing, and the disclosure index has a positive 
effect on the long-run performance of IPOs. In addition, the author grouped the use-of-
proceeds into 2 categories: ‘Investment’ and ‘Debt Repayment’ IPOs based on the level 
of IPO proceeds disclosure and the proceeds purposes. It was found that the size of the 
issue, the return on equity and the bull-market conditions are significant determinants of 
under-pricing. However, there is in fact no statistically significant relationship with other 
explanatory factors such as age, time-lag, return on assets, changes in earnings per 
shareand the proportion of foreigners and institutions subscribing to IPOs and the level of 
under-pricing.  
The results obtained from the second empirical study also show that the ex-ante 
uncertainty and signalling hypotheses partially explain the IPO under-pricing 
phenomenon in the Thai IPO market. In addition, several hypotheses were posed and 
tested concerning IPO under-pricing and the long-run performance of IPOs and these then 
supported the impresario hypothesis that posits a positive relation between under-pricing 
and three-year aftermarket abnormal returns. The analysis of the effect of the use of IPO 
proceeds based on the different types of disclosure on three-year aftermarket abnormal 
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returns indicates that IPO companies that declared their use-of-proceeds to be for 
investment performed better in the long-run than ‘Debt Repayment’ IPOs.  Interestingly, 
government or state ownership in the IPO filing period is positively associated with the 
long-run performance of IPOs. The important factors which have an effect on the 
performance of IPOs in the long-run are the use-of-proceeds disclosure, the IPO 
underpricing and the proportion of IPOs owned by the government.  
The second empirical chapter focussed on Thai firms, with their unique characteristics, 
government ownership and foreign and institutional investor settings. The author also 
added to the extant knowledge in this area of disclosure, IPO pricing and the performance 
of IPOs in the long-run by investigating the behaviour of IPOs around a key political 
event during the sample period in the study (the military coup in Thailand). 
5.2.3 IPO Signalling and Turnover List Results  
The third empirical chapter (Chapter 4) investigated the relationship between IPO 
underpricing and abnormal aftermarket returns and the subsequent classification of such 
stocks as speculative investments. The author tried to answer the following research 
questions: 
‘Do the nature and extent of the initial returns of IPOs and after-market returns 
explain the probability of stocks appearing on the Turnover List, and if so, in what 
way?’ 
‘Are IPOs stocks more speculated than non-IPO stocks?’  
This study showed that 34.2% of the IPO firms in the sample were speculative stocks 
within one year following their IPOs. It was also found that firms from the SET that 
experienced relatively larger underpricing for their IPOs and higher aftermarket abnormal 
returns are subsequently more likely to be on the Turnover List. Unlike with the MAI 
IPOs, this indicates that the initial returns around the date of the IPO play a significant 
role in predicting future speculative stocks.  
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Furthermore, the author found that the proportion of IPOs owned by foreigners is 
negatively related to abnormal returns of IPOs around the time of the TOL 
announcements. It was therefore concluded that IPO underpricing and the aftermarket 
return are significant indicators of stocks being placed on the Turnover List.  In addition, 
a panel dataset including IPO and non-IPO firms was used and it was found here that the 
abnormal return and the standardized trading volume increased the risk of appearing on 
the Turnover List. The abnormal return, the trading volume, and the firm’s growth also 
have significant effects on the Turnover List count. Moreover, the author confirmed that 
IPO companies and non-dividend companies have a higher risk of stock speculation and 
being on the Turnover List.   
Overall, the results support the existing debate on long-run return anomalies, suggesting 
that the long-run performance of IPOs depends on the methods used to measure returns, 
and especially on the weighted scheme used. In addition, the information disclosure in the 
prospectus file plays a significant role in pricing an IPO and in its long-term performance. 
The results indicate that firms that stated their use-of-IPO-proceeds to be paying off their 
loans show a poor performance in the long-run. Furthermore, the empirical findings 
suggest that IPO under-pricing and aftermarket abnormal return are interesting indicators 
for the detection of speculative (Turnover List) stocks, supporting the application of the 
IPO signalling model and the market feedback hypothesis and the contention that a firm’s 
characteristics, such as new issuers and non-dividend distribution, increase the risk of 
their IPOs becoming speculative stocks.  
5.2 Implications of the study           
This research has several important implications for both investors and regulators. First, 
from an investor’s viewpoint, the existence of price patterns may present opportunities for 
the implementation of active trading strategies to generate superior returns. Given the 
conflicting results of poor post-IPO stock market performance, investors may do better 
holding Thai IPOs for a short period with the likelihood of gaining a higher return. In 
addition, the results can help investors to identify which characteristics are associated 
with more over-performance or underperformance, which is informative for them when 
formulating their investment strategies. For security analysts, the conflicting results afford 
more opportunities for them to extend their consultation services and expertise to 
investors by recommending stocks that might over-perform in the long-run. Second, the 
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finding of non-zero aftermarket performance calls into question the informational 
efficiency of the IPO market. It suggests that stock markets in general and the IPO market 
in particular are subject to fads that affect market prices. Finally, the cost of external 
equity capital for firms going public depends not only upon the transaction costs incurred 
in the IPO process but also upon the returns that investors receive in the aftermarket. To 
the degree that low returns are gained in the aftermarket, the cost of external equity 
capital is lower for these listed firms.  Chapter 2 should thus be of interest to scholars 
working in the areas of corporate and behavioural finance, market based accounting as 
well market anomalies and efficiency. The results can alert them to the stock performance 
measures of using various alternative techniques and can provide them with useful 
guidance to evaluate not only the long-run performance of IPOs but also the long-run 
impact of a corporate or regulatory event. This study can also assist academics and/or 
practitioners to evaluate the robustness of the findings from prior studies.  Furthermore, 
the findings from the second empirical study suggest that IPO companies with high levels 
of use-of-proceeds disclosure for investment purposes reduce ex-ante uncertainty in that 
these disclosures help investors to better estimate the dispersion of the secondary market. 
These results are likely to be of interest to investors in terms of short-term and long-term 
investment planning for Thai IPOs. Chapter 4 also provides novel evidence that IPO 
prospectus information on the intended use of the proceeds predicts IPO post-offering 
performance. Thus, the prospectus information can help investors avoid firms issuing 
equity to pay off their loans and thus also having disappointing post-offering returns. The 
IPO firms may choose a number of signalling mechanisms, in addition to their 
characteristics. More specifically, information disclosure may be used as another 
signalling factor but, just as with governance, it creates a trade-off between the benefit of 
reducing information asymmetry and the costs associated with revealing proprietary 
information and possible litigation. Finally, the findings from the third or last empirical 
work in this thesis are particularly useful for SET and SEC, enabling the Thai authorities 
to monitor IPOs that have a high probability of becoming speculative stocks in the future 
and so to be able to warn investors about the risks associated with trading in them. 
Regulators can also use the probability of Turnover List risk as one of the benchmarks to 
measure the success of the rules they impose on companies that plan on going public. 
Policy makers and regulators can improve laws for the future as well as avoid the 
mistakes of the past. Specifically, the laws must aim to protect the minority shareholders 
and in certifying investment bankers, underwriters and managers of IPO firms by making 
them more accountable. Professionals (such as corporate financiers, accountants and 
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lawyers), especially those dealing with IPOs, will be able to draw on the findings of the 
study to improve their knowledge and professional practices when dealing with issuers. 
Prospective issuers can become more informed about matters related to avoidance in 
boosting the offering price and IPO valuations. In addition, understanding the 
determinants of speculative stocks is crucial for many stakeholders especially money 
lenders (i.e. banks and building societies) and investors (individuals and portfolio 
managers), who are increasingly facing challenges in predicting and managing investment 
risks.     
5.3 Limitations of this study  
The results and implications of this study should be considered within the context of the 
following limitations. For the first empirical study, the post-IPO period scrutinised in this 
study spanned three years and this may be an inadequate length of time for gains or losses 
to be revealed by the IPO companies. For the intended use-of-IPO-proceeds variables, it 
is difficult to correctly classify them in each category. According to the prospectus file in 
Thailand, some firms intend to use the proceeds for several issues at the same time such 
as general operation purposes, working capital, expanding business and others. Due to the 
limitation of our finite sample size, we classify the intended use-of-proceeds into two 
types, merely based on recapitalization and information disclosure. For example, if a firm 
does not mention its use-of-proceeds to be for repaying debt, it is put into the ‘Investment 
IPOs’ group. Finally, using probability model, this study examines the association 
between IPO underpricing, aftermarket return and firm characteristics and the likelihood 
of being speculative stocks. The Turnover List (TOL) has been defined as speculative 
stocks in the Thai stock market since 2004. In the early period of the TOL being effective, 
the SEC announced TOL stocks from the SET market only. When considering both SET 
and MAI markets simultaneously, this may lead to over-weight for the volume of TOL in 
the SET. In addition, on 20
th
 July 2015 the SEC (Thailand) cancelled the TOL regulation 
and introduced a new implement, namely, the ‘Volume Alert’ instead of TOL. There are 
now some regulatory changes involved with speculative stock classification in Thailand.  
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5.4 Suggestions for Future Research 
The examination of the performance of IPOs, IPO under-pricing and the intended use-of-
IPO-proceeds, together with IPOs’ signalling for speculative stock detection, are fruitful 
areas for research, not only for IPO event studies but also for financial accounting and 
corporate finance issues such as firms’ information disclosure and speculative stock 
announcements.  
A further extension of the long-run performance of IPOs might be to consider a longer 
period after going public. In addition it is suggested for future studies that once the IPO 
sample size is suitably large, various types of use-of-proceeds should be taken into 
consideration in order to increase the different types of use-of-proceeds disclosures. The 
findings of the long-run performance of IPOs suggest that researchers interested in event 
studies should consider analyzing each particular company that produces large abnormal 
return in the sample period because such companies may affect the portfolio returns, be 
they from big-size stock or the small-size stock. For the IPO signaling model, seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs) should be included in future studies. However, there are no IPO 
studies examining these issues for SEO companies in Thailand due to the small number 
issuing SEOs after the IPO period. Finally, this study examined the association between 
companies or IPO characteristics and the probability of their being speculative stocks. 
Recently, the SET and SEC (Thailand) have introduced ‘Volume Alert’ to warn investors 
which stocks have speculative features. The determinants of Volume Alert participation 
using the IPO signaling model approach are left for future research.      
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